Rav Shlomo Eliyahu Miller Response to R. Zev Aryeh Knopfler on Techeiles

Rosh Chodesh Adar 5764

To my dear friend, HaRav HaGaon R’ Zev Aryeh Knopfler shlita,

I received your letter, which was full of many different comments and points. However, because I am so busy, I have almost no time to answer you. Still, out of respect for you, I pushed myself, and I therefore tried to respond to several points that are relevant to divrei Torah.

My purpose is not to debate the basic issue itself. In my opinion, it is clear that this is not Techeiles, and I do not believe that debating the matter will change the minds of those who support it. This is especially so since they have already acted upon their position. The Maharlbach already wrote in his Kuntres HaSemichah that once people have acted upon a position, they are already noge’a badavar—personally invested in maintaining what they have said.

However, regarding the Torah points you raised: I wrote that cutting off part of a living creature involves a melachah de’Oraisa, either gozez or netilas neshamah. Yet the Gemara states explicitly that there is no issur involved in processing the chilazon aside from tzad, trapping, according to our ruling that disha applies only to something that grows from the ground.

His Honor commented based on the Ritva that, with the chilazon, although extracting its blood would normally constitute chovel, just like any other wound, and one should therefore be liable because of netilas neshamah, as Tosafos asks, Tosafos answers that the blood of the chilazon used for dyeing is mifkad pakid—collected in one place rather than absorbed into its body. According to the Ritva cited by His Honor, since the chilazon is not a creature made up of distinct limbs, netilas neshamah applies only when one takes the life of the entire creature, not when one removes only part of it. If so, His Honor argues correctly that according to the Ritva, there would be no grounds to make one liable because of netilas neshamah.

However, as is well known, Tosafos and most of the Rishonim did not give this answer. Even according to the Ritva—and the Ramban also brings this approach—the entire basis for such a major chiddush, that with a creature that does not have distinct limbs there is no liability for netilas neshamah unless one affects the entire creature and not merely part of it, comes from the question of why puncturing the chilazon should not be considered netilas neshamah because of the blood being extracted, just as with any other wound.

It is therefore explicit in their words that the blood of the chilazon is the blood through which the chilazon lives, and that it is actual blood. The secretion found in the murex, however, is not blood at all, and extracting it does not involve netilas neshamah. These Rishonim are therefore stating explicitly that the “blood” of the murex, which is merely a secretion, is not the blood of the chilazon discussed by the Gemara.

Whichever way you look at it, there is no basis for identifying the murex as the chilazon according to the Rishonim, who clearly say that extracting this substance involves netilas neshamah, just as it does with the blood of an animal or bird. If one insists that the Rishonim were mistaken and did not know that the “blood” of the chilazon is not actual blood but merely a secretion, and that the word “blood” is only being used figuratively, like the pasuk, “You drank the blood of grapes as wine,” then there is no source for saying that with a small creature such as the chilazon there is no liability for taking part of its life. If so, one can indeed be liable because of netilas neshamah when removing part of a living creature.

His Honor also commented that there can be no liability for gozez when removing part of a living creature. Otherwise, one should also be liable for gozez when cutting off part of a creature after it has died. We also find regarding milah itself that there is no Torah liability when circumcising an eight-month fetus that was born alive but is not considered viable. Why, then, is one not liable because of gozez? His Honor cited several Acharonim who say that gozez applies specifically to milah because the foreskin is considered something secondary to the body of a Jewish person.

However, although His Honor cited the Chasam Sofer in Shabbos, you should also have cited the Chasam Sofer at the end of Kesubos 5b, who writes that one can also be liable because of tolesh when removing something from a living creature. If so, one could be liable here because of tolesh.

Regarding the main question from the milah of an eight-month nonviable baby, it appears to me that the words of the Shitah Mekubetzes can be explained as follows: Whenever one cuts something from a living creature, during the process of cutting it becomes like a partially detached limb or piece of flesh. We hold that death causes such a limb to be considered fully detached, whereas shechitah does not cause it to be considered detached.[1]

At that point, it is no longer completely part of the living creature, since death would cause it to be considered detached. At the same time, it is not entirely separate, since shechitah does not cause it to be considered detached. It is therefore considered something secondary to, and attached to, the living creature, and the melachah of gozez applies to it.

After the creature has died, however, or in the case of an eight-month nonviable baby, which is not halachically considered alive, it is not viewed as something secondary to the body. Rather, it is part of the main body itself, a portion of which is now being cut away. The concept of gozez applies only with a living creature, where the part being cut does not have the same full life as the creature itself. According to this, none of the questions raised against the Shitah Mekubetzes are difficult.

Although there is no Torah liability for gozez when one removes pieces of skin that have already become detached along most of their length, as explained in Shabbos 94b, that is because they are already close to falling off, as Rashi writes there. With a piece of flesh or a limb that has become detached along most of its length, however, it would appear that it is not close to falling off, and there would therefore be a Torah liability for gozez.

Regarding what I wrote in the name of R’ Chaim concerning the rule that a safek de’Oraisa must be treated stringently, His Honor cited R’ Menachem Ziemba zt”l in Gur Aryeh Yehudah, siman 8. It is true that R’ Menachem Ziemba also discusses this sevara. However, it appears that His Honor did not understand what I wrote, nor what R’ Menachem Ziemba wrote. I will therefore try to explain the sevara once again.

This has nothing at all to do with the words of the Pri Megadim that His Honor cited. The Gur Aryeh Yehudah also writes that it has nothing to do with the sevara of the Pri Megadim; see the responsa section, siman 8, se’if katan 7.[2]

The rule that a safek de’Oraisa must be treated stringently applies only when, by performing the act in question, the person is released from his obligation. There is no Torah obligation to perform an act if, even after doing it, he will remain under the same obligation as before.

For example, suppose a person has a Torah obligation to take an esrog on the first day of Sukkos, but the only esrog presently available to him is of doubtful validity. Even after taking it, he would still be obligated, because of safek de’Oraisa lechumra, to continue searching for an esrog that is definitely kosher. Taking the doubtful esrog therefore does not release him from his obligation. If so, there is no Torah obligation for him to take it.

This has nothing to do with the words of the Magen Avraham and Pri Megadim regarding Birkas HaMazon. They discuss someone who ate enough to be satiated and is therefore obligated min haTorah, but he knows only one berachah, and there is a safek whether the berachos prevent one another from being fulfilled. Even if we say there that he is obligated because of safek de’Oraisa lechumra, that case is different. He has certainly fulfilled the mitzvah of saying one berachah. Even if he has not fulfilled his entire obligation, he has at least discharged that part of the mitzvah and does not need to do it again.

R’ Menachem Ziemba zt”l writes all of this. I am therefore surprised that if His Honor already saw the Gur Aryeh Yehudah, you did not see what he wrote in siman 8, se’if katan 7. The sefer Pesil Techeiles also cites the Gur Aryeh Yehudah, but does not quote what he says explicitly in siman 8, as explained above; see Pesil Techeiles, page 81. This has nothing to do with the Ran in Sukkah, nor does it have anything to do with the Pri Megadim, as explained above.

This also explains what I wrote: At first glance, the matter depends upon the machlokes between the Rambam and the Rashba whether a safek de’Oraisa must be treated stringently min haTorah or only miderabbanan. According to the Rambam, by performing the doubtful mitzvah, one has already discharged his Torah obligation. He is therefore obligated min haTorah to perform the doubtful mitzvah, since doing so releases him from his Torah obligation. According to the Rashba, however, he still remains under his original obligation min haTorah.

His Honor did not understand what I wrote and responded that he is nevertheless obligated miderabbanan. That has nothing to do with the sevara I wrote.

However, I wrote according to the Chavas Daas and those who agree with him that even according to the Rambam, when there is a safek whether one has fulfilled a mitzvah, we apply safek de’Oraisa lechumra. Just as, with issurim, the Torah prohibited only something that is definitely forbidden and not something doubtful, so too with mitzvos: the Torah obligated a person to take an esrog that is definitely kosher, not an esrog of doubtful validity. Therefore, even according to the Rambam, one has not definitely fulfilled the mitzvah by performing a doubtful mitzvah, and he remains obligated to fulfill it.

Regarding the concern of bal tosif that I mentioned according to the Rambam: It is well known that the primary understanding of the Rambam’s position is that using two lulavim constitutes bal tosif. His retraction in his responsum applies only to the aravah, since the Torah does not give an explicit number for aravos; it merely says arvei, in the plural.

The same applies here. According to the Rambam, the mitzvah calls for one strand of Techeiles, not two. If one uses two, there is a concern of bal tosif according to the Rambam.

I delayed my response for a long time because of various distractions and a lack of strength. Nevertheless, I have now gathered my strength to finish these few words, although there is much more that could be written regarding every one of your points.

With best wishes,

Shlomo Eliyahu Miller

[1] See Chullin 73.

[2] See se’ifim ketanim 9 and 10.