Main Text
החששות שהמטיל תכלת נמצא מבטל מצות ציצית לגמרי
הרב יהודה דניאל גליס
Footnotes
English Translation
The Concern That One Who Wears Tekhelet May Be Completely Mevatel the Mitzvah of Tzitzis
Rabbi Yehuda Daniel Gelis
Author of Yedos HaMishnah on Hilchos Tzitzis
One of the main arguments made by those who want to be zocheh to the mitzvah of Tekhelet is that even if we assume that what has been discovered today is not really Tekhelet and therefore accomplishes nothing, at least it cannot hurt. Therefore, they argue, one is obligated — or at the very least it is proper — to use it.
We will explain here that it appears the exact opposite may be true: if it works, it may hurt. Meaning, on the possibility that what has been found really is Tekhelet and is halachically effective, someone who uses it may be entering into a safek of completely losing the mitzvah of tzitzis.
There are three opinions among the Rishonim regarding how many of the strings are supposed to be Tekhelet. According to Rashi and Tosafos at the beginning of Perek HaTekhelet, four of the eight hanging strings must be Tekhelet. According to the Rambam, only one of the eight is Tekhelet. According to the Raavad, two strings are Tekhelet and six are white.
We will explain that according to each opinion, if one gets the number of Tekhelet strings wrong, besides certainly losing the mitzvah of whichever type he has provided in insufficient quantity, there is also at least a safek din whether he thereby loses the mitzvah of the other type as well — with the result that he may have lost the mitzvah of tzitzis entirely.
Based on this, we will discuss how one should conduct himself lemaaseh as long as there is no clear halachic ruling between these opinions.
This discussion is relevant both today, for those who are choshesh that what has been discovered may in fact be Tekhelet, and in the future, for everyone, when — bimheirah beyameinu — the true Tekhelet becomes definitively known.
We will discuss:
- According to Tosafos, what is the din if one uses fewer than two doubled strings of Tekhelet?
- According to the Rambam, what is the din if one uses more than one Tekhelet string?
- According to the Raavad, what is the din if one uses more or less than one doubled Tekhelet string?
- Is there a halachic hachra’ah regarding how many strings should be Tekhelet?
- Based on the above, how should one act in order to satisfy all the opinions?
A. According to Tosafos, What Happens If One Uses Fewer Than Two Doubled Tekhelet Strings?
It is obvious that if one makes only half of one string Tekhelet, as per the Rambam, or even one full string, as per the Raavad, he does not fulfill the mitzvah of Tekhelet according to Tosafos. According to Tosafos he has used less than the required shiur of Tekhelet.
The question, however, is whether he at least fulfills the mitzvah of lavan.
We should first note that although the mitzvah of lavan is fulfilled with two white strings and the mitzvah of Tekhelet with two Tekhelet strings, Rashi in Menachos (38b) explicitly says that if one has tzitzis consisting only of white, or only of Tekhelet, he still needs four strings.[1]
Tosafos there asks where we know this from and writes:
Perhaps it is because we darshen, “gedil means two, gedilim means four,” whether there is one type or two types.
The explanation appears to be[2] that the gezeiras hakasuv of gedilim establishes a din in the actual cheftza of tzitzis: with fewer than four strings it is not called “tzitzis.”
Accordingly, where the tzitzis contains only one Tekhelet string, it would seem at first that even the mitzvah of lavan is not fulfilled.
Since that Tekhelet string lacks the necessary shiur to qualify for the mitzvah of Tekhelet, it cannot receive the halachic status of “tzitzis.” The result is therefore effectively tzitzis containing only three strings.
Even a string that is needed merely because of the requirement of gedilim, since it is ultimately part of the tzitzis, would seemingly need to have the status of “tzitzis.”
One might ask: if so, how can tzitzis consisting of four white strings be kosher? The mitzvah of lavan itself requires only two white strings, so perhaps the other two cannot have the status of tzitzis and are merely ordinary strings.
That is not difficult. Tosafos explains that the requirement of two strings each for lavan and Tekhelet is only a minimum. One may add more strings of either type, at least up to four strings of that type.
Therefore, when one adds to the amount of lavan and makes all four strings white, the mitzvah of lavan is fulfilled through all of them, and the status of “tzitzis” properly applies to all four.
There might, however, be an argument that one nevertheless fulfills the mitzvah of lavan.
Regarding the gezeirah not to place Tekhelet on a linen garment, the Gemara in Menachos (40a) explains that Chazal were concerned that a person might substitute kela ilan, whose color resembles Tekhelet.
The Gemara asks:
“Let it at least be considered lavan.”
Meaning: even if the strings are dyed with kela ilan and are therefore invalid for Tekhelet, why should that matter? They should at least be valid for lavan, giving us the equivalent of four white strings.
Perhaps the same could be said where someone uses only one Tekhelet string. Although he does not fulfill Tekhelet because that requires two strings, perhaps we should say regarding that one string, “Let it at least be lavan,” leaving us with four strings that count toward lavan.
However, it appears clear that there is a difference between actual Tekhelet and kela ilan.
The Mishnah at the beginning of Perek HaTekhelet says:
Tekhelet does not prevent lavan, and lavan does not prevent Tekhelet.
Rashi explains:
Even though the mitzvah is to place two Tekhelet strings and two white strings in the tzitzis, nevertheless one does not prevent the other. If he made all four Tekhelet or all four white, he has fulfilled the mitzvah.
When Rashi says “he has fulfilled,” he necessarily means that if all four are Tekhelet he has fulfilled only the mitzvah of Tekhelet — just as when all four are white he fulfills only lavan.
After all, “lavan does not prevent Tekhelet” means that although, in the absence of lavan, the mitzvah of lavan is not fulfilled, the absence of lavan does not prevent the mitzvah of Tekhelet.
Why, then, do we not say that he has also fulfilled lavan? Regarding the two extra Tekhelet strings that are unnecessary for the mitzvah of Tekhelet, why not say, “Let them at least be lavan”?
Similarly, according to Rebbe, who holds that lavan and Tekhelet are me’akev one another, the tzitzis is invalid. Why not say that the strings contain both Tekhelet and lavan?
It is therefore clear that regarding actual Tekhelet we do not say, “Let it at least be lavan.”
The reason appears to be that a string dyed with kela ilan is merely a colored string. The color does not remove its eligibility for the mitzvah of lavan.
A string dyed with genuine Tekhelet, however, has become fit for the mitzvah of Tekhelet, and we therefore understand that it is no longer fit for lavan. The fact that the Torah specifically instructed us to dye part of the tzitzis Tekhelet shows that the other portion is supposed not to be Tekhelet.
I subsequently saw that the Keren Orah already writes along these lines.[3]
I saw that HaGaon Rav Zalman Nechemiah Goldberg shlita already addressed this question. His remarks were printed in the kuntres Vehayah Lachem LeTzitzis in 5767.
He too initially wrote that apparently one does not fulfill lavan when using only one Tekhelet string, but afterward brought a proof that one does indeed fulfill it.
The Gemara later brings a beraisa that when making tzitzis one should put the lavan before the Tekhelet.[4] If one put the Tekhelet first, the beraisa says:
“He fulfilled, but was lacking a mitzvah.”
The Gemara considers whether this could mean that he failed to fulfill lavan but did fulfill Tekhelet. The Gemara rejects this according to Rebbe, since according to Rebbe lavan and Tekhelet are mutually me’akev. Thus, if he failed in lavan, he automatically failed in Tekhelet as well.
Tosafos infers that according to the Chachamim, who hold that lavan does not prevent Tekhelet, the Gemara would have accepted the possibility that he fulfilled Tekhelet despite failing to fulfill lavan.
Based on this, Tosafos challenges Rashi’s principle that even Tekhelet alone requires four strings:
We see that although he failed to fulfill the mitzvah of lavan, he fulfilled Tekhelet with two strings.
Tosafos answers:
Nevertheless, the lavan helps validate the Tekhelet, because it allows us to call it four gedilim.
Rav Zalman Nechemiah Goldberg explains their answer as follows:
Even though when there is no lavan at all one needs four Tekhelet strings, the requirement for four strings is only in order to satisfy gedilim. That requirement can be fulfilled by the two white strings even though those white strings themselves are invalid for the mitzvah of lavan.
Based on this he adds:
Likewise, if one has three white strings and one Tekhelet string, he has two white strings, which is the number needed for the mitzvah of lavan. The other two strings are required only for gedilim, and for that purpose they can consist of one white string and one Tekhelet string.
It appears, however, that lehalachah there are several reasons to question this proof.
1.
Although Tosafos initially writes simply that the Gemara implies that according to the Chachamim, where lavan and Tekhelet do not prevent one another, one could fulfill Tekhelet despite failing to fulfill lavan, their comments on the actual sugya (38b, s.v. LeRebbe) indicate that this inference is not at all certain. Rather, it depends on two answers offered by Tosafos there.
Tosafos once again notes that the Gemara says specifically:
“According to Rebbe, they are me’akev one another.”
This implies that only according to Rebbe can we not understand the beraisa to mean, “He failed in lavan but fulfilled Tekhelet.”
But there Tosafos asks a different question: if so, according to the final halachah, which follows the Chachamim, Rav Yehudah’s reinterpretation of the beraisa would no longer be necessary.
In their second answer Tosafos writes:
Alternatively, according to the Chachamim the question is even stronger: why did he fail in a mitzvah at all? They are not me’akev one another.
The meaning is that according to the Chachamim there is an independent reason why the beraisa cannot be understood that way. Since lavan and Tekhelet do not prevent one another, putting Tekhelet first should not invalidate the lavan at all.
Thus even the first half of the proposed explanation — “he failed in lavan” — cannot be correct according to the Chachamim.
According to this approach, when the Gemara invokes Rebbe’s view that the two are mutually me’akev, it is not because according to the Chachamim one really could have fulfilled Tekhelet while failing lavan. Rather, Rebbe is mentioned because only according to him is the specific problem that if lavan fails, Tekhelet must fail as well. According to the Chachamim, the entire proposed reading is impossible for another reason.
According to this approach there is no implication from the Gemara that the Chachamim would allow Tekhelet to be fulfilled where lavan failed.
On the contrary, Tosafos’ view would appear to be that even according to the Chachamim, Tekhelet would not be fulfilled in such a case, because there would effectively be only two valid tzitzis strings.
That was Tosafos’ original assumption when they asked that the validity according to the Chachamim appears to prove that tzitzis consisting entirely of one type should not require four strings.
2.
Rashi there also appears to disagree with Tosafos. The fact that Rashi disagrees was already noted in Taharas HaKodesh by Rav Yitzchak Ashkenazi of Lvov. See note [5] regarding one point that should nevertheless be raised concerning his interpretation.
Rashi explains:
“If you say he lacked a mitzvah” — meaning lavan, and it is as though he did not place it at all — why did he fulfill? According to Rebbe they prevent one another, and we are establishing the Mishnah according to Rebbe.
The final words, “and we are establishing the Mishnah according to Rebbe,” appear unnecessary. The Gemara itself explicitly says that Rav Yehudah is attempting to establish the Mishnah even according to Rebbe. That is the entire point of the sugya.
It appears that Rashi too understood from the wording of the Gemara that the difficulty was specifically according to Rebbe. He was therefore bothered by Tosafos’ question: the problem should exist even according to the Chachamim, because there are only two valid strings.
Rashi therefore adds that the Mishnah is being established according to Rebbe. Meaning: although according to the Chachamim the tzitzis would also be invalid because gedilim is lacking, since the discussion is specifically attempting to establish the Mishnah according to Rebbe, the Gemara uses Rebbe’s own reason — that the two mitzvos prevent one another.[6]
There seems to be a proof to this understanding from Tosafos themselves.
Tosafos writes:
“According to Rebbe they prevent one another.” Rashi explains, “and we need to establish it according to Rebbe.” This is difficult, because it implies that according to the Chachamim it works…
Why did Tosafos need to quote Rashi before asking their question? The Gemara itself seems to imply that according to the Chachamim it works.
On the contrary, Rashi’s explanation appears to provide the very answer to that inference, as we have explained.
It therefore appears that Tosafos quoted Rashi specifically in order to challenge him. They understood his intent as we have explained, but they argued that Rashi’s explanation only accounts for why the Gemara uses Rebbe’s reason — that the two are mutually me’akev — rather than saying simply that gedilim is lacking.
It still does not explain why the Gemara had to introduce the words “according to Rebbe.” It is from those words that Tosafos infers that according to the Chachamim the case really would be acceptable.
See note [7], where several nuances in Tosafos’ wording support this explanation.
3.
We should also mention the words of the Shitah Mekubetzes — although they apparently are his own words rather than a quotation from one of the Rishonim.
He too asks like Tosafos:
It implies that according to the Chachamim it works. According to Rashi’s explanation of the Mishnah, that when one has no Tekhelet he must make four white strings and may not reduce the number of strings, the same question exists according to the Chachamim. Since the lavan is considered as though it is absent, the Tekhelet strings are worthless.
It appears that he did not accept Tosafos’ answer. According to him, strings that are invalid for their mitzvah cannot serve even for the requirement of gedilim.
One might argue that according to his reasoning tzitzis consisting of one type should need only two strings. Since we pasken that four are required, perhaps his view has no practical relevance.
That does not appear correct.
Since he derives his objection merely from the implication of the Gemara’s wording — “it implies that according to the Chachamim it works” — his intent may simply be to challenge Rashi based upon that implication. If we accept Rashi’s halachah, however, we would have to reject the inference from the Gemara.
Furthermore, according to our explanation of Rashi and Tosafos, the actual dispute is whether one should infer from the Gemara the chiddush that for the requirement of gedilim, even strings that cannot fulfill their own mitzvah can nevertheless count.
The Shitah Mekubetzes appears to side with Rashi that we should not make such an inference.
4.
Even according to the side in Tosafos that where Tekhelet was placed first the white strings can count for gedilim despite being invalid for the mitzvah of lavan, it does not necessarily follow that a single Tekhelet string can likewise count for gedilim.
In the case where Tekhelet was placed first, the white strings are inherently fully fit for the mitzvah of lavan. The requirement that lavan come first is not an inherent requirement in the mitzvah of lavan itself, as is clear from the fact that when one makes four white strings without Tekhelet he properly fulfills lavan.
The reason the white strings nevertheless become invalid when Tekhelet is also used — as implied by the expression “he failed in the mitzvah of lavan” — must be that putting Tekhelet first creates a pesul in the lavan.[8]
We can ask what type of pesul this is.
It is possible that putting Tekhelet first does not create an intrinsic deficiency in the white strings themselves. It merely creates a halachic reason why the mitzvah cannot be fulfilled through them.
The strings themselves are fully fit for the mitzvah and can therefore still be called “tzitzis,” but because of the deficiency involved in putting Tekhelet first, the Torah says one does not fulfill the mitzvah through these tzitzis.
This resembles something invalid because of mitzvah haba’ah ba’aveirah: the object itself does not become inherently invalid; rather, one is prevented from fulfilling the mitzvah with it.
If this is correct — and this appears logical, at least according to Tosafos’ answer — Tosafos never abandoned their original assumption that strings needed merely for gedilim must themselves have the status of tzitzis.
Their chiddush would only be that it is unnecessary for the status of “tzitzis” possessed by the white strings to actually enable the mitzvah to be fulfilled at that moment.[9]
Accordingly, one single Tekhelet string would remain invalid for gedilim even according to Tosafos’ conclusion. Since a lone Tekhelet string lacks the required shiur, it is inherently unfit for the mitzvah and cannot receive the status of “tzitzis” at all.
Conclusion of Section A
Combining all of these reasons — if our analysis is correct — it appears that lehalachah, according to the opinion requiring two white strings and two Tekhelet strings, if one uses fewer than two Tekhelet strings, he does not fulfill even the mitzvah of lavan.
I would add that I have now seen quoted in an article by HaRav Rav Dov Schiff shlita, in Vehayah Lachem LeTzitzis 5772, that the Semag explicitly holds that strings which are unfit for their own mitzvah cannot count even toward the requirement of gedilim.
Although the author of that article intends to permit our case where the number of Tekhelet strings is deficient, based on his assumption that Rashi disagrees with the Semag’s principle, it seems that there is no proof at all that Rashi disagrees, as explained at length in note [10].
B. According to the Rambam, What Happens If One Uses More Than One Tekhelet String?
We should begin by noting that although the Rambam writes:
“There is no Torah-prescribed number for the strings of the anaf,”
it is nevertheless clear that at least mid’Rabbanan there is a required number, and that this number is me’akev. The Rambam rules:
“If even one string was severed at its root, it is invalid.”
In truth, according to most mefarshim, the Rambam agrees that min haTorah four doubled strings are required. He too accepts the derashah of “gedil means two, gedilim means four,” and understands it as a real derashah rather than merely an asmachta. See note [11].
[There is an apparent break in the supplied source text at this point.]
For these two white strings are being placed instead of Tekhelet, and they may be dyed any color one wishes.
His words clearly indicate that there is a special principle regarding min kanaf which does not apply to the two additional white strings.
To understand his intent, we should first note that his words imply that there are two categories of white strings: white strings to which the requirement of min kanaf applies, and white strings to which it does not apply.
This principle is certainly correct. We find that with a completely Tekhelet-colored tallis, the lavan does not need to be min kanaf.
The beraisa in Menachos (41b) says:
With a tallis that is entirely Tekhelet, any other color can exempt it.
Rashi explains:
Since min kanaf cannot be fulfilled with it, there is no need to seek specifically white; it is enough that there be two different types.
Based on this, the Aruch HaShulchan? [the abbreviation in the source is אהה”ח] develops a chiddush: since the two additional white strings are not needed in order to fulfill the mitzvah of lavan, but rather come “in place of Tekhelet” — corresponding to the possibility discussed above in note [2] — it makes sense that the requirement of min kanaf was never stated regarding those strings.
Accordingly, even the two strings dyed with kela ilan can receive the status of tzitzis, because regarding the rule that white strings may serve “in place of Tekhelet,” there is no requirement that they be min kanaf.
3.
There is also significant room to argue that when tzitzis are made from wool or linen, it is not universally agreed that the lavan must be the same color as the garment.
According to Rav Nachman, who holds that the Torah obligates only garments of wool and linen, if one holds that “tzitzis hakanaf” teaches that the white strings must match the color of the garment, this requirement necessarily applies to wool and linen tzitzis — because according to him there are no other Torah-level tzitzis.
According to Rava, however, all types of garments are obligated min haTorah. Menachos (39b) explains that there are two categories of tzitzis:
Rava raised a contradiction. It says “hakanaf,” implying the same type as the corner, but it also says wool and linen. How can both be true? Wool and linen exempt both their own type and other types. Other materials exempt garments of their own type but not other types.
The simple understanding would appear to be that tzitzis made from other materials, which are valid because of min kanaf, must fully match the garment — both the material and the color.
But wool and linen tzitzis are learned from a separate pasuk and need not match the material of the garment at all; they work for every type of garment. Why should we assume that they nevertheless have to match its color?
Although the Chazon Ish clearly disagrees and writes:
There is no difference whether the tzitzis are wool, linen, or the material of the tallis. Since the Torah calls them tzitzis hakanaf, meaning the color of the corner, they are all included.
On the other hand, the Chayei Adam clearly appears to follow our approach, writing:
If one makes tzitzis from silk or other materials, they must be the same color as the garment.
The fact that the Rambam states the rule without distinguishing wool and linen is no difficulty, because according to his own view he rules like Rav Nachman.
Based on this, there is no proof at all from the Gemara’s statement “Let it at least be lavan” that strings used because of gedilim need not be valid for their own mitzvah.
Since that Gemara deals with wool strings, according to Rava those strings do not need to match the color of the garment in the first place. We certainly should interpret the anonymous Gemara in accordance with Rava, since Rashi rules like him, as Tosafos in Menachos (39b) quotes.
This also works according to the Raavad, who agrees with Rashi that lavan should match the garment’s color, because the Kesef Mishneh explains that the Raavad also rules like Rava.
Although according to the Rambam, who rules like Rav Nachman, this explanation cannot be given, according to his view only the wrapping string is Tekhelet. It therefore seems quite logical that if that string is not Tekhelet it does not need to match the color of the garment. The requirement of min kanaf applies to the strings of the anaf, not to the string wrapped around them.
Since according to the Rambam only one of the eight hanging strings is Tekhelet, it follows that the required number of white strings is seven.
The Rambam explicitly writes:
One of the eight strings shall be a Tekhelet string, and the seven shall be white.
The Beis Yosef explicitly indicates that according to the Rambam fewer than seven white strings are insufficient:
When placing lavan alone he must place at least seven white strings, and it is possible that eight white strings are required and seven are insufficient… The Rambam explicitly writes in that chapter that one who makes lavan without Tekhelet takes one of the eight strings…
Accordingly, if someone makes two Tekhelet strings according to the Raavad, or four according to Tosafos, it would apparently be obvious that according to the Rambam he has not fulfilled lavan, since he has reduced the required number of seven white strings.
See note [12], however, where there is some room to discuss this.
As to whether he nevertheless fulfills the mitzvah of Tekhelet — based on the rule that lavan does not prevent Tekhelet — this appears to depend on a machlokes regarding the explanation of another halachah in the Rambam.
After quoting the Mishnah’s rule that Tekhelet does not prevent lavan and lavan does not prevent Tekhelet, the Rambam explains:
How so? If he has no Tekhelet, he makes lavan alone. Similarly, if he made lavan and Tekhelet and the lavan was severed and diminished all the way to the corner, leaving only the Tekhelet, it remains kosher.
This needs explanation.
Why does the Rambam not explain the second half — that lavan does not prevent Tekhelet — the same way he explains the first? He could simply say that if one has no lavan, he makes Tekhelet alone.
Instead he gives the case of gardumei tzitzis: he originally made both lavan and Tekhelet, and only afterward the white strings broke.
The straightforward implication is as the Kesef Mishneh explains there: according to the Rambam, one cannot initially make tzitzis of Tekhelet alone, which is why he was forced to use the case of broken strings.
The reason would be that according to the Rambam’s approach, where only one string is Tekhelet and that string wraps around the others, there is simply no concept of Tekhelet without lavan.
The mitzvah of Tekhelet is, in a sense, an addition to the mitzvah of lavan. The commandment of Tekhelet is to wrap a Tekhelet string around the strings that constitute the mitzvah of lavan, as implied by the pasuk:
“They shall place upon the tzitzis of the corner a thread of Tekhelet.”
This principle is already clear from the Rambam’s own definition of the mitzvah at the beginning of the chapter:
The anaf made on the corner of the garment from the material of the garment is called tzitzis… This anaf is called lavan, because we are not commanded to dye it… One takes a wool string dyed like the sky and wraps it around the anaf, and this string is called Tekhelet… Thus there are two commands in this mitzvah: to make an anaf extending from the corner, and to wrap a Tekhelet string around the anaf, as it says, “They shall make for themselves tzitzis,” and “They shall place upon the tzitzis of the corner a thread of Tekhelet.”
According to this approach,[13] it would apparently follow that whenever one does not make seven white strings, he does not even fulfill the mitzvah of Tekhelet.
Since the required shiur of lavan is lacking, the pasuk of “They shall make for themselves tzitzis” has not been fulfilled. Automatically, the pasuk of “They shall place upon the tzitzis of the corner a thread of Tekhelet” has not been fulfilled either.
See note [14], where there is a possibility that according to this approach the failure to fulfill the mitzvah is, according to everyone, on a Torah level.
Although the Kesef Mishneh adopts the above approach in that location, elsewhere it is clear that he was not certain of it.
At the end of the chapter he gives a different explanation, and he follows this same approach in the Beis Yosef:
It appears to me that the Rambam certainly rules according to the Chachamim and according to the straightforward anonymous Mishnah, which states that Tekhelet does not prevent lavan, etc. If one has only one type, he makes whichever type he possesses. The Rambam writes that if he has no Tekhelet he makes lavan alone, and it automatically follows that lavan does not prevent Tekhelet. Indeed, it is a kal vachomer: the primary mitzvah is Tekhelet, and if when he has no Tekhelet he makes lavan alone, certainly if he has no lavan he makes Tekhelet alone.
According to this second approach, it would apparently be obvious that if one makes only two or four of the strings Tekhelet, he at least fulfills Tekhelet.
Just as adding seven additional Tekhelet strings does not ruin the mitzvah of Tekhelet, there is no reason why adding fewer than seven should be different.
Why was the Kesef Mishneh uncertain regarding the Rambam’s view?
It appears that the basis of his uncertainty is a difficulty from the Gemara.
On the one hand, the fact that the Rambam does not explain “lavan does not prevent Tekhelet” as meaning that one who has no lavan can make Tekhelet alone strongly implies that the Rambam holds there can be no Tekhelet without lavan, except in the case of gardumin, where lavan was originally present and only later broke.
On the other hand, interpreting the Mishnah specifically as referring to gardumin is difficult from the Gemara. The Gemara itself uses this interpretation only to establish the Mishnah according to Rebbe, who holds that lavan and Tekhelet prevent one another. This implies that according to the Chachamim no such ukimta is necessary.
Although in Hilchah 4 the Kesef Mishneh offers a way of explaining the Gemara according to his first approach, the Gemara itself does not naturally read that way.
The Keren Orah already notes this, and the sefarim Yitzchak Yeranen by Rav Elyakim Gatigno and Shalal David by Rav David Muati raise additional difficulties with the Kesef Mishneh’s explanation.
It appears that the Kesef Mishneh himself recognized the weakness of this approach, which is why at the end of the chapter he gives a different explanation even though the Rambam’s wording itself does not naturally indicate it.
Although most mefarshim adopt the Kesef Mishneh’s second approach, it nevertheless appears for several reasons that one must at least be choshesh for the first approach:
1.
Several major Acharonim resolve the Gemara’s difficulty against the first approach. Once the difficulty is resolved, the straightforward implication of the Rambam’s own words would again lead us to follow that view.
Among these Acharonim are the Mishkenos Yaakov and his brother the Keren Orah.
See note [16] for an explanation of their words, the Gemara source they bring for the Rambam’s reasoning, and another statement of the Rambam which is particularly precise according to this approach and therefore provides some support for it.
The Sefer Kovetz explicitly writes that the Kesef Mishneh’s first explanation is more logical.
[The text supplied here appears to jump into the middle of the next discussion.]
It would have appeared that there is room to distinguish between the cases.
Tosafos’ position that even min haTorah one has not fulfilled the mitzvah may apply specifically where the Rabbinic law is fundamentally a gezeirah forbidding the mitzvah to be performed in a certain manner. When Chazal declared that the mitzvah may not be performed in that fashion, they thereby remove the status of “mitzvah” from such an act.
In our case, however, the Rabbinic rule is fundamentally an enhancement in the mitzvah requiring four strings, with their takanah being that the mitzvah should specifically be performed in this manner.
It could therefore be argued that everyone agrees that failure to fulfill the Rabbinic requirement does not remove the Torah-level character of the act as a mitzvah, and one can still be considered to have fulfilled the Torah requirement.
The Pri Megadim, however, clearly does not make such a distinction.
In his Pesichah Koleles, after explaining that if someone covers a sukkah with something that is invalid mid’Rabbanan, he has not fulfilled even the Torah-level mitzvah, he writes:
Regarding any Rabbinic requirement in a positive mitzvah where Chazal said that it must be done in a certain way, if one intentionally fails to do so, he has not fulfilled the mitzvah even min haTorah. If he was prevented by circumstances beyond his control, he has fulfilled it. Thus, a heretic who recited the weekday Shemoneh Esrei on Shabbos and mentioned Shabbos has, on a Torah level, fulfilled Kiddush, as the Magen Avraham writes. Nevertheless, since Chazal attached Kiddush to a pasuk and required specifically a cup of wine and Kiddush in the place of the meal, he has not fulfilled the mitzvah even min haTorah.
English Footnotes
1.
We should mention here the words of the Pri Megadim in his introduction to Hilchos Tzitzis, quoted in the Biur Halachah, who tells us that some disagree with Rashi and hold that min haTorah two white strings are sufficient, while we make four as a remembrance of Tekhelet.
Anyone who studies his words will see that he treats this as a safek din.
According to the Pri Megadim, therefore, even if our later proof is correct that one who uses more than two white strings may entirely fail to fulfill even lavan, that itself remains only a safek. According to the opinion that min haTorah one fulfills lavan with only two strings, the mitzvah of lavan would still be fulfilled.
This does not change our practical discussion. Even according to the Pri Megadim there remains at least a possibility that one using more than two white strings does not fulfill even lavan, and he therefore should not do so, as will be explained at the end.
The Pri Megadim’s statement itself requires investigation: who are the “some say” who hold that only two strings are required min haTorah?
One could perhaps say he means the Rosh, who explicitly writes this in a teshuvah quoted by the Beis Yosef. But if so, it is difficult because the Rosh’s Pesakim, also quoted by the Beis Yosef, appear to follow Rashi. Where the Rosh’s teshuvos contradict his Pesakim, we follow the Pesakim.
Furthermore, many Rishonim appear to follow Rashi, Tosafos, and the Rosh that when making lavan alone, four strings are required min haTorah, as we have explained elsewhere.
2.
Our approach appears already in Taharas HaKodesh. In explaining Tosafos he writes:
According to the Chachamim, although we place two strings in place of Tekhelet and two in place of lavan, this is only to fulfill the mitzvah of gedilim, as Tosafos wrote earlier. Nevertheless, the strings have only the name of one type, namely lavan.
However, several Poskim appear to hold — as we have explained at length elsewhere — that the reason two white strings alone are insufficient is that although Tekhelet does not prevent lavan, two additional white strings are nevertheless required “in place of Tekhelet.”
Accordingly, even when one has only white or only Tekhelet, the tzitzis are considered to contain, in a certain sense, the equivalent of two types.
Tosafos could possibly be understood in this manner: the gezeiras hakasuv of gedilim teaches that when tzitzis contain only one actual type, two additional strings must be added in place of the second type.
This does not change our present discussion. On the contrary, according to this approach it is even clearer that a single Tekhelet string cannot satisfy gedilim.
3.
At the beginning of Perek HaTekhelet, the Keren Orah asks according to Rashi:
What is Rebbe’s reason for saying that lavan prevents Tekhelet? There are four strings. Why should it become invalid merely because he dyed them Tekhelet? Lavan does not literally mean white, since strings dyed another color are also kosher. Why should Tekhelet make them invalid?
Later he answers:
We must say this is the meaning of the pasuk: “They shall place upon the tzitzis of the corner a thread of Tekhelet” — implying that the thread alone should be Tekhelet, but not all the tzitzis.
4.
Regarding the requirement of precedence, Rashi explains that one first inserts the white string through the corner.
The Shitah Mekubetzes, however, brings that Tosafos had difficulty with Rashi’s explanation — either because there is no special chavivus mitzvah in doing this, or because precedence does not apply to something that is not visibly recognizable afterward.
They therefore explain that the Gemara means the rule that while wrapping the gedil, the white chulya is made before the Tekhelet chulya.
5.
When Rashi explains “he failed in the mitzvah,” he writes:
“It is as though he did not place it at all.”
Taharas HaKodesh understood Rashi to mean, as Tosafos assumed in their question, that the white strings are literally regarded as absent.
He therefore explains that although Rashi normally holds that even Tekhelet alone requires four strings, according to this initial understanding of the Gemara he temporarily holds that two strings are sufficient for the opinion that the two mitzvos do not prevent one another.
According to this reading of Rashi there is no source from the Gemara that strings lacking the status of “tzitzis” can nevertheless count toward gedilim.
There are, however, difficulties with this understanding of Rashi.
First, the discussion is according to Rebbe, and according to Rebbe the tzitzis would be invalid even without treating the lavan as literally absent, because according to him lavan prevents Tekhelet.
Second, Rashi could simply have said, as the Shitah Mekubetzes does, that the lavan is regarded as absent.
It therefore appears that Rashi had another intention in these words, which we have explained elsewhere.
6.
One cannot argue that the Gemara should simply have used the reason that gedilim is lacking, since that reason would apply according to everyone.
This is not correct.
According to Rebbe there is no source that there is an independent din in the cheftza of tzitzis that fewer than four strings cannot be called tzitzis.
The derivation from gedilim requiring four strings can simply be understood as resulting from Rebbe’s rule that lavan and Tekhelet prevent one another and each mitzvah requires two strings.
7.
In their earlier comments, where Tosafos challenges Rashi’s rule that tzitzis of one type require four strings, they use the expression “a little difficult.”
This is noteworthy. At first glance the question is extremely strong, since according to their inference Rashi’s rule seems disproven.
Even more notable is that later, where Tosafos argues that Rav Yehudah’s answer would become unnecessary, they use the stronger expression “temah.”
Based on our explanation, the wording is precise.
Their challenge to Rashi’s rule comes from the inference that the Gemara specifically used the reason that according to Rebbe the two mitzvos prevent one another. That inference can be rejected, as Rashi explains, since the Mishnah was specifically being established according to Rebbe. Therefore Tosafos writes only “a little difficult.”
But when Tosafos argues that Rav Yehudah’s answer becomes unnecessary, their inference is from the Gemara’s explicit introduction of Rebbe’s name. Since they had no way to reject this inference, they use the stronger term “temah.”
There is another precision in their wording.
When inferring that Rav Yehudah’s answer becomes unnecessary, Tosafos explicitly mentions the Chachamim:
“It is difficult, because it implies that according to the Chachamim it works.”
But in their earlier challenge to Rashi they do not explicitly mention the Chachamim, even though Rebbe appears in the Gemara they quote. They write merely:
“It implies that if they do not prevent one another, it works.”
8.
The requirement that lavan precede Tekhelet cannot mean that where tzitzis contain both mitzvos together, the combined mitzvah requires lavan to be first.
If that were so, when one put Tekhelet first he should at least fulfill one of the two mitzvos, because his deficiency would only relate to fulfilling both together.
Rather, the rule must be that whenever tzitzis contain two types, giving one type precedence constitutes a maalah for that type.
The Shitah Mekubetzes, quoting Tosafos Rabbeinu Chananel, refers to chavivus mitzvah in precedence. Rashi explains that since the pasuk mentions min kanaf, meaning lavan, first, it shows that lavan is considered more important.
The Torah therefore insists that this advantage be given specifically to lavan, and putting Tekhelet first detracts from and invalidates the lavan.
9.
The Hagahos Ashri quotes Rabbeinu Yitzchak HaLavan regarding a sukkah constructed inside a house beneath a roof:
Taaseh velo min ha’asui applies only when the body of the sukkah itself was invalid, such as attached vines, gourds, or ivy. Here the sechach itself is kosher and only the roof causes the problem. Therefore, after the roof is removed, the sukkah is kosher.
The explanation appears to be that regarding taaseh velo min ha’asui, which requires an act of making “sechach,” it is sufficient that the object possess the status of sechach when it is made, even if that status cannot at that moment actually make the sukkah kosher.
Thus, sechach beneath a roof has no problem of taaseh velo min ha’asui, because intrinsically it is fit to be kosher and therefore is properly called “sechach.” The roof merely prevents one from fulfilling the mitzvah with that sechach while the roof remains.
10.
Rashi, the Rambam, and others hold that the white strings must match the color of the garment.
The Semag writes that Rashi was not precise in this. His proof is from the Gemara discussed earlier. When the Gemara asks regarding someone using kela ilan in place of Tekhelet, “Let it at least be lavan,” we see that those strings are valid for lavan despite not matching the garment’s color.
The Semag therefore clearly assumes that although the kela ilan strings are required only for gedilim, they nevertheless need to be inherently fit for the mitzvah of lavan.
We must obviously find a way to explain how Rashi can be correct, but that does not prove that Rashi disagrees with the Semag’s basic assumption and holds that strings needed for gedilim need not be fit for their mitzvah — especially in light of what we explained above indicating that this is not Rashi’s view.
Several other answers to the Gemara can be given:
A.
Tosafos also challenges Rashi from the Gemara’s statement that “color does not make a difference,” but concludes:
Perhaps [matching the garment’s color] is only Rabbinic, because of zeh Keili ve’anveihu.
If Rashi holds that matching the garment’s color is only mid’Rabbanan, the Gemara’s statement “Let it at least be lavan” presents no difficulty.
Since on a Torah level the strings are valid as lavan, that is sufficient not to create the gezeirah, since we do not make a gezeirah ligezeirah.
B.
The author of the article cited above writes that the Aruch HaShulchan? and Chazon Ish adopt his explanation: because those strings are needed only for gedilim, they may count even though they are not fit for lavan.
Although this may indeed be the Chazon Ish’s view, it appears that the first sefer intended something else.
He writes that where the Shulchan Aruch cites an opinion requiring the tzitzis to match the color of the tallis, this applies only to two of the strings. He explains:
This seems obvious, because regarding the two strings that come in place of Tekhelet, as will be explained in Siman 12, min kanaf does not apply. With this, the Semag’s difficulty against Rashi disappears.
11.
The Kesef Mishneh asks how the Rambam can say that there is no Torah-prescribed number of strings when the Gemara derives from a pasuk that four strings are required.
He leaves the question unresolved.
The Maaseh Rokeach answers that the Rambam indeed agrees that four strings are required min haTorah. When he says there is no Torah-prescribed number, he means there is no maximum.
The Mishkenos Yaakov and the other cited sefer explain similarly.
The Mabit in Kiryas Sefer explains that the Rambam refers only to the loose ends, the anaf. In the wrapped gedil, four strings certainly are required min haTorah.
The Birkei Yosef brings another answer: the Rambam refers to anything not explicitly written in the Torah as divrei sofrim, even where it is actually a Torah law.
Accordingly, the requirement for four strings is indeed a Torah law.
The Birkei Yosef adds that even the Kesef Mishneh understood the Rambam this way. His question was different: this particular derashah is so explicit in the pasuk that it should not properly be described as divrei sofrim.
The Mishkenos Yaakov, Magen Giborim, and other mefarshim explain the Kesef Mishneh similarly.
On the other hand, the Radbaz, while explaining the Rambam, plainly understands at the end of his discussion that min haTorah there is no required number of strings at all.
The Chayei Adam likewise understands the Rambam this way.
Rav Yedidiah Shmuel Tarika in Ben Yedid also adopts this view and answers the Kesef Mishneh’s question by saying that the Gemara’s derashah is merely an asmachta.
The Aruch LaNer gives another answer: not everyone accepts the Gemara’s derashah, and the Rambam rules according to the view that does not.
12.
In truth, there is some room to question our assumption here — a possibility also raised by Rav Zalman Nechemiah Goldberg.
Perhaps a Tekhelet string can, when necessary, count toward the mitzvah of lavan. Being dyed Tekhelet might not harm its ability to count as lavan.
If so, even when one increases the number of Tekhelet strings, he could fulfill both Tekhelet and lavan according to the Rambam.
Above, in Section A, we brought a proof against this. We argued that Tekhelet must constitute a separate type that is excluded from functioning as lavan. We also noted that the Keren Orah already proves this.
That proof, however, depends on understanding the Mishnah’s statement that lavan does not prevent Tekhelet as referring to tzitzis in which all the strings are Tekhelet.
Since in such a case we do not say that one fulfills both Tekhelet and lavan, but only Tekhelet, it follows that a Tekhelet string cannot count for lavan.
According to the Rambam, however — following the first explanation of his position cited in the main text — this still requires investigation.
According to that approach, the Rambam understands the Mishnah’s statement that lavan does not prevent Tekhelet specifically where the tzitzis originally contained lavan, but it subsequently broke and only Tekhelet remained.
Thus it remains possible that if someone initially makes all his strings Tekhelet, he might actually fulfill lavan as well, because Tekhelet can count toward lavan.
In the Rambam’s own view this explanation seems difficult. His wording is:
“One of the eight strings shall be a Tekhelet string and the seven shall be white.”
This sounds as though the other seven specifically have to be white. Otherwise he could have written, “one or more of the eight strings shall be Tekhelet.”
However, this does not prove that the reason is because Tekhelet is inherently excluded from functioning as lavan.
The Rambam holds that the white strings should match the color of the tallis. It could therefore be that this alone is why the other seven must specifically be white.
This requirement seemingly is me’akev, since its source is the beraisa:
“A tallis can only be exempted with its own type.”
I later saw that the Rashba explicitly derives from the wording of this beraisa that the requirement is me’akev.
However, lehalachah we do not pasken like the Rambam regarding matching the garment’s color.
If so, if we nevertheless follow the Rambam regarding the number of Tekhelet strings, perhaps there would be no requirement for the other strings not to be Tekhelet.
Accordingly, one could fulfill lavan even when using two or four Tekhelet strings.
This would undermine the main argument in the body of the article that according to the first explanation of the Rambam, adding Tekhelet strings might cause one not to fulfill even the mitzvah at all.
It nevertheless seems very difficult to rely on this reasoning.
First, the mefarshim who adopt the first explanation of the Rambam clearly assume that Tekhelet cannot count as lavan. They all explain that the Rambam could not interpret “lavan does not prevent Tekhelet” as referring to tzitzis made entirely from Tekhelet because the pasuk says:
“They shall place upon the tzitzis of the corner a thread of Tekhelet.”
This implies that only the thread is Tekhelet, not the tzitzis themselves.
13. Continued
Accordingly, if all the strings are made Tekhelet, one would not fulfill even Tekhelet, because the Torah says to place a Tekhelet thread specifically upon tzitzis.
One might ask why they did not instead explain that Tekhelet cannot count as ordinary tzitzis because tzitzis must match the garment’s color.
Perhaps they hold unlike the Rashba that matching the garment’s color is not me’akev. See the responsa Lev Chaim, which rejects the Rashba’s position and adds that the Rambam implies it is not me’akev.
There also appears to be another source for the principle that Tekhelet cannot count toward lavan.
The beraisa in Menachos states:
A tallis that is entirely Tekhelet: he brings Tekhelet and another color and attaches them. He should not bring kela ilan, but if he did, it is kosher.
The Mishkenos Yaakov explains that the reason he must bring “another color” is that there has to be something other than Tekhelet present.
It is not enough for all the strings to be Tekhelet, because, as explained above, the Torah insists that the tzitzis themselves not be entirely Tekhelet.
This rule would seemingly be me’akev. The beraisa’s wording implies that only regarding kela ilan is the rule merely lechatchilah, with the result that if it was used the tzitzis remain kosher.
Indeed, according to this first approach there is a proof that if one uses an insufficient number of the seven required white strings, he does not even fulfill Tekhelet.
For if he still fulfilled Tekhelet despite lacking some of the seven white strings, the Mishnah’s statement “lavan does not prevent Tekhelet” could have been explained straightforwardly as precisely such a case.
Why, then, did the Rambam need to use the special case of gardumin?
14.
Even according to those mefarshim mentioned above who hold that the Rambam’s required number of strings is only mid’Rabbanan, meaning that only Rabbinically is the pasuk of “They shall make for themselves tzitzis” not fulfilled where seven white strings are lacking, it is still far from obvious that on a Torah level one has fulfilled either lavan or Tekhelet.
Rather, this depends on a machlokes Rishonim.
The reason is that since he is not performing the mitzvah in the manner established by Chazal, this resembles the case of someone whose table was removed outside the sukkah.
Regarding that case Chazal say it is considered:
“As though he did not eat in the sukkah.”
The Biur Halachah explains:
According to Tosafos in Sukkah, even min haTorah he did not fulfill the mitzvah, since the Rabbanan made a gezeirah regarding this and said it is considered as though he did not fulfill the mitzvah of sukkah. According to the Ran and Ritva, however, the failure is only mid’Rabbanan.
15.
This is the wording of the Beis Yosef, where he added several words by way of explanation.
16.
It is worth introducing the explanation of the Mishkenos Yaakov and Keren Orah — and others similarly — that there is a source in the Gemara for the Rambam’s position.
The beraisa quotes Rabbi Yishmael b’Rebbi Nachman:
“If he has no Tekhelet, he puts on lavan.”
The implication is that specifically when he has no Tekhelet he puts on lavan. But if he has no lavan, he should not put on Tekhelet alone.
