Many claim that the Tekheiles of tzitzis was produced from the snails known as argamonim [murex snails]. We will attempt to examine how far this identification can be relied upon in order to fulfill the mitzvah with certainty; whether it is permissible to use it if the identification remains a safek, and what precautions must be taken. We will also examine whether, if the identification is uncertain, there is nevertheless an obligation to use it.

HaTorah VeHaAretz III

Part I

Outline

Introduction

Chapter I — Methods of Identifying the Objects Needed for Mitzvos

Introduction

A. Certainty in Identifying the Objects of a Mitzvah

B. Methods of Resolving Doubts in Identification

1. Mesorah
2. Parameters of Mesorah
3. Simanim
4. The Evidentiary Strength of Simanim Compared with Other Forms of Proof

Introduction

Many claim that the Tekheiles of tzitzis was produced from the snails known as argamonim. We will attempt to examine how far this identification can be relied upon in order to fulfill the mitzvah with certainty; whether it is permissible to use it if the identification remains a safek, and what precautions must be taken. We will also examine whether, if the identification is uncertain, there is nevertheless an obligation to use it.

The main difficulty in proving that Tekheiles was produced from the argamonim is establishing a clear and certain connection between these snails and the Tekheiles of tzitzis. We have certain information in our sources regarding the chilazon of Tekheiles, and we know the argamonim that exist today. The question, however, is whether this identification is absolute and certain or whether doubts remain, and if so, how Tekheiles produced from the argamonim should be treated.

This article is divided into four chapters:

A. The general rules for identifying the physical objects used for various mitzvos, and how an identification can be reestablished after it has been forgotten.

B. The degree of certainty of the proofs for Tekheiles from the argamonim, and the doubts concerning them.

C. The halachic problems created by this renewed identification.

D. Issues of derech eretz involved in wearing Tekheiles today.

Chapter I — Methods of Identifying the Objects Needed for Mitzvos

Introduction

In this chapter we will attempt to define what types of evidence can enable us to renew the observance of mitzvos, halachos, and the like where the identification has been forgotten. Attention must be paid to the different subjects involved and to the degree of certainty required in each one.

We will not discuss here the laws of safek and how one should act out of doubt. We will deal only with restoring the observance of a mitzvah through identifying the physical object with which the mitzvah is performed.

The performance of all mitzvos that depend on physical objects or physical definitions rests upon certain identification. As the Gemara says (Menachos 29a):

The academy of R’ Yishmael taught: Three things were difficult for Moshe until HaKadosh Baruch Hu showed them to him with His finger: the Menorah, the new moon, and the sheratzim… and some say also the laws of shechitah…

Likewise in Chullin (42a):

The academy of R’ Yishmael taught: “These are the living creatures that you may eat” — this teaches that HaKadosh Baruch Hu took each species and showed it to Moshe, saying to him: “This you may eat, and this you may not eat.”

Similarly, the identification of the arba minim today rests upon a clear mesorah among Klal Yisrael. The measurements of a kezayis, beitzah, agudal, and so forth were transmitted until our time from generation to generation, notwithstanding the questions that have arisen regarding how they correspond to the descriptions in our sources.

The boundaries of places such as Har HaBayis and the location of the Beis HaMikdash, as they relate to entering in a state of tumah, building the mizbe’ach and the Beis HaMikdash, and so on, likewise require very precise identification (see Rambam, Hilchos Beis HaBechirah 2:1). The borders of Eretz Yisrael occupied by Olei Mitzrayim and Olei Bavel for the mitzvos dependent on the Land; the lineage of Kohanim and Levi’im; kosher and non-kosher animals; the location for the mitzvah of milah; and so on — with all such objects of mitzvos, one needs both the Torah definition of the mitzvah as it applies to the body, place, or time, and a certain identification of the actual object.

It is not enough to know theoretically that a mitzvah is performed with a particular object. We must know with certainty that this is indeed the object regarding which we were commanded.

With mitzvos that were continuously practiced, doubts generally did not arise. Performing the mitzvah from time to time prevented it from being forgotten, and its observance rests upon a reliable mesorah. The doubts that did arise are generally not doubts about the identification itself, but apparent contradictions between the received identification and descriptions found in our sources, such as the measurements or the order and placement of the parshiyos in tefillin.

As the Kuzari states (Ma’amar I, §25):

Something that was originally established for Bnei Yisrael through direct sight and was afterward transmitted from person to person through a tradition comparable to eyewitness knowledge.

With such mitzvos, however, we must still determine whether mesorah is the only basis upon which reliable observance of mitzvos can be established, or whether other forms of certainty may also be used. And even if mesorah is the only method, it still requires clarification what constitutes a mesorah that should not be doubted and what constitutes a mesorah that cannot be relied upon.

The problem becomes particularly acute regarding mitzvos for which there is no clear continuous mesorah: what proofs can be relied upon to fulfill the mitzvah with certainty, and what proofs cannot?

Despite the importance of this subject — particularly in our generation, when we have merited that many mitzvos which for many generations were only in the category of “hatzivi lach tziyunim” are returning to their full observance in Eretz Yisrael — I have not found anyone who has dealt with the subject systematically. I will therefore record what I have managed to gather in my limited understanding.

A. Certainty in Identifying the Objects of a Mitzvah

Most doubts that arose over the generations regarding the identification of the physical objects used for mitzvos resulted from the decrees in Eretz Yisrael, the hardships of galus, and the dispersion of Klal Yisrael, until the observance of those mitzvos was forcibly interrupted.

A minority of the doubts arose for other reasons, involving uncertainty in the very halachic status of the entities themselves, such as a palges, koy, androgynos, and the like. These are outside the scope of this article.

The Rambam writes in his Introduction to Peirush HaMishnayos (p. 9, R. Kapach edition):

When you see the Talmud discussing and disputing by way of analysis and bringing proofs for one of these interpretations or similar matters — for example, regarding the Torah’s expression “pri etz hadar,” whether perhaps it means a pomegranate, quince, or something else, until they bring a proof from “pri etz” that it must be a tree whose wood and fruit have the same taste; another says that it is a fruit which remains on its tree from year to year; another says that it is a fruit that grows by all waters — this is not because they were uncertain about the matter until they derived it through these proofs. Rather, we have seen without any doubt, from Yehoshua until the present day, that the esrog is what is taken with the lulav every year, and there has never been any dispute about it. They were only investigating the indication in the verse for this received interpretation.

Similarly, Maran Rav Kook zt”l writes in Etz Hadar (pp. 249–250, R. Zoldan edition):

It is obvious that when the Torah referred to the species by name, even though it did not define them explicitly, its intention was certainly only one species among all the species that could possibly be included under that name. It never entered the minds of Chazal that many different species should be valid for the mitzvah… The Torah certainly intended only one species. Therefore, once we ultimately know that the Torah intended the particular species known to us — whether the source of our knowledge is through derashos of the pesukim or through halachah leMoshe miSinai — that is only relevant to identifying the species. But once the species has been identified, certainly only that species is valid, because the Torah referred to only one species for the mitzvah.

B. Methods of Resolving Doubts in Identification

To continue an already established status or identification, a chazakah is sufficient, as the Gemara states (Kesubos 24b; Kiddushin 69b):

R’ Yosi says: Great is chazakah. As it says, “And from the sons of the Kohanim, the sons of Chavayah, the sons of Hakotz, the sons of Barzilai… These searched for their genealogical records, but they were not found, and they were disqualified from the Kehunah. And the Tirshasa said to them that they should not eat from the most holy offerings until a Kohen would arise with the Urim VeTumim.” He told them: You remain with your previous chazakah. Just as in galus you ate the sanctified foods of the borders, so too here you may eat the sanctified foods of the borders…

Where no chazakah yet exists, the halachah is that one witness is believed regarding issurim (Yoreh De’ah 127:3), and his testimony can itself establish a chezkas kashrus. In such a case, no mesorah or other proof is necessary.

Creating a new status, however, or establishing a new identification, or renewing a halachic practice that has not been observed for hundreds of years, is different. Here we cannot rely on ordinary testimony, and written testimony from those earlier times is not legally admissible, because we rule, “Mipihen velo mipi kesavam” — testimony must come from their mouths and not from their writings. And who can testify that what was recorded in writing is true?

We are therefore left with other methods of clarification: mesorah, if one exists; simanim; and various forms of umdena. With each method, we must first determine the inherent strength of that type of evidence, and then evaluate the quality of the particular evidence in the case being investigated.

1. Mesorah

We learned in a Beraisa (Tosefta Arachin end of ch. 5; Shevuos 16b; Megillah 10a):

Once Yisrael were exiled to Bavel, the mitzvah of walled cities ceased from them. When they returned from the exile, they found these cities that had been surrounded by walls since the days of Yehoshua bin Nun and counted them. And not only these; rather, any city regarding which a mesorah reaches you that it was surrounded by a wall from the days of Yehoshua bin Nun, all these mitzvos apply to it…

Rashi in Shevuos explains that this refers to the laws of houses in walled cities, sending metzora’im out of the city, and not converting the open spaces surrounding the cities into fields.

The Gemara in Shevuos corrects the text and says that one should not read “they sanctified them” but rather “they counted them.” It follows that according to the opinion that the original sanctification remained in force for the future, the mitzvah of houses in walled cities could not have been renewed without mesorah.

One could argue that mesorah was simply the easiest method, since only about seventy years had passed since the exile of the First Beis HaMikdash. However, R’ Yishmael bar R’ Yosi, the author of this teaching, stated it approximately six hundred years after the return from exile, and he told his audience: “Any city regarding which a mesorah reaches you…” This implies that mesorah is the only method through which the mitzvah of walled cities can be renewed.

The Torah’s rules regarding the kosher status of animals use different simanim for different species. Some are permitted based on simanim alone: fish, for example, by fins and scales.

For kosher domesticated and wild animals, the Torah gives signs of taharah. However, to distinguish between a kosher behemah and a kosher chayah regarding kisui hadam and eating the forbidden fats, the Torah itself did not give identifying signs; the signs are only Rabbinic and are subject to disputes.

Regarding kosher grasshoppers, the Torah did give signs. Wherever uncertainty exists in the simanim — such as with grasshoppers, aside from communities which preserved a continuous mesorah — or where the signs are merely Rabbinic, as in distinguishing a behemah from a chayah, the halachah is that the signs cannot be relied upon and the species is eaten only on the basis of mesorah. See Shach, Yoreh De’ah 80:1 and Pri Megadim, Sifsei Da’as there.

The Rambam writes at the beginning of Hilchos Ma’achalos Assuros, and the Shulchan Aruch rules likewise (Yoreh De’ah 82:1):

The identifying signs of a kosher bird were not stated explicitly by the Torah. Rather, only the non-kosher species were listed, and all other bird species are permitted… Anyone who is expert in those species and their names may eat any bird that is not among them without examination. A kosher bird is eaten based upon mesorah, provided it is something plainly accepted in that place that this is a kosher bird. A hunter is believed to say, “My teacher the hunter permitted this bird to me,” provided that hunter is established as expert in the non-kosher species mentioned by the Torah and their names.

The Shulchan Aruch afterward lists the signs of kosher birds and concludes:

Even though it possesses these three signs, it may not be eaten, because we are concerned that it may be a bird of prey, unless they have a mesorah handed down from their fathers that it is kosher.

The Razah recorded additional signs in the name of the Geonim. These signs were accepted by other Rishonim and are cited by the Shulchan Aruch (§3), yet the Rema nevertheless rules:

Some say that even these signs may not be relied upon, and no bird should be eaten except based upon a mesorah that it is kosher. This is our practice, and it should not be changed.

Regarding the signs of a kosher bird, the Kreisi U’Pleisi (82:1) writes:

Strictly speaking, if one witness says that he has a received tradition from a trustworthy person that this bird is kosher, he is believed, because one witness is believed regarding issurim. However, nowadays, because of the decline of the generations, unfortunately, one may rely only on a person who is established as reliable and possesses complete understanding, whose report is exact, and who states it in the name of a talmid chacham who is expert in these matters and in the species and their names. Therefore, establishing a new mesorah in our time regarding birds unknown to our fathers requires very serious examination.

In recent centuries, the problem of grafted esrogim arose. The Chasam Sofer writes regarding it (Kovetz Teshuvos §25):

Regarding the esrogim, all these signs are not Torah signs, nor are they even Rabbinic signs. They were devised by later authorities based upon the fruit grown in their countries. We possess no siman muvhak by which to distinguish between a grafted esrog and a kosher one…

Elsewhere (Orach Chaim §207) he writes:

I have already written… that all these signs are not Biblical and are not mentioned in the Shas or anywhere else. Strictly speaking, the law of an esrog is like the law of a kosher bird: it is accepted through mesorah…

Rav Kook zt”l (Etz Hadar §50) disagreed with the Chasam Sofer, but specifically in the case of esrogim, because an esrog tree grows old and dies. Therefore, even if certain esrogim were once established as kosher, that is no proof regarding fruit from the same location dozens — and certainly hundreds — of years later, when the trees that once stood there have already died. A new mesorah is needed regarding the kosher status of the new trees.

2. Parameters of Mesorah

Even regarding mesorah, not every claimed mesorah is accepted. The Shulchan Aruch rules (Yoreh De’ah 82:1):

A hunter is believed to say: “This bird was permitted to me by my teacher the hunter.”

The Shach notes from the conclusion of the Gemara (Chullin 63b) that this applies specifically if his teacher was a hunter, not merely if his teacher was a chacham. The Pri Megadim, Sifsei Da’as, explains:

If his teacher was a chacham, it proves nothing, because perhaps the chacham relied on his own knowledge and examined the signs, and perhaps the bird is nevertheless a predator.

In other words, we are concerned that his teacher ruled based upon his own reasoning rather than upon a mesorah.

Similarly, the Rosh (Klal 20 §20) replied to people in a certain locality who were eating the stork:

Know that in our country and in Spain we do not eat the bird that nests in houses… It would be proper to investigate their tradition, however, because perhaps one individual relied upon his own wisdom, examined its signs, and permitted it. This may not be relied upon, because perhaps it is a predator.

The Rosh adds:

Know that I personally would not eat based upon their mesorah, because I consider our mesorah and the tradition of our fathers, the sages of Ashkenaz — whose Torah was inherited from their fathers from the days of the Churban — as well as the tradition of our fathers, the Rabbanim of France, more authoritative than the tradition of the people of this country.

We learn from this that when there are two conflicting traditions — one forbidding and one permitting — greater weight should be given to those who are greater in Torah and whose traditions were transmitted with greater precision. The Mahari”l writes similarly (Responsa §95).

The Mahari”l further writes:

Certainly, if there were a bird regarding which there was no mesorah of prohibition, but it was simply unknown to us, and in another place they possessed a mesorah permitting it, that is the case in which the Rosh said one may rely upon the mesorah of that place.

He further writes:

One who comes to testify to a new mesorah regarding an unfamiliar foreign bird must be a reliable authority and testify that in another country or city it is the accepted widespread practice to eat it, or that he possesses a tradition from a great person whose testimony is worthy of reliance — for we may assume that such a person investigated carefully and knew whose testimony he was accepting. But an ordinary person, or one who testifies that he saw or heard it from an ordinary person, is not relied upon, because perhaps he was not sufficiently precise. A minor difference can entirely change the matter and lead to error… Regarding this the Gemara said, “provided he is expert in them and in their names,” and such expertise does not exist nowadays at all.

It appears to me from their words that, unlike certain areas of halachah where one may rely on a person speaking mesiach lefi tumo, in matters where a mesorah is required to permit or institute a practice, one cannot rely upon mesiach lefi tumo. Precision is required here, and the concern for inaccuracy or mistaking one thing for another is significant.

Certainly, there must be clear testimony regarding the practice of an entire city or country. And after the Mahari”l writes that in our time there is no great scholar sufficiently expert in the species and their names, it requires clarification whether there is any single great person upon whose authority a forgotten mitzvah can be renewed.

3. Simanim

Besides reliance upon mesorah when renewing forgotten mitzvos, there is another method of clarification: simanim.

Simanim are used to establish ownership, as in returning a lost object, or to establish identity, as in permitting an agunah. The Rishonim rule that simanim muvhakim can be relied upon on a Torah level even for returning a get and permitting a woman to remarry (Rambam, Hilchos Gerushin 3:11; Tur and Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 132:4). Intermediate simanim are relied upon only Rabbinically (Even HaEzer §17; Choshen Mishpat §267 and commentaries).

We do not find that simanim, even simanim muvhakim, were relied upon to restore forgotten mitzvos or identifications. The Meiri writes likewise (Bava Metzia 27b):

Some say regarding all these matters that, for practical halachah, we have no authority to rely upon a siman except in those matters where the Talmud itself established that it may be relied upon and under the circumstances explained there, whether in issur or monetary law.

We therefore learn that, as a general rule, simanim should not be used as evidence outside the areas of returning lost property and permitting an agunah.

One could perhaps argue that several non-definitive simanim which all point toward one particular identification together have the strength of a siman muvhak, which can be relied upon even on a Torah level.

The Maharibal (Vol. I §7, quoted by the Mishneh LaMelech, Hilchos Gerushin 13:21) raised this argument and rejected it:

Regarding my question whether, where there are two bodily signs as in our case, although neither one is a siman muvhak, perhaps together they have the strength of a siman muvhak: even though logically there is room to be lenient, nevertheless I have found no hint of such a concept in any of the authors. Are we to act merely because we think something seems comparable? Rather, even where there are two bodily signs that are not muvhak, we do not rely upon them. Indeed, the wording of the Mishnah itself indicates this, for it says, “Even though there are simanim on his body,” implying that even two do not have the strength of a siman muvhak.

The Tzemach Tzedek likewise writes in his chiddushim to Bava Metzia, Chapter II, that combining two simanim is effective regarding monetary law, but not regarding an issur unless there is some additional reason for leniency.

It therefore appears that even combining several non-definitive simanim is insufficient, and certainly forgotten mitzvos cannot be restored based upon such signs.

Part II

Outline

5. The Difference Between Accidental and Intrinsic Simanim
6. Umdena
7. Scientific Proof
8. Renewed Identification by Chachamim

Summary

Chapter II — Matching the Argamonim to the Chilazon of Tekheiles

A. Tekheiles Is Valid Only If It Comes from the Chilazon
B. The Scholarly Identification of Argaman and Royal Tekheiles
C. The Claim That the Tekheiles of Tzitzis Came from the Argaman Chilazon

Background

4. The Evidentiary Strength of Simanim Compared with Other Proofs

The Gemara states in Chullin (96b):

Rava said: Originally I thought that a siman was stronger than tevias ayin, because we return a lost object based on a siman but do not return one based on tevias ayin. Now that I have heard these teachings, I say that tevias ayin is stronger… R’ Yitzchak the son of Rav Mesharshiya said: You can know this, because if two witnesses came and said, “A person with this siman and this siman murdered someone,” we would not execute him…

Tosafos there explains that simanim establish ownership where the money is not presently in anyone’s established possession, but we do not remove property from an established owner based upon simanim. Tosafos HaRosh says the same.

The Chazon Ish (Even HaEzer §32) explains:

The essential reason that simanim are insufficient to execute a person, even if simanim are Torah-level evidence, is that taking a life is an act of removing something from an established owner, and a person’s life is certainly no less protected than his property. Since money is not removed based on simanim, neither is a person executed based upon them.

The Meiri likewise writes regarding simanim (Chullin 95b):

Tevias ayin is greater than a siman, because a person is liable to err regarding a siman, which is not the case with tevias ayin. You already know that a person is not executed based on a siman. Meaning: if witnesses say that the murderer was a young man with black locks of hair and a crooked nose, or similar features, then even if one person is found with all those signs he is not executed. But if they say, “We recognize this person as the murderer,” even without giving any siman, he may be executed.

This resembles what the Rambam writes (Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah 8:1):

Klal Yisrael did not believe in Moshe Rabbeinu because of the signs he performed, for one who believes merely because of signs always retains some doubt in his heart.

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 267:9) rules:

If one claimant gives simanim and the other brings witnesses, the object is given to the one who brought witnesses.

The Shach explains:

This applies even to simanim muvhakim — Rosh. It appears that he means even extremely distinctive simanim, and this is also implied by the Maharshal.

The Nesivos writes the same.

The Noda BiYehudah (Mahadura Kama §51) writes that according to the opinion that simanim are Torah-level evidence, it might appear that a person could even be executed based on a siman muvhak. Perhaps the Rambam did not quote the Gemara in Chullin because he holds simanim are only Rabbinic evidence.

Ultimately, however, the Noda BiYehudah derives the rule from the laws of lost property and writes:

That applies specifically to a case similar to a lost object, where the finder who presently holds it does not make a definite claim contradicting the simanim… But if two witnesses say that “a man with these simanim killed someone,” the accused contradicts them and says, “I did not kill him.” His definite claim is strong, and we say perhaps another person happened to possess the same simanim. Even though that is unusual, his definite denial is sufficient.

The Pnei Yehoshua (Kesubos, Kuntres Acharon §§72–73) writes that simanim have the status of a rov, and one cannot execute based upon them:

Even if simanim are comparable to a majority, because it is uncommon that another person would happen to possess the same distinctive simanim, nevertheless, since on the minority side it remains possible that another person could possess them, one cannot impose the death penalty based upon simanim, for the Torah says, “Do not kill an innocent person…”

The conclusion is that even extremely distinctive simanim are weighed by the Poskim as equivalent to a rov or a chazakah. There nevertheless remains a real possibility of a minority possessing the same simanim, although the significance of those simanim may be different.

5. The Difference Between Accidental and Intrinsic Simanim

There is room to distinguish between simanim in monetary law and simanim used to identify a particular species regarding issurim or mitzvos.

Regarding issurim and mitzvos, the function of a siman is to identify its subject as the desired species. For example, the kosher signs of a chayah and behemah indicate that they may be eaten; or, in the laws of agunah, signs on a deceased man establish that he was the husband of a particular woman and thereby permit her to remarry.

In monetary law, by contrast, the object and its simanim are already known. The claimant’s knowledge of those simanim demonstrates that he owns it.

There is another distinction. In monetary law we begin with a defined group and identify one particular item from that group based upon its signs, arguing that those signs indicate that this item belongs to a particular person. Those signs are accidental characteristics; other similar objects may exist without possessing those features.

A siman used to identify a species appears different. Here the siman would seem to be an intrinsic characteristic rather than an accidental one, pointing toward one particular species.

However, a natural characteristic does not always identify only one species. The camel, shafan, and hare (Vayikra 11:4–6), for example, possess one kosher sign and are nevertheless forbidden to eat.

Therefore, even if we find a species matching several natural simanim, that still does not necessarily prove that it is the species we seek. Consequently, if we wish to use several natural signs to renew a mitzvah, we cannot give them greater weight than ordinary non-definitive simanim, because significant doubts remain.

We must also distinguish between identifying signs that the Torah or Chazal themselves gave us and signs derived in other ways. The former are absolute and may not be disregarded. With inferred simanim, however, many doubts can arise regarding whether the derivation itself is correct. The signs can be interpreted in different ways and can obviously point toward different animals.

6. Umdena

Chachamim and R’ Acha disagree whether one follows an umdena where the facts are not clear (Bava Basra 93b; Shevuos 34a). The halachah follows Chachamim that we do not rely on umdena to remove money from someone or to execute a murderer (Rambam, Hilchos Nizkei Mamon 8:14; Hilchos Sanhedrin 20:1).

The Rambam explains the reason in Sefer HaMitzvos, Negative Commandment 290, R. Kapach translation:

We were warned not to carry out punishments based upon strong estimation, even one that is almost certain… Do not find this difficult and do not think this is unjust law. Possible events range from the highly probable to the extremely remote, with many degrees in between, and the realm of possibility is very broad. If the Torah permitted punishment based upon something extremely probable, almost unavoidable, as in the example mentioned there, punishments would then be carried out based upon something somewhat less certain, then something still less certain, until people would eventually be executed unjustly based on a weak estimate in accordance with the judge’s imagination. Therefore, Hashem closed this door entirely…

In other words, because umdena fills in missing facts with assumptions, there is no clear line between a small assumption and a large one. There is a danger that one would eventually impose a death sentence based upon mere conjecture. The specific prohibition against punishment by umdena, however, applies only in capital cases.

We nevertheless find an area of halachah where umdena is relied upon:

What is the case of an injured person? Witnesses testify that he entered another person’s domain uninjured and emerged injured. He says, “You injured me,” and the other says, “I did not injure you.” The injured person takes an oath and collects.

The witnesses did not see the injury itself; they witnessed only the surrounding circumstances and the result.

The Rambam writes regarding this case (Hilchos Chovel U’Mazik 5:4):

Chazal imposed a penalty upon these violent fools: the injured party is believed, upon taking a Torah-level oath, to say that the defendant inflicted this injury upon him and to collect what is due him, provided there are witnesses. How so? Two witnesses testify that he entered the defendant’s control uninjured and left injured. They did not actually see him being injured. The defendant says, “I did not injure you,” and the injured person says, “You injured me.” The injured person swears and collects.

The Raavad disagrees and writes:

Avraham says: This was not a penalty. Rather, people do not normally injure themselves, and therefore Chazal believed the injured party with an oath.

It appears that even according to the Raavad some Rabbinic enactment is necessary, as the Ramah writes (Sanhedrin 37b):

This is a Rabbinic enactment.

The Ramah further states:

But where they did not see him enter the other person’s house uninjured and emerge injured, there is room to say that perhaps he was already injured. And even if he was initially uninjured, if they did not see him enter the defendant’s control, perhaps someone else injured him. In such a case Chazal did not enact that he should swear and collect. This is why Chachamim entirely exempt the owner in the case of the camel found mating among the camels, as discussed in HaMocher Peiros.

Witnesses are therefore a prerequisite for this halachah. Without witnesses, the rule is hamotzi meichaveiro alav hara’ayah, unless the person who caused the injury admits liability.

The Ramah continues:

Regarding Rav Yehudah’s statement that this applies only where he could have injured himself, but if the injury is in a place where he could not possibly have injured himself he collects without an oath — there is no umdena there at all. When we say testimony by estimation is invalid in monetary cases, that is only where it is possible that the defendant did not cause the damage, although logically it appears that he did. But where we know with certainty that the person entered his control uninjured and emerged injured, and we know with certainty that no one else injured him and he did not injure himself, there is no doubt at all. This is not umdena. Rather, it is testimony based upon knowledge without actual sight. This applies to monetary law, but in capital cases it is invalid.

This concept is therefore called “yediah belo re’iyah” — knowledge without seeing the act. Regarding capital cases, the Rishonim disagree whether such knowledge may be relied upon.

It appears that in our discussion regarding identifying the argamonim as the chilazon of Tekheiles, all the proofs are forms of umdena — evaluations and inferred signs derived from combining Midrashim and halachos dealing with the chilazon. They cannot be given the force of testimony or mesorah.

The simanim themselves are also not the sort upon which one can rely independently. We are therefore dealing with umdenos, and their degree of strength requires considerable analysis. See also Rav Kook’s words at the end of this chapter.

7. Scientific Proof

Those who identify the argamonim as the chilazon of Tekheiles rely primarily upon conclusions from various scientific disciplines: history, archaeology, marine biology, and linguistics. See R. M. Burstein’s HaTekheiles.

We must therefore consider the halachic weight of scientific conclusions in establishing facts with certainty when halachic rulings are to be made based upon them.

Rav Kook zt”l writes in a responsum regarding metzitzah at a bris milah (Da’as Kohen §140):

All of this helps only if we decide that the statements of the physicians are considered certain in our eyes. In truth, however, it appears that in general we regard their statements only as a safek. They themselves cannot regard their conclusions as absolute certainty. At times one person, or even many people, lays down a fundamental principle in medical science — and the same is true of all sciences — and many accept it as truth. Then a later generation investigates it and demonstrates that their words were worthless. What one builds, another overturns. Their statements are therefore no more than support and estimation. Consequently, all of their conclusions have the status of safek. The reason we rely upon them leniently regarding prohibitions in matters of Yom Kippur or Shabbos is because even a possible danger to life overrides all Torah prohibitions except the three cardinal sins… It is almost unnecessary to bring proofs that physicians’ statements possess only the status of doubt, since their own scholars say so. “Poor is the dough whose baker testifies against it.” Nevertheless, we will bring some proofs…

It follows from Rav Kook that reliance upon scientific assessments is not considered certainty. We are therefore dealing with umdenos which must be taken into account, but their strength is as support for the words of Chachamim and no more.

8. Renewed Identification by Chachamim

We do find cases in Chazal where forgotten identifications were reestablished.

Regarding several areas of halachah, Chazal say that something had been forgotten and was later reestablished: the final forms of the letters mem, nun, tzadi, pei, and chaf (Shabbos 104a; Megillah 3a); the measurements necessary for punishments (Yoma 80a); encircling the mizbe’ach with aravos (Sukkah 44a); and the Aramaic translation of the Torah (Megillah 3a).

It appears, however, that all these restorations depended either upon Nevi’im — “the tzofim established them,” which Rashi in Megillah explains to mean “the prophets of the generations” — or upon Ruach HaKodesh, or at least confirmation through Ruach HaKodesh.

The Gemara in Zevachim (62a) asks:

Granted regarding the structure of the Beis HaMikdash, its form was recognizable.
Rashi: The Anshei Knesses HaGedolah knew what area had been sanctified for the Azarah and what for the Heichal, because the foundations of the walls were recognizable.
But regarding the mizbe’ach, how did they know its location?
R’ Elazar said: They saw a built mizbe’ach with Michael, the great ministering angel, standing and offering upon it.
R’ Yitzchak Nafcha said: They saw the ashes of Yitzchak resting in that place.
R’ Shmuel bar Nachmani said: Throughout the entire Beis HaMikdash they smelled the scent of ketores, while from that location they smelled the scent of limbs being burned.

Clearly all three opinions refer to perception through Ruach HaKodesh, not ordinary physical sight or smell. This is even before considering the opinions of R’ Eliezer ben Yaakov and R’ Yochanan in the same sugya, according to whom a Navi identified the location.

This fits with Rav Kook zt”l’s approach (Ginzei HaRe’iyah, Yom HaAtzmaut):

I am particularly clear that all the uncertainties preventing the plan to build the Beis HaMikdash — for example, regarding Tekheiles, the lineage of the Kohanim, the exact measurements and location of the mizbe’ach, and similar matters — Ruach HaKodesh will assist in clarifying the halachah, together with clear umdenos and implementation through a universally accepted Beis Din Gadol.

Rav Kook mentions several conditions: Ruach HaKodesh, clear umdenos, and implementation by a Beis Din Gadol accepted by the entire nation.

These words were admittedly written regarding uncertain matters involving the Beis HaMikdash. Regarding other matters, one might argue that such extensive clarification is unnecessary.

It appears, however, that Rav Kook’s intention is to explain why practical action concerning the Mikdash cannot be undertaken while halachic doubts remain. In other mitzvos it may be possible, at least in some cases, to observe them because of a safek. Regarding the Mikdash, that cannot be done because of the possibility of desecrating the sacred and the severe punishments involved.

Summary

To fulfill a mitzvah with certainty, one needs a clear mesorah regarding the physical object used for the mitzvah.

Where no mesorah exists, one may make use of simanim and umdenos. They are not, however, strong enough to establish certainty, and doubts therefore remain regarding the correctness of the identification.

Consequently, any mitzvah performed using such an identified object cannot be considered certain. It must be treated as a safek mitzvah, with all that this implies.

In the next chapter we will examine the evidence regarding Tekheiles from the argamonim.

Chapter II — Matching the Argamonim to the Chilazon of Tekheiles

A. Tekheiles Is Valid Only If It Comes from the Chilazon

The Tosefta (Menachos 9:6) states:

Tekheiles is valid only if it comes from the chilazon. If it is not from the chilazon, it is invalid.

The Beraisa DeTzitzis similarly states:

Tekheiles may be dyed only with the chilazon.

The Rambam writes at the beginning of Hilchos Tzitzis:

One takes a wool thread dyed like the appearance of the sky and winds it around the hanging strands. This thread is called Tekheiles.

Later (Hilchos Tzitzis 2:2), the Rambam describes the dyeing process:

Afterward they bring the blood of the chilazon, which is a fish whose appearance resembles the sea and whose blood is black like ink…

Similarly, in his Peirush HaMishnayos (Menachos 4:1):

This thread is called Tekheiles, as the Torah says, “They shall place upon the tzitzis of each corner a thread of Tekheiles.” We do not have it today because we do not know its dyeing process. Not every blue shade in wool is called Tekheiles; rather, it is a particular Tekheiles which is not possible today…

In Hilchos Klei HaMikdash (8:13), the Rambam writes:

The Tekheiles mentioned everywhere is wool dyed like the body of the sky, a color mixed from kochal.

The Mishneh LaMelech comments:

The Rambam wrote something similar at the beginning of Hilchos Tzitzis, and I do not know why he did not explain here that this dye must be made from the blood of the chilazon. Even if another dye were found whose appearance resembled the body of the sky, it is obvious that it would not help, since it is not from the blood of the chilazon. At the beginning of Chapter II of Hilchos Tzitzis, the Rambam explained that the Tekheiles of tzitzis comes from the blood of the chilazon, and it is obvious that the same law applies here. Perhaps he relied upon what he wrote in Hilchos Tzitzis.

Some Acharonim have tried to prove from the Rambam’s silence regarding the chilazon in Hilchos Klei HaMikdash that the Tekheiles of the Mikdash need not specifically come from the chilazon. See Ir HaKodesh VeHaMikdash, Vol. V, pp. 43–46, where the issue and the dissenting opinions are discussed.

Regarding tzitzis, however, it appears that everyone agrees that Tekheiles is valid only if it comes from the chilazon.

B. The Scholarly Identification of Argaman and Royal Tekheiles

Non-Jewish sources — works of historians such as Pliny and scholars such as Aristotle — describe the chilazon used to dye argaman and royal Tekheiles, meaning colors used for royal garments, together with its habits and the method of extracting its dye.

They describe the snail from which porphyra, the argaman dye, was produced, and the snail from which hyacinth, a blue-purple form of porphyra, was produced.

Likewise, at archaeological sites near ancient dyeing installations, enormous numbers of argamon shells have been found broken directly opposite the dye gland. This demonstrates that these snails were formerly used to produce dyestuffs.

A total of four blue textile fragments have been discovered in the world whose dye source has been identified as argamon. None of them are tzitzis threads. Other textiles of a Tekheiles-like blue color have been identified as plant-based imitations, kela ilan.

C. The Claim That Tzitzis Tekheiles Came from the Argaman Chilazon

General Background

The recurring principle in the arguments of modern identifiers is that the chilazon used for Tekheiles in tzitzis was the same chilazon used in the ancient world for argaman and royal Tekheiles.

Three species of argamon are found along the coast of Eretz Yisrael: Argamon Keheh Kotzim, Argamon Chad Kotzim, and Argamonit Adumat Peh. These snails possess a dye gland which is colorless while inside the animal. Once removed, it becomes a dye material which, through chemical processes, can produce colors ranging from black-purple through red-purple to blue-turquoise.

Those involved in the identification rely upon historical and archaeological sources and their analysis, marine biological research, and linguistics.

Among our own sources, we have a text of the Yerushalmi at the beginning of Berachos, quoted by the Raavyah, which identifies Tekheiles as “porphyrin.” From this one can infer that the source of the Tekheiles dye was the same as the source of porphyra, argaman.

R’ Binyamin Mussafia, author of Mussaf HaAruch, and the Chavos Yair in Mekor Chaim also write this, although they do not bring proofs.

We do not possess even a single thread of tzitzis Tekheiles from the period when Tekheiles was practiced among Klal Yisrael. No tallis together with its tzitzis has survived from that period, notwithstanding that the Gemara and Poskim indicate that the dead were buried in their garments with tzitzis.

It is therefore impossible to use chemical analysis to identify the precise components of tzitzis Tekheiles and thereby determine their animal source.

The blue royal Tekheiles threads that have been discovered cannot constitute absolute proof regarding the source of tzitzis Tekheiles. How do we know that they had the same source?

Scientific research across different fields, even when the results are compared with one another, remains scientific research containing uncertainty. Direct testimony and mesorah are unquestionably preferable.

Similarly, the ancient argaman dyeing sites do not clearly prove that tzitzis Tekheiles was dyed there. No tzitzis Tekheiles threads were found at these sites. What was found were shells broken near their dye glands, and in some locations traces of dye tending toward argaman.

Aside from the sources mentioned above, neither our sources nor foreign sources explicitly identify the chilazon used to dye Tekheiles for tzitzis.

Every later identification is based upon deductions from the Shas, newly formulated simanim, and applying those simanim to the Tekheiles of tzitzis.

I spoke with Professor Zvi Koren of Shenkar College of Engineering and Design in Ramat Gan, one of the leading experts on dyes in the ancient world. He stated that it cannot be proven with certainty that the Tekheiles of tzitzis was produced from the argamonim.

Some Rabbanim who investigated the subject relied more heavily upon the simanim of the chilazon collected from the Shas and Rishonim, such as the Radzyner Rebbe and Rav Herzog.

Others proceeded through elimination, rejecting every plausible animal until they reached the argamonim, as Rav Eliyahu Tavger did in his article “HaTekheiles” at the end of his sefer Kelil Tekheiles.

According to all approaches, it must be determined whether the mitzvah of pesil Tekheiles can now be fulfilled in tzitzis or whether the mitzvah still remains hidden from us.

It must likewise be determined whether other issues that have been raised, such as the exact color, have actually been resolved.

Part III

Outline

1. The Approach and Proofs of the Modern Identifiers
2. Analysis of the Talmud and Midrashim
3. Examination of the Rishonim and Acharonim

D. The Color of Tekheiles

1. Analysis of the Midrashim and Rishonim
2. The Modern Dyeing Process and Its Correspondence to the Dyeing of Chazal

1. The Approach and Proofs of the Modern Identifiers

The Radzyner Rebbe arrived at his identification based upon simanim. Several later researchers followed a similar method, such as Rav Herzog in his writings and Dr. I. Ziderman in Techumin IX.

The simanim themselves require explanation, and whether the proposed chilazon actually fits those simanim is uncertain.

Furthermore, the simanim do not come from a single source. Some are taken from the Bavli’s descriptions of the chilazon; some are inferred from the Yerushalmi in Shabbos, where the Rebbe disagrees with the Korban HaEidah’s interpretation; some are based on comparisons with Mishnayos in Bechoros and Keilim dealing with an eye defect; some from the type of lock called a chilazon; some from the Rambam’s wording; some from Kabbalistic works such as Sefer HaKanah; and others from Aggadic passages in the Gemara and Midrashim.

The very need for so many simanim is surprising, particularly since each siman on its own can be interpreted differently. The identification therefore remains doubtful.

For this reason, it appears that most of the Gedolei Yisrael did not accept the Radzyner Rebbe’s identification as certain. The Aruch HaShulchan (Orach Chaim 9:12) writes sharply:

Know that a few years ago, one individual boasted that he had found the chilazon and produced Tekheiles from it, and some people followed him. However, none of the Gedolei HaDor or Klal Yisrael listened to him, and the matter became nullified, until the righteous Redeemer arrives, speedily in our days.

The Yeshuos Malko (Orach Chaim §§1–2) likewise writes that this identification was not certain.

It is also reported in the name of the Chafetz Chaim — quoted in HaTekheiles, p. 189, based on R. M. M. Yoshor’s The Chafetz Chaim: His Life and Work — that he said:

I would not put my head into the fire and risk performing the service in the Beis HaMikdash based upon the theory of the Radzyner Rebbe.

Rav Kasher likewise writes in Torah Sheleimah, supplementary material to Vol. XXIII, that the doubt surrounding the Radzyner Rebbe’s identification is too great.

Perhaps the strongest proof of all is that both Rav Herzog, who leaned toward the Janthina snail, and the present Rabbanim and researchers who accept the argamonim did not accept the cuttlefish simanim as compelling.

It should be noted that if reliance on simanim leaves the Radzyner identification uncertain, the other Rabbanim and researchers who relied upon simanim — Rav Herzog, Professor Felix, Dr. Ziderman, and others — are likewise not free from uncertainty. The fundamental questions raised against the Radzyner approach apply to them as well.

Rav Eliyahu Tavger, in his article “HaTekheiles” at the end of Kelil Tekheiles, followed primarily a process of elimination.

When identifying something through elimination, one must first determine whether the central criterion used to reject the alternatives is itself correct. One must also carefully determine whether the eliminated possibilities truly had to be excluded.

Rav Tavger adopted the following criteria for defining a chilazon:

A. The chilazon is an animal.
B. It is found in the sea, specifically the Mediterranean.
C. This chilazon is not a mountain snail.
D. The chilazon has a casing or shell.

Everyone agrees regarding the first two criteria.

Regarding the third, however, Rav Tavger explicitly disagrees with Rashi. In three places — Megillah 6a, Sanhedrin 91a, and Menachos 44b — Rashi writes that the chilazon comes out of the sea and ascends onto the land or mountains. Such behavior is not known regarding the argamonim.

As for the shell or casing, the Radzyner Rebbe also knew the relevant sugyos and interpreted the “casing,” “bones,” and “sinews” mentioned in the Yerushalmi in Shabbos differently from Rav Tavger.

Rav Tavger further cites the Raavad’s commentary to Sefer Yetzirah:

It is impossible to determine whether the chilazon belongs to the category of fish or vegetation, for it lives and moves, yet it does not change its location because it is fixed and embedded in the ground.

This description also does not fit an ordinary terrestrial snail. Anyone who observes them sees that they are not embedded in the ground; they adhere to surfaces and move, leaving a trail of slime behind them.

Rav Tavger also cites the Aruch that the form of the chilazon is a ring, and he reproduced a drawing found in various manuscripts. Neither the description “ring” nor the drawings, however, resemble a snail at all.

After establishing his criteria and supporting them with sources, Rav Tavger examined all matching snails capable of producing dye and arrived at the argamonim.

This depended upon two assumptions:

A. We know all the species of snails that exist in the Mediterranean.
B. No relevant species which existed in antiquity has since disappeared.

To support both assumptions, he relies on scientific opinion.

Regarding the second assumption, he argues that natural conditions have not changed since ancient times and there was no intentional human extermination of such a species. There is therefore no reason that the chilazon should have disappeared.

Regarding the first assumption, scientists have searched for additional snail species for many years, yet virtually no new species have been discovered.

Even if these assumptions are accepted as correct, they remain umdenos based on hypotheses. They cannot actually be proven, particularly the second assumption.

We should add that Rav Herzog was very familiar with the scientific tendency to identify the argamonim as the chilazon of Tekheiles and did not accept it.

Although a certain Midrash did not appear to him to fit the argamon, he certainly knew that alternative interpretations of a Midrash are always possible.

Likewise, regarding the color produced from the argamonim, which he knew did not correspond to his understanding of Tekheiles, he was aware of chemical methods and the possibility of altering the shade.

It therefore appears that he did not accept the argamonim as the chilazon of Tekheiles because he did not regard the evidence as sufficiently certain and proven.

2. Analysis of the Talmud and Midrashim

Unfortunately, in our own sources, aside from one source that will be discussed below, the animal from which the dye was produced is not identified beyond the generic name chilazon.

All proposed identifications are therefore based solely upon simanim derived from sugyos in the Gemara and Midrashim.

The only source giving a more specific identification is the Raavyah, who quotes the Yerushalmi in Berachos:

The Yerushalmi has the reading: “Between Tekheiles and karti” means between pirpiron and perifinin. It is a cloak called pirpura in the vernacular, and there is another color that resembles it somewhat.

Pirpura, also appearing as porphor, porphora, and porphyra, is the snail from which, according to Greek and Roman historians, argaman and royal Tekheiles were produced.

This source itself, however, requires examination.

First, we have no parallel witness to the Raavyah’s version. According to my investigation, none of the Geonim or other Rishonim quotes the Yerushalmi with this wording.

That casts some doubt on its origin. Is it an authentic textual variant? Was it a later addition that entered the manuscript of the Yerushalmi before the Raavyah? Or was it an addition to the Raavyah’s own chiddushim which spread from one manuscript into all later editions?

Admittedly, there are other examples of unique textual variants preserved only by individual Rishonim.

In addition, the word porphyra appears dozens of times in the writings of Chazal, both in well-known Midrashim such as Midrash Rabbah and Midrash Tanchuma and in the Zohar. Yet nowhere is it identified as connected directly or indirectly with tzitzis.

If the Tekheiles of tzitzis was dyed from the same source as porphyra, why did Chazal remain silent about this and never even hint at it?

One can answer that Chazal did not call Tekheiles “porphyra,” so they had no reason to identify the source of its dye with the source of porphyra. But if so, why would the Yerushalmi describe it this way?

Likewise, Tekheiles itself is mentioned many times in the Shas and Midrashim, yet it is never identified as porphyra. Perhaps that is simply because the term was not used as a name for Tekheiles; but perhaps it is because its source was not the same chilazon.

Furthermore, the terms porphyra and argaman appear dozens of times in Chazal, and nowhere is it stated that they come from a chilazon — certainly not that they come from the same chilazon from which Tekheiles was produced, which Chazal regarded as one of the special products of Eretz Yisrael (Bereishis Rabbah ch. 91, on “Take from the praise of the Land”).

By contrast, Chazal repeatedly state that Tekheiles is produced from the chilazon.

The connection drawn between Tekheiles and argaman, that both came from one source, therefore requires proof in my opinion. Consequently, it is difficult to identify Tekheiles with absolute certainty as having been produced from the argamonim.

In conclusion, we possess no explicit statement of Chazal linking Tekheiles with porphyra as coming from one dye source. It has not been proven from Chazal that Tekheiles and argaman had the same source, nor is there a proof from Chazal that argaman and porphyra were produced from a chilazon.

At first glance, a proof that Tekheiles and porphyra are identical might be brought from Pirkei DeRabbi Eliezer, Chapter 49:

R’ Pinchas says: Mordechai became king, as it says, “Mordechai went out from before the king in royal garments of Tekheiles and white…” Just as a king wears porphyria, so too Mordechai, as it says, “Mordechai went out from before the king in royal garments of Tekheiles and white…”

It appears, however, that this proof can be rejected.

First, the Midrash calls the royal garment porphyria, not the Tekheiles itself.

Second, even if porphyria is a term for Tekheiles, the passage has nothing to do with tzitzis. How do we know that the Tekheiles of tzitzis and the royal Tekheiles garment were produced from the same source?

The only source I found from which one might prove that royal Tekheiles and tzitzis Tekheiles had the same source is Shabbos 26a, and only according to Rashi’s explanation.

The Gemara states:

“Nebuzaradan, chief executioner, left some of the poorest people of the land as vineyard workers and yogvim…”
Yogvim — these are hunters of the chilazon from the Ladder of Tyre until Haifa.

Rashi explains:

Uleyogvim — related to the word yekev, because they squeeze and crush the chilazon to remove its blood, as we say later in the chapter Klal Gadol. Nebuzaradan left them there to produce the garments of the king.

We learn from Rashi that the material used to dye Tekheiles — the chilazon of Klal Gadol — was the same material used to dye royal garments.

However, the chilazon itself is not identified in this source, nor does it say that it was the argaman chilazon.

Consequently, even if one argues that Chazal provide a source that royal Tekheiles and tzitzis Tekheiles came from the same source, it remains necessary to prove that this source was the argaman chilazon. That identification is known only from Greek and Roman historians.

By contrast, I have not found any statement of Chazal that argaman and Tekheiles came from the same source, as those who produce Tekheiles from the argamonim maintain. Chazal did not even note such a connection in passing.

One Midrash might raise this possibility. Tanchuma, Terumah §5, states:

HaKadosh Baruch Hu said to them: You are not bringing from your own possessions, but from the spoils of the sea… “Tekheiles and argaman” — Tekheiles, which they dye with blood, as a remembrance of the sign already prepared by the fathers of the world; tola’as — as it says…

Anyone examining the Midrash will notice that the explanation for argaman is missing. The Midrash moves directly from Tekheiles to tola’as.

One could therefore suggest that the explanation of argaman dropped out and that the text should read: “Tekheiles and argaman, which they dye with blood.”

I have found no support for such a reading, however, and no such version appears in other editions of Midrash Tanchuma.

3. Examination of the Rishonim and Acharonim

Raavyah

The clearest Rishon for identifying the argamonim as the source of Tekheiles is the Raavyah. His version of the Yerushalmi stated that Tekheiles is porphyra. His words were discussed above.

Rav Nachshon Gaon

Rav Nachshon Gaon preceded the Raavyah in discussing Tekheiles. A responsum of Rav Nachshon Gaon appears in the Ittur, Hilchos Tzitzis:

In a question to Rav Nachshon, Rosh Mesivta: “Tekheiles resembles the sea, the sea resembles the sky, and the sky resembles the Kisei HaKavod. Its name in Arabic is lamasma, and argaman is banafsegah…”

The Arabic term lamasma is unknown.

In Pesil Tekheiles (Radzyner Rebbe, p. 64), the Rebbe compared this with a statement in The Great Canon, Book II §269, a medical work of Ibn Sina, that there is a chilazon whose hard shell is taken to market, and whose name in old Latin is lamasia.

The Rebbe explained that this word was borrowed from Arabic and refers to the medicinal cuttlefish, which in his view was the chilazon of Tekheiles.

He repeated this in Ein HaTekheiles §24, p. 124, and rejected the possibility that the Arabic term was a general designation for sea creatures rather than a specific chilazon. If that were so, there would be no reason to say that this was the Arabic name for Tekheiles.

Rav Tavger quoted a version of the Ittur in which Tekheiles is described as lawn asma, meaning “the color of the sky.”

According to that version, it is more understandable why Tekheiles and argaman are mentioned together, since the responsum would be listing colors.

The difficulty, however, is the actual wording cited by Rav Tavger. The version appearing in the Radzyner Rebbe’s sefarim, and in our editions of the Ittur, is lamasma, not lawn asma.

I asked scholars of Arabic about the two Arabic words in Rav Nachshon Gaon’s responsum: whether they designate a particular animal species, a color, or perhaps both.

Rav Yosef Kapach replied:

These two words refer only to appearances and colors. The first means the appearance of the blue dome covering the earth, and the second — the translation of argaman — is a shade of purple named after the plant called banafseg, commonly used as a cough remedy.

I find it puzzling that Rav Kapach translated lamasma this way, because elsewhere, in his commentary to Rav Saadia Gaon at the beginning of Parashas Terumah, he explains Rav Saadia’s word for Tekheiles, asmanjun, as:

Like the color of the sky when clear, which is intensely blue and tends toward black.

It would therefore emerge that Rav Kapach gave two different words the same translation.

I asked the same question of Rav Nissim Sabato, who works with translations of the Geonim from Arabic to Hebrew. He discussed it with Professor Blau, who translated the Rambam’s responsa from Arabic and other works.

Neither of them knew the meaning of lamasma.

If the version is lawn asma, the matter is simple, since that means “the color of the sky,” but that was not the word about which they were asked.

Regarding argaman, they agreed with Rav Kapach, except that they noted that today argaman is used for red, whereas Rav Nachshon Gaon describes it as a blue tending toward purple.

The conclusion is that Rav Nachshon Gaon’s words cannot establish the identity of the chilazon of Tekheiles, contrary to the Radzyner Rebbe’s argument. At most, according to certain readings and translators, they establish the color of Tekheiles.

Rambam

In Hilchos Tzitzis, the Rambam describes the chilazon used for Tekheiles:

It is a fish whose appearance resembles the sea, its blood is black like ink, and it is found in the salt sea — meaning salt water, as opposed to fresh water.

This description can be interpreted as describing the argamon snails while they are in the sea.

The phrase “its blood is black like ink,” however, does not fit the argamonim.

One could force an explanation that the Rambam knew the dye liquid only in its dried powdered state rather than as it appears immediately upon breaking the snail open, but ultimately this is a forced reading.

Rashi

Rashi’s commentary to Sanhedrin 91a does not fit any of the accepted identifications:

A worm that comes out of the sea once in seventy years, and they dye Tekheiles with its blood; initially only one chilazon is visible on the entire mountain…

Rashi’s description of the chilazon as an animal that ascends from the sea onto dry land does not fit the argamonim.

The Gra likewise, in his glosses to the Sifrei, VeZos HaBerachah §354, deletes the word “in the sea” from the Sifrei and leaves the wording:

There is a place which lies between mountains.

Other Rishonim

The Radbaz (Vol. II §685) writes:

In the portion of Zevulun it would ascend by itself from the sea onto dry land, and they would gather it. After Yisrael went into exile, it stopped ascending… Chazal said, “These are hunters of the chilazon,” implying that they then had to hunt it.

Neither phenomenon is known regarding the argamonim: they are not known to ascend naturally from the sea onto land, nor are they known to have altered their behavior after the Churban so that they stopped ascending and instead had to be caught only with nets.

The responsa Binyamin Ze’ev (§195) states:

It is a fish whose appearance resembles the sea and whose blood is black like ink, and it ascends once in seventy years, as Rashi explains in Shabbos, Chapter Klal Gadol…

He combines Rashi’s description with that of the Rambam, making the description even less consistent with the argamonim for the reasons explained above.

D. The Color of Tekheiles

1. Analysis of the Midrashim and Rishonim

The Rambam writes in Hilchos Tzitzis (2:1):

The Tekheiles mentioned everywhere in the Torah is wool dyed like a color mixed with kochal, and this is the appearance of the sky visible to the eye when the sky is clear… Anything not dyed with that particular dye is invalid for tzitzis, even if it has the color of the sky, such as wool dyed with istis or other darkening substances.

Based on this Rambam, Rav Kapach writes in note 2 that the color of Tekheiles is blue tending toward black.

His proofs are the comparison to the dye produced from istis, the Rambam’s statement in Halachah 2 that the chilazon’s blood is black, and the Midrash (Bamidbar Rabbah 2:7):

Yissachar — sapphire, and his banner was colored black resembling kochal.

Chazal likewise compare Tekheiles to sapphire and to the Kisei HaKavod (Menachos 43b).

In my opinion, none of this is conclusive.

The word pasuch means “mixed,” as is apparent from the Rambam’s commentary to Negaim, Chapter I. The resulting color could therefore be the familiar color we call Tekheiles today: blue mixed with white.

The Rambam uses the word “black” both for actual black, as in Hilchos Tefillin U’Mezuzah 3:1 and 3:14, and as a general description of a dark color, as in Hilchos Avodah Zarah 12:10, Hilchos Terumos 14:1, Hilchos Tumas Tzara’as 8:10, and Hilchos Edus 1:6.

The Rambam does not describe Tekheiles itself as “darkening.” He uses that word only for its imitations. Therefore, rather than indicating that Tekheiles itself is very dark, his wording may actually indicate that it is less dark than its imitations.

See also Hilchos Shechitah 7:17 and 7:19, where the Rambam uses “black like ink” to describe the appearance of a forbidden lung and “black like blue” for a permitted lung.

It is also difficult to depart from the Rambam’s explicit statement that Tekheiles resembles the sky.

In Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah 3:3 he likewise describes the color of the heavens as Tekheiles.

And in Hilchos Klei HaMikdash 8:13 he writes:

The Tekheiles mentioned everywhere is wool dyed like the body of the sky, a shade mixed from kochal.

Regarding Rav Kapach’s proof from sapphire, aside from the fact that comparisons do not necessarily refer specifically to color — certainly not regarding the Kisei HaKavod — see Ibn Ezra’s long commentary to Shemos 28:9, where he discusses the color of sapphire.

Furthermore, the very Midrash Rabbah cited as a proof actually undermines the argument:

“According to their signs” — each Nasi had a banner, and each banner had a color corresponding to the precious stone on Aharon’s breastplate… Yehudah — nofech, and the color of his banner resembled the sky, with a lion drawn upon it. Yissachar — sapphire, and his banner was black resembling blue…

The Midrash clearly distinguishes between a dark blue tending toward black and the color of the sky.

Since the Rambam compares Tekheiles to the color of the sky — as do Rav Saadia Gaon and Rav Nachshon Gaon in the responsum quoted by the Ittur — it is difficult to depart from their words.

The Raavyah’s statement, if we accept it as an authentic text of the Yerushalmi rather than a later addition, apparently implies that Tekheiles is purple-argaman, because he calls Tekheiles porphyrin. We do not find in Chazal that porphyra is a term for Tekheiles; it is used for argaman.

The responsa Besamim Rosh (§244) writes that one reason the mitzvah of Tekheiles cannot be renewed is:

It is impossible to reproduce the precise appearance of a color based only upon a description in a book.

2. The Modern Dyeing Process and Its Correspondence to the Dyeing of Chazal

The dyeing process in the time of Chazal is described in Menachos 42b:

We bring the blood of the chilazon and other substances, place them into a pot, and boil them…

The Rambam writes (Hilchos Tzitzis 2:1–2):

The Tekheiles used for tzitzis must be dyed with a particular dyeing process that retains its beauty and does not change. Anything not dyed in that way is invalid for tzitzis, even if it resembles the sky…
How is Tekheiles for tzitzis dyed? They take the wool and soak it in lime, then wash it until clean. They boil it with ahala and similar substances, in the manner of dyers, so that it will absorb the color. Afterward they bring the blood of the chilazon… place the blood in a pot, add substances such as kamonia and the like, as dyers do, boil it, and place the wool into it until it becomes like the appearance of the sky. This is the Tekheiles of tzitzis.

From the Gemara’s vague wording and the Rambam’s repeated expression “as dyers do,” it appears that dyeing Tekheiles followed ordinary dyeing methods, aside from the special intention required for the mitzvah.

The Rambam adds one condition:

A known dyeing process that retains its beauty and does not change.

It appears from the Rambam that we were not commanded to use one specific technical process. Any dyeing process is sufficient, provided the dye comes from the blood of the chilazon and the resulting Tekheiles remains beautiful and does not fade.

The Gemara in Menachos also gives tests based upon colorfastness for distinguishing true Tekheiles from kela ilan. Rashi and the Rambam disagree regarding the substances used in those tests because they interpret the Gemara differently.

The modern dyeing process was developed by the late Professor Otto Elsner based upon his scientific knowledge and upon descriptions by Greek and Roman historians of ancient dyeing methods.

The actual dyers, the Ptil Tekhelet organization, tested the resulting dye both according to the testing substances described by Rashi and according to those of the Rambam, and found that the color remained unchanged.

From this perspective, therefore, there would apparently be no concern that the dyeing is invalid, even though today’s process is not certainly identical to the process described in the Shas.

There is, however, another issue requiring examination.

Professor Elsner himself acknowledged that his process essentially isolates the chemical dye components and removes all the organic material from the chilazon blood used for dyeing.

The practical result is that, using today’s dyeing process, the final dyed wool cannot be distinguished from wool dyed with the plant indigo, meaning kela ilan, or even from wool dyed with entirely synthetic chemicals.

The tests of the Shas themselves would yield the same results with all these dyes.

This, however, does not appear to invalidate the Tekheiles by itself. The tests, as their name implies, are merely methods of proving the dye’s source. The validity of the Tekheiles does not depend upon passing the test. Therefore, inability to test it does not render it invalid.

One could also argue that the modern dyeing process removes the substances which formerly enabled a distinction between the two sources of dye and perhaps even destroys the substance responsible for the unusual durability of chilazon Tekheiles.

On the other hand, it can be argued that the problem is not that modern chilazon dyeing is less durable than the Tekheiles of Chazal, but that modern kela ilan dyeing is far more durable today because of greater knowledge of chemistry and dyeing.

Furthermore, there is no proof that the substance that allowed Chazal to distinguish the two dye sources was the same substance responsible for the Tekheiles dye’s durability.

The fact that the source can no longer be distinguished therefore does not prove that the dye fails the Torah’s criterion for Tekheiles.

In a recent conversation I had with Professor Zvi Koren, he explained that although at the time Professor Elsner developed his process it was impossible to distinguish kela ilan from Tekheiles produced through that process, today more advanced equipment can determine whether a dye is of plant or animal origin.

He also informed me that the dye material extracted from Argamon Keheh Kotzim contains at least four different dye compounds. Even according to Professor Elsner’s process, the final dye is not chemically homogeneous; different quantities of these pigments remain in the Tekheiles dye.

Part IV

Outline

Summary

Chapter III — The Halachic Status of Doubtful Tekheiles in Tzitzis

Introduction

A. Performing a Mitzvah Out of Safek
B. The Gezeirah of Kela Ilan
C. Safek DeOraisa LeChumra in Positive Mitzvos

Summary

Our investigation shows that it has not been proven with certainty that the various argamonim are the chilazonim from which the dye for tzitzis Tekheiles was produced.

The principal reliance is upon scholars of argaman and Tekheiles in the ancient world, where these colors were used for prestigious garments. The connection between those prestigious garments and tzitzis Tekheiles has not been sufficiently demonstrated.

In addition, we possess no thread of tzitzis Tekheiles from the time when Tekheiles was practiced among Klal Yisrael from which chemical analysis could establish the precise shade and its animal source.

The Shas and Midrashim likewise do not clearly support the claim that tzitzis Tekheiles came from the argamonim.

Among all the Chachmei Yisrael, we possess one source upon which this identification might be based — the Raavyah’s version of the Yerushalmi — and even that source can be questioned.

Furthermore, that very source raises a question regarding the blue shade adopted because of the name Tekheiles.

The exact shade is not agreed upon by all the Rishonim and Acharonim, although it is unclear how essential the precise shade is.

Likewise, it is not clear that the dyeing processes developed today are the processes used by Chazal. With modern dyeing methods, Tekheiles and kela ilan cannot be distinguished except through highly sophisticated testing.

Chapter III — The Halachic Status of Doubtful Tekheiles in Tzitzis

Introduction

Many remain uncertain whether the snail currently identified as the chilazon of Tekheiles, Argamon Keheh Kotzim, is in fact the chilazon of tzitzis.

Since the matter has not yet been established with certainty, we must determine whether there is any mitzvah at all in using this doubtful Tekheiles, or perhaps those who use it may even be committing an aveirah because its identity is uncertain.

The following halachic questions arise:

A. Several possibilities exist.

The first is that without this doubtful Tekheiles we would place four doubled white strings, producing eight ends. If the doubtful Tekheiles is not actually Tekheiles, perhaps those colored strings do not count toward the tzitzis at all. One would then be wearing a four-cornered garment without proper tzitzis, actively violating a positive mitzvah.

A second possibility is that the doubtful Tekheiles strings invalidate all the tzitzis. The wearer would again be actively neglecting a positive mitzvah.

A third possibility is that the mitzvah is fulfilled through the remaining white strings, so there is no active neglect of the mitzvah, but no mitzvah at all is performed with the doubtful Tekheiles strings; they are halachically as though absent.

A fourth possibility is that even if the Tekheiles is not genuine, the colored strings count as lavan, and the mitzvah of tzitzis is fulfilled through both them and the ordinary white strings.

This question also requires us to investigate the nature of the gezeirah concerning kela ilan.

B. A second question is whether there is an obligation to use doubtful Tekheiles in tzitzis.

C. A further question, according to the possibilities that this Tekheiles does not count as lavan, is whether using it involves bal tosif.

D. Even if none of these concerns applies, we must still consider whether using doubtful Tekheiles might lead to error if definite Tekheiles is eventually discovered — assuming the present Tekheiles proves not to be genuine.

A. Performing a Mitzvah Out of Safek

Is there any prohibition against placing doubtful Tekheiles in tzitzis?

The answers to the possibilities raised above emerge from several sugyos.

The Tannaim disagree whether Tekheiles and lavan are me’akev one another (Menachos 38b). Rebbi rules that each is essential to the other. Chachamim disagree and hold that they are not me’akev.

The Razah, in his commentary to the Rif, Shabbos 11b, as well as an opinion quoted in the Ittur and Meiri, rules like Rebbi. The other Rishonim rule like Chachamim.

The Razah thought that the Baal Halachos Gedolos agreed with him, although the Ramban in Milchamos disagreed with that reading.

According to the Razah and those who agree with him, the mitzvah of tzitzis cannot be fulfilled with lavan without Tekheiles or Tekheiles without lavan. It would follow that throughout all the generations since Tekheiles ceased, the Torah mitzvah of tzitzis was not fulfilled.

According to his opinion, tzitzis without Tekheiles is only Rabbinic. See the Ramban in Milchamos, who questions this.

It would therefore follow that at a time when genuine Tekheiles exists, it would be forbidden to use doubtful Tekheiles, because if the strings are not genuine Tekheiles there would be no valid tzitzis at all.

Since halachah was not ruled according to this opinion, however, it appears that we need not be concerned with it.

The Mishnah at the beginning of HaTekheiles (Menachos 38a) states:

Tekheiles does not prevent the fulfillment of lavan, and lavan does not prevent the fulfillment of Tekheiles.

If this were interpreted like the following statement, “The tefillin of the arm does not prevent the fulfillment of the tefillin of the head,” it would mean that each component stands entirely on its own.

Accordingly, if one had no Tekheiles he would use only two white strings according to Rashi, or three according to the Raavad, and vice versa.

One might then have argued that strings which are neither Tekheiles nor lavan, such as kela ilan, invalidate the entire tzitzis.

Rashi, however, explains:

Even though the mitzvah is to place two Tekheiles strings in tzitzis, as explained below, nevertheless they do not prevent one another. If one made all four Tekheiles or all four white, he has fulfilled the mitzvah.

The other Rishonim write similarly. See Tosafos, s.v. HaTekheiles; Shitah Mekubetzes, letter 10; Rosh §6.

The Ma’adanei Yom Tov quotes the Levush that tzitzis constitutes one mitzvah. Therefore, if one lacks Tekheiles, he places lavan in its place. It is surprising, however, that neither Rashi, Tosafos, nor the Rosh cite a source for this.

The Rosh concludes:

The custom follows Rashi’s explanation.

It follows that the basic mitzvah requires four strings of either lavan or Tekheiles, while there is an additional commandment that a pesil Tekheiles be included in the tzitzis.

The Gemara regarding a linen garment and tzitzis (Menachos 40a), after concluding that Beis Hillel obligates it in tzitzis, quotes R’ Elazar bar Tzadok:

Anyone who placed Tekheiles on his linen garment in Yerushalayim was among those who caused surprise.

Rebbi explains why Chazal prohibited it:

A gezeirah because of kela ilan.

Meaning, perhaps he will place wool dyed with kela ilan upon a linen garment. Since it is not genuine Tekheiles, the wool-linen combination would be kilayim where no mitzvah justifies it.

The Gemara asks:

Let it be no worse than lavan!

Meaning that if a person has no Tekheiles, he places white strings. Kela ilan should be no worse than ordinary white wool.

The Gemara answers that since the lavan can be made from the same material as the garment — linen — and no genuine Tekheiles is present, one may not use white wool and thereby violate kilayim. Only if genuine Tekheiles were present would Beis Hillel permit woolen lavan as well.

We therefore learn that only regarding a linen garment did Chazal decree against woolen tzitzis because of kela ilan. Regarding a wool garment, we hear no prohibition at all, and even the color itself does not prevent the mitzvah.

This supports the fourth possibility raised above: wool dyed with kela ilan fulfills the mitzvah of lavan. It simply does not fulfill the mitzvah of Tekheiles.

Regarding a linen garment, Chazal decreed against using it because one would otherwise violate kilayim unnecessarily.

Tosafos in Menachos 38a likewise writes this. Although they discuss the matter regarding kilayim and bal tosif, they do not distinguish concerning kela ilan. The same appears from the Rosh.

Another relevant sugya is that of a tallis made entirely of Tekheiles (Menachos 41b):

The Rabbis taught: If a tallis is entirely Tekheiles, strings of every color exempt it except kela ilan.
An objection was raised: A tallis can be exempted only with strings of its own color. If the tallis is entirely Tekheiles, one brings Tekheiles and another color and hangs them from it. One should not bring kela ilan, but if he did so it is valid.
Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak said: There is no contradiction. One case refers to a tallis with four strings; the other to a tallis with eight strings.

Rashi gives two explanations for why all colors are valid while kela ilan is invalid initially but valid bedieved.

According to the first explanation, since a tallis which is entirely Tekheiles cannot fulfill min kanaf using strings matching the garment, all other colors can serve as lavan except kela ilan.

The concern regarding kela ilan is that one might remove the strings from this tallis and transfer them to another tallis as genuine Tekheiles. If that second garment is linen, the result could be kilayim where no mitzvah exists.

The conclusion distinguishes between a garment containing only four strings, where one would not remove them because doing so would invalidate the original garment, and a garment containing eight strings, where there is a realistic concern that some might be removed and transferred elsewhere.

According to Rashi’s second explanation, the concern is that one should not have two distinct dye colors in the same tallis.

The conclusion would then mean that where the tallis already has four genuine Tekheiles strings, one should not add four kela ilan strings and thereby introduce two colors. If it has eight strings, including four lavan, adding kela ilan would not invalidate it.

In any event, the underlying concern is kilayim.

In practice, however, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 9:2) rules that one should never place linen tzitzis on a wool garment or wool tzitzis on a linen garment. There is therefore no practical concern that kela ilan will be treated as Tekheiles in a situation involving kilayim where no mitzvah exists.

Furthermore, the entire concern applies specifically to a tallis that is itself Tekheiles-colored, whereas the Mishnah Berurah (9:16), based on the Taz, writes that a yerei Shamayim should make his tallis white.

Finally, the Rashba writes in his chiddushim to Menachos — quoted by the Radzyner Rebbe in Ein HaTekheiles §40, letter 2, although I did not find it in our printed editions:

It appears to me that all colors count as lavan except Tekheiles, because if one used Tekheiles itself in place of lavan, there would be only one color and not two species. Nevertheless, what we require regarding lavan, that it be another type not resembling Tekheiles, applies specifically when genuine Tekheiles is present. But if he places no Tekheiles at all and fulfills only the mitzvah of the corner, meaning lavan, he may use even a color that resembles Tekheiles, such as kela ilan, since he is not explicitly placing Tekheiles. Therefore, the Gemara asks that this kela ilan should at least be considered lavan and exempt the linen garment from tzitzis, since no Tekheiles is present.

According to the Rashba, kela ilan on an ordinary tallis does count as the lavan of tzitzis.

The Rambam, however, writes (Hilchos Tzitzis 2:1):

The Tekheiles mentioned regarding tzitzis… anything not dyed with that particular dye is invalid for tzitzis, even if it resembles the sky, such as wool dyed with istis, black dye, or other darkening substances.

It appears that the Rambam means only that it is invalid as Tekheiles. He is not discussing whether it is valid as lavan. The commentaries do not appear to have addressed this distinction.

The Gemara states in Bava Metzia 61b:

Rava said: Why did the Torah mention Yetzias Mitzrayim… regarding tzitzis?… I am the One who will ultimately punish… one who hangs kela ilan from his garment and says it is Tekheiles.

Likewise, the Sifrei on Parashas Shelach states:

What does Yetzias Mitzrayim have to do with this? So that a person should not say, “I will use colored dye and kela ilan, which resemble Tekheiles, and who will know?” “I am Hashem your God” — know what I did to Mitzrayim.

This seems at first glance to imply that there is punishment for hanging kela ilan in place of Tekheiles.

However, both sources indicate that what is wrong is specifically the fraudulent intention. The person knows that what he is using is not Tekheiles and falsely claims that it is.

Our case is entirely different. The person wants to fulfill the mitzvah and uses the dye because its identity is genuinely uncertain.

The words of Tosafos, however, require analysis:

“One who hangs kela ilan on his garment and says that it is Tekheiles.” Although he violates the mitzvah of tzitzis, nevertheless a verse was necessary to make him violate it from the moment he hangs the strings.

This wording is difficult. It sounds as though one who places kela ilan on his garment not only fails to fulfill Tekheiles but violates the entire mitzvah of tzitzis from the moment of attachment.

There are two obvious difficulties.

First, the halachah is that the obligation of tzitzis applies only when the garment is worn; garments sitting in a box are exempt.

Second, we rule like Chachamim that Tekheiles and lavan are not me’akev one another.

The commentaries likewise struggled with Tosafos’ wording.

The Maharshal in Chochmas Shlomo explains that Tosafos is discussing a person who attaches kela ilan to a garment and sells it to others as Tekheiles. Tosafos ask that he is already violating “lo sonu,” ordinary fraud, which has nothing specific to do with Tekheiles. They answer that here he violates the additional prohibition already from the time he attaches the strings.

The Maharshal wanted to understand the Rosh similarly, and Maharam of Lublin gives a similar explanation.

The Pilpula Charifta explains that the case is one who attaches kela ilan to a garment for the purpose of selling the strings, not necessarily selling the garment itself.

The Maharsha disagrees and maintains that it refers to a person hanging the strings on his own garment. The Torah emphasizes this case because the violation begins already at the time the strings are attached, unlike ribbis or false weights where another person is actually cheated.

The Pnei Yehoshua, after discussing Tosafos, writes:

The Rosh explains that “one who hangs kela ilan on his garment” means one who sells it to others as Tekheiles. In my opinion, his explanation is compelled according to practical halachah. We rule that Tekheiles is not me’akev lavan, and bedieved one fulfills the mitzvah with lavan alone. The Tekheiles mentioned by the Torah is a mitzvah in its superior form. Therefore, why did the Torah need to mention Yetzias Mitzrayim regarding tzitzis? Kela ilan is at least no worse than lavan, as the Gemara states in HaTekheiles, were it not for the Rabbinic gezeirah. Thus, on the Torah level it would be permissible initially to use kela ilan, except that it lacks the superior fulfillment of Tekheiles. There would therefore be no fraud unless the case is one where he sells it to others as Tekheiles.

It follows from the Pnei Yehoshua that kela ilan is invalid only because of a Rabbinic gezeirah.

The Chasam Sofer similarly explains:

It appears to me that there is an obvious question. If the entire problem is that he deceives another person by selling him kela ilan as Tekheiles, why does the Torah specifically mention Yetzias Mitzrayim regarding this fraud when it does not mention it regarding ordinary monetary fraud?… In the case of kela ilan, the buyer at least fulfills the mitzvah of tzitzis, because it is no worse than lavan. As for his failure to fulfill the mitzvah of Tekheiles, he is not responsible; he made the effort to purchase Tekheiles. What more could he have done? There is therefore only ordinary monetary deception here…

The Yeshuos Malko (Orach Chaim §2) writes:

Regarding his further argument that even if it is only a safek, since he may thereby fulfill the mitzvah of Tekheiles he is correct, and one is at least obligated to do so out of doubt, since no harm results. In this he certainly wrote properly, because the string is not invalid according to halachah. As the Gemara says in HaTekheiles, “Let it be no worse than lavan.” Thus, even one who attaches kela ilan, although he has not fulfilled Tekheiles, has nevertheless fulfilled lavan. Although a few Poskim disagree, the majority of Poskim rule this way.

Rav Kasher, in the supplementary material to Torah Sheleimah on Parashas Terumah, likewise addressed the question of renewing Tekheiles in tzitzis while its identification remains uncertain. He rejected renewing the mitzvah for four reasons:

A. It must be restored specifically through mesorah; without mesorah it cannot be renewed.

B. The Radzyner Rebbe’s simanim regarding the cuttlefish are not sufficient or compelling, and there is therefore no obligation to be concerned for his identification.

C. The Rambam did not possess Tekheiles.

D. He cited a source for the Arizal that when the Beis HaMikdash does not exist, lavan alone is sufficient because of poverty, so that poor people should not be embarrassed.

These answers are not satisfactory.

Rav Kasher concludes:

If, with Hashem’s help, a species is discovered regarding which there is no question at all, there will then be room for the Gedolei Torah to reconsider the possibility of observing this mitzvah.

Today, when there is a strong possibility that Argamon Keheh Kotzim is the chilazon, there would appear to be no reason to refrain from placing argamon Tekheiles in tzitzis — at least out of safek.

B. The Gezeirah of Kela Ilan

Some maintain that Chazal issued a gezeirah not to use any doubtful Tekheiles whatsoever, and that only definite Tekheiles is permitted.

According to this view, doubtful Tekheiles has the status of a chaticha de’issura, and refraining from using it is preferable to using it out of doubt.

Their first proof is Bava Metzia 61b:

Rava said: Why did the Torah mention Yetzias Mitzrayim?… HaKadosh Baruch Hu said: I am the One who distinguished in Mitzrayim between the drop that produced a firstborn and one that did not; I am the One who will ultimately punish… one who hangs kela ilan on his garment and says it is Tekheiles.

At first glance, this implies that one who attaches kela ilan to his garment is punished. If there is a punishment, there must be an aveirah. According to this approach, the aveirah is the very act of using these strings.

A second proof is the Gemara’s statement that one reason Chazal prohibited tzitzis on a linen sheet is:

A gezeirah because of kela ilan.

They understand this to mean that Chazal prohibited wearing a garment to which kela ilan tzitzis had been attached.

A further argument is Rav Kook’s statement:

I am particularly clear that regarding all the uncertainties preventing the plan to build the Beis HaMikdash — such as Tekheiles, the lineage of Kohanim, the precise measurements of the location of the mizbe’ach, and similar matters — Ruach HaKodesh will assist in clarifying the halachah, together with clear umdenos and implementation through a universally accepted Beis Din Gadol.

At first glance, this would seem to close the door on renewing Tekheiles until the matter is clarified through spiritual revelation and the agreement of the Sanhedrin.

Even though Rav Kook was speaking about matters relating to the Beis HaMikdash, one might argue that since the Tekheiles is the same Tekheiles, there should be no distinction between its use for tzitzis and its use in the Mikdash.

It appears, however, that none of these arguments removes the possibility — or perhaps obligation — to renew the mitzvah of Tekheiles in tzitzis, at least because of the safek.

First, nowhere in the Gemara, Rishonim, or Acharonim do we find any mention of such a gezeirah transforming kela ilan, which is valid for lavan in almost all garments aside from certain cases involving a garment entirely of Tekheiles, into a forbidden object.

The Gemara itself asks regarding the linen garment:

Let it be no worse than lavan!

How can we invent a new gezeirah on our own?

The proof from Rava in Bava Metzia can likewise be rejected.

That case involves deception and misleading other people. It is this dishonesty that makes the use of kela ilan an aveirah.

But why should it be forbidden where a person uses it in order to fulfill the mitzvah and makes it perfectly clear that he is using it only because of the safek?

According to the proposed approach, every case where we perform something because of a doubt should be prohibited: doubts about a person’s status, such as a tumtum or androgynos; doubts regarding time, such as Yom Tov Sheini in chutz la’aretz; or doubts in the actual form of a mitzvah, such as the different shofar blasts according to certain Rishonim.

That is obviously impossible to maintain.

The prohibition must therefore refer specifically to deceiving others.

Likewise, those who reject wearing doubtful Tekheiles because of the gezeirah of kela ilan are, in my opinion, mistaken regarding the nature of the gezeirah.

The entire concern is that a person may take a linen garment and attach wool strings dyed with kela ilan. Since he is not fulfilling the mitzvah of Tekheiles, while he could have fulfilled lavan using linen strings, he would be wearing kilayim where there is no need for it.

As the Gemara states:

Since it is possible to use the same material, one may not use the other material, in accordance with Reish Lakish: Wherever you find a positive mitzvah and a negative prohibition, if you can fulfill both, that is preferable; only where you cannot fulfill both does the positive mitzvah override the prohibition.

Here both can be fulfilled, and therefore he would violate kilayim.

But the practical halachah is that a linen tallis receives only white strings of its own material, linen (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 9:2), and some authorities forbid even that (ibid. §4).

Likewise, placing Tekheiles upon linen garments was already prohibited by Chazal. The Gemara says that anyone in Yerushalayim who attached Tekheiles to his linen garment was among those who caused surprise.

There is therefore no practical concern of kilayim without a mitzvah even if the present dye is not genuine Tekheiles.

Regarding the proof from Rav Kook, it should be noted that he was speaking specifically about the mitzvos of the Mikdash.

There is room to distinguish between the Tekheiles of tzitzis and the Tekheiles of the Mikdash.

Many Acharonim have already noted the difference in the Rambam’s wording. When discussing tzitzis Tekheiles, he mentions the chilazon and states that the dye must retain its beauty and not change. When discussing the Tekheiles of the Mikdash, he omits these requirements.

Some Acharonim conclude from this that according to the Rambam, Mikdash Tekheiles does not require everything that uniquely defines tzitzis Tekheiles, but only the proper color.

Among the Acharonim who discuss this distinction, although some remain with a question and others adopt the distinction, are the Mishneh LaMelech in Hilchos Klei HaMikdash, Merkavas HaMishneh, Avnei Nezer (Orach Chaim §15), Yad David, Aruch HaShulchan in Hilchos Klei HaMikdash 28:15, and Rav Tukachinsky in Ir HaKodesh VeHaMikdash, end of Vol. V.

Even if we assume that they are literally the same Tekheiles, there is still a difference between the Mikdash and other mitzvos.

In the Mikdash, each halachic detail can be me’akev, and we generally do not perform doubtful acts as a chumra except in a few bedieved situations, such as mixtures of sacrificial blood.

With mitzvos outside the Mikdash, by contrast, we often perform them because of a safek.

It therefore appears that one should not refrain from placing Tekheiles in tzitzis, at least as a safek, out of concern for some supposed Rabbinic gezeirah prohibiting doubtful Tekheiles.

C. Safek DeOraisa LeChumra in Positive Mitzvos

The Radzyner Rebbe, in Ein HaTekheiles §41, pp. 171–177, maintained that even if the Tekheiles he discovered was uncertain, one is obligated to use it under the general rule of safek deOraisa lechumra.

He debates an opponent who argued that where performing the mitzvah will not resolve the underlying doubt, there is no Torah obligation to perform it. The Radzyner brings many proofs that this is incorrect and that an obligation nevertheless exists.

His argument requires examination.

The Rishonim disagree regarding the rule of safek deOraisa lechumra in prohibitions: whether the Torah itself requires stringency or whether Torah law is lenient and only Chazal required stringency.

The Rambam’s position is that on a Torah level one may be lenient in a safek, and the requirement to be stringent is Rabbinic.

The Rashba’s position is that Torah law itself requires stringency.

The Acharonim discuss this at length. See Shev Shemaatsa, Shaar I; Shaarei Yosher, Shaar I; and elsewhere.

According to those who hold safek deOraisa lechumra on the Torah level, some explain that the uncertain prohibition is treated as though it were definitely prohibited, as the Rashba’s wording in Toras HaBayis implies.

Others maintain that it remains merely a doubtful prohibition, except that the Torah commands us to be stringent regarding it.

Thus, for example, one brings an asham talui for doubtful forbidden fat rather than a regular chatas.

This also explains why a person must separate himself from a doubtful prohibition as though it were definite, although one who deliberately violates a doubtful prohibition does not receive lashes.

Regarding Tekheiles, however, we are not dealing with a doubtful prohibition but with a doubtful positive mitzvah. We must determine whether the same dispute applies.

The Maharitam Algazi writes in his commentary to the Ramban’s Hilchos Bechoros, Chapter III, §40:

One cannot challenge the Rambam by saying that since he holds all doubts regarding prohibitions are permitted by the Torah, why would the Torah obligate a woman who is doubtfully a yoledes to bring a korban because of the doubt? Should she not be exempt? This is incorrect. The Rambam’s principle applies only to prohibitions. Regarding positive mitzvos, however, if one is uncertain whether he fulfilled the mitzvah or uncertain whether he is obligated to perform it, he must fulfill the positive mitzvah because of the doubt. Since a positive mitzvah has greater force than a prohibition, as we rule that a positive mitzvah overrides a negative prohibition, it likewise possesses greater force regarding doubt, and one must act stringently.

The Oneg Yom Tov (§71) similarly writes:

If we say that a doubtful mitzvah is treated stringently, the matter is understood, because destroying idolatry is a mitzvah with which they were commanded after entering Eretz Yisrael, as stated in Avodah Zarah 45a, and safek mitzvah lechumra.

The implication of these sources is that a doubtful positive mitzvah is treated as part of the positive mitzvah itself.

Just as one must pursue an opportunity to perform a mitzvah, one must likewise act in a case of doubtful fulfillment.

Some Acharonim compare the Maharitam Algazi’s approach with that of the Chavos Da’as, §110, beginning of Beis HaSafek. In my opinion there is a distinction.

The Chavos Da’as addresses the questions of the Rishonim against the Rambam’s rule that a doubtful prohibition is lenient on the Torah level and stringent only Rabbinically.

He resolves the questions and concludes:

From here we also see a distinction between where the Torah commands an active obligation and where it commands passive abstention. Regarding all prohibitions, where the Torah says, “You shall not eat this,” such as pig or forbidden fat, we say: definite pig and definite fat you may not eat, but doubtful pig or fat may be eaten, just as the Gemara derives regarding “no impure thing shall be eaten,” that only definite impurity is forbidden. But where the Torah commands an affirmative act, such as “he shall take a virgin as a wife,” taking an esrog, or eating matzah, we say he must fulfill it with certainty rather than doubt, just as the Torah derives “definitely pure and not doubtfully pure.”

In my opinion, his intention is as the Avnei Nezer explains (Yoreh De’ah §334:19):

The Acharonim have formulated an important principle in the Rambam: whatever the Torah says refers to certainty, not doubt. Consequently, the mitzvah itself must also be fulfilled with certainty; otherwise one has not fulfilled it.

One might have thought that according to the Rambam, just as one is lenient regarding every doubtful Torah prohibition, the same should apply to positive mitzvos, and a doubtful fulfillment should suffice.

The Chavos Da’as establishes that this is not so: one has fulfilled the mitzvah only where its fulfillment is certain.

Some Acharonim drew two conclusions from this concept of safek deOraisa lechumra regarding positive mitzvos:

A. One does not fulfill the mitzvah through a doubtful act.

B. The Torah obligates a person to perform even doubtful acts, lest he thereby fulfill a Torah mitzvah.

In my opinion, the Chavos Da’as agrees only with the first conclusion.

According to him, a Torah mitzvah has been fulfilled only with certainty, and a Torah obligation to perform it exists only where certainty can be obtained.

Therefore, if a person is definitely obligated in a positive mitzvah but is uncertain whether he has already fulfilled it, and he now has the ability to perform it with certainty, he certainly must do so on a Torah level.

But where only a doubtful method of fulfilling the mitzvah stands before him, and he does not know whether this action will fulfill the mitzvah, the Torah does not obligate him to perform it.

The phrase safek deOraisa lechumra can thus carry several different meanings.

A practical difference between the approaches would involve the obligation of a tumtum regarding positive mitzvos, or performing a mitzvah during bein hashmashos where the mitzvah must be fulfilled that day.

According to the Maharitam Algazi, he is obligated because perhaps he will thereby fulfill a Torah mitzvah.

According to the Chavos Da’as, there is no Torah obligation because the act itself constitutes only doubtful fulfillment.

It appears that Maharam Benet intended this understanding of the Chavos Da’as in his commentary to the Mordechai, Hilchos Tzitzis §949:

It can indeed be said that regarding a safek mitzvah, the Rambam agrees that we act stringently and that one fulfills his obligation only through certainty. A proof appears from Hilchos Krias Shema, Chapter II, where the Rambam rules that if one is uncertain whether he recited Krias Shema, he repeats it and recites the berachos before and after it. If Torah law were lenient and he repeated it only Rabbinically, how could he make the berachos? It would be a possible berachah levatalah. It must therefore be that regarding a mitzvah, the Rambam agrees that one does not fulfill his obligation until he performs it with certainty, and he therefore repeats Krias Shema on a Torah level and may properly make the berachos.

According to the Maharitam Algazi, however, since a doubtful mitzvah itself carries a Torah obligation like a definite mitzvah, one could apparently make a berachah for that reason as well.

It also appears that the Chasam Sofer understood the Chavos Da’as in the manner I have suggested, based upon the words of the Kesav Sofer, quoted by the Sdei Chemed, system samech, rule 41:

The Chavos Da’as has already established for us, and my father, the great light of the exile, the Chasam Sofer z”l, independently confirmed the same principle, that a doubtful positive Torah mitzvah is treated stringently because the Torah did not speak regarding doubt. He discusses the matter and concludes that this applies specifically to someone who is definitely obligated. But where his very status as one obligated in the mitzvah is doubtful — such as a doubtful Kohen who may be obligated to perform nesias kapayim, a doubtful Yisrael, or a doubtful minor — we do not say that the Torah requires stringency.

According to the Maharitam Algazi, however, even a person whose very obligation is doubtful should apparently be obligated on the Torah level.

This also appears to be the view of Mahari Assad (Yehudah Ya’aleh, Vol. II §256):

There is no question. The Rambam agrees that from doubt one does not fulfill the obligation of the mitzvos of Pesach…

His wording implies that a doubtful act does not satisfy the mitzvah. It does not imply that a new Torah obligation exists to perform every doubtful mitzvah.

The Acharonim who discuss the matter, however, note that some reject the entire principle that doubtful positive mitzvos must be treated stringently.

Some argue that just as the Rishonim dispute doubtful negative prohibitions, they likewise dispute positive mitzvos.

Others argue that even according to the Rashba and those who agree with him, Torah law requires stringency only regarding negative prohibitions, while with positive mitzvos Torah law is lenient.

The Sdei Chemed lists among these opinions the Pri Megadim, Orach Chaim §344, Mishbetzos Zahav; Toras Chesed §7; Hagahos Semak of Mahari”tz; the Netziv; and other Acharonim.

The Pri Megadim in Orach Chaim 17:2, Eshel Avraham, himself remains uncertain. He leans toward saying that stringency is required only Rabbinically, because regarding a prohibition the person actively violates an issur, whereas failure to perform a positive mitzvah is merely shev ve’al ta’aseh. Therefore, on a Torah level, one would be exempt in a doubtful case.

The Pnei Yehoshua writes similarly in Berachos 20b and 12a.

The conclusion of this discussion is that the Acharonim disagree whether there is a Torah or Rabbinic obligation to perform an act where it is doubtful whether the positive mitzvah will actually be fulfilled.

Part V

Outline

D. Bal Tosif
E. Concern for Issur if Definite Tekheiles Is Later Discovered
F. Concern for Error if Definite Tekheiles Is Later Discovered

Summary

Chapter IV — The Significance of Wearing Tekheiles Today for the Individual Who Does So

A. Yuhara

1. Sources in the Shas

D. Bal Tosif

A further question requiring clarification is whether performing a positive mitzvah because of a safek creates a concern of bal tosif.

The Gemara in Rosh Hashanah 28b concludes:

Rava said: To fulfill a mitzvah, intention is not required. To violate bal tosif, during the proper time intention is not required; outside the proper time intention is required.

Rashi explains:

To fulfill the mitzvah, intention is not required; even without intending, he fulfills his obligation.

Regarding bal tosif, such as adding a fifth species to the four minim or five compartments to tefillin, during the proper time one need not intend to perform a mitzvah in order to violate bal tosif.

Outside the proper time, one does need intent to fulfill the mitzvah in order to violate bal tosif. Therefore, one who sleeps in a sukkah on Shemini Atzeres without intending it as a mitzvah does not receive lashes.

From the Gemara and Rishonim, see Rabbeinu Yerucham, end of Nesiv XIII, it appears that according to those who hold mitzvos tzrichos kavanah, such as the Rif and those who follow him, intent for the mitzvah is required in order to violate bal tosif even during its proper time.

According to those who hold mitzvos ein tzrichos kavanah, such as Tosafos and the Rashba, intention is not necessary to violate bal tosif during the proper time.

Where a mitzvah is performed because of doubt, one must therefore determine whether the person possesses full intent to perform the doubtful mitzvah, or whether his intent itself is conditional or doubtful.

Tosafos, Rosh Hashanah 28b, s.v. Mena, asks:

Why is this case stronger — blood requiring one application mixed with blood requiring four applications, where only one application is made because of bal tosif — than the case of a Kohen who ascends to duchan and may not add a blessing of his own?
It can be answered that regarding the Kohen, since he specifically intends to bless and add, he may violate bal tosif even though it is no longer the proper time. Here, however, he does not intend to add and acts only because of the doubt. He would therefore not violate unless this is considered the proper time. It must be considered the proper time, because if another firstborn animal came before him, he would again sprinkle from its blood.

It follows that during the proper time, where bal tosif is violated even without specific intent according to Rava, a person may violate bal tosif even if his act is motivated by a doubt.

According to this, one might argue that doubtful Tekheiles should not be placed in tzitzis.

However, this proof can be rejected. The case there does not involve a genuine safek. It involves a mixture of two different types of sacrificial blood. Whether one gives extra applications or fewer applications, one side of the mixture will inevitably be handled incorrectly.

Our case is different. One possibility is that he will genuinely fulfill the mitzvah and violate nothing.

Thus, when Tosafos uses the word safek, it is only loosely describing the uncertainty created by the mixture.

This is also indicated by Tosafos HaRosh, who slightly changes the wording:

But here, where he does not intend to add and acts only because of the mixture, he would not violate were it not considered the proper time…

The distinction between a safek and a mixture is that in a mixture he deliberately intends to perform either one application or all four.

With a true safek, however, if he knew there were no mitzvah involved, he would not perform the act at all.

There is therefore no proof from Tosafos or Tosafos HaRosh regarding our case.

The Mordechai (Megillah, Chapter I §775) explicitly writes that even where a mitzvah is performed because of a safek, bal tosif can apply:

The reason we do not read the Megillah on both the fourteenth and fifteenth out of doubt nowadays, as we do regarding Yom Tov, may be because perhaps the fourteenth is the actual established date, and on the fifteenth there would be a violation of “and it shall not pass.” And even though they already read it, there is a general prohibition of bal tosif… Alternatively, there is bal tosif, because it remains the proper time if residents of a walled city happen to be present and he could discharge their obligation.

It appears that the Mordechai is concerned that the second day might still be considered within the mitzvah’s time. Therefore, even though the person reads only because of a safek, he can violate bal tosif.

Rashi in Eruvin 96a explains the Gemara’s question:

“Furthermore, one who sleeps in the sukkah on the eighth day should receive lashes.”

Rashi explains:

He is adding an eighth day onto the seven. Yet we ourselves sit in the sukkah on the eighth day because perhaps it is really the seventh. Rather, outside the mitzvah’s proper time, without intention it is not considered an addition. Therefore, we permit it, because if it is actually the eighth day we do not intend to fulfill the mitzvah of sukkah.

Rashi therefore holds that since this is outside the proper time, intention is necessary to violate bal tosif. If the person specifically does not intend to perform the mitzvah on the eighth day, he does not violate.

Rashi further implies that merely having doubtful intent is not enough to avoid bal tosif. One must specifically intend that if he is not obligated, he is not performing the mitzvah.

Rashi therefore disagrees with the Mordechai and permits the act through a condition: if there is no obligation at this time, he does not intend to fulfill the mitzvah.

The Rosh agrees with Rashi in Hilchos Tefillin §6:

Since great Geonim disputed the matter and the tefillin of each opinion are invalid according to the other, while Chazal said there is enough room on the head to place two pairs of tefillin and likewise on the arm, a yerei Shamayim should satisfy both opinions. He should make two pairs of tefillin and wear both, and when placing them he should intend: “With whichever pair is written properly I fulfill my obligation; the other is merely ordinary straps.” There is no bal tosif unless one makes tefillin with five compartments.

This is ruled by the Tur and Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 34:2.

The Rosh’s chiddush goes beyond Rashi.

Rashi discussed a mitzvah outside its proper time, where intent is necessary for bal tosif. The Rosh maintains that even during the proper time, a conditional intention can prevent bal tosif.

Our interpretation of the Rosh agrees with the Bach, who explains that the second pair is regarded as ordinary straps specifically because of the concern of bal tosif.

The Magen Avraham and Gra also appear to understand it this way.

The Yom Teruah writes:

There is room to explain why those who wear both Rashi and Rabbeinu Tam tefillin do not violate bal tosif. Since they do not intend to add, but wear both only because of the doubt, it is not bal tosif. It is as though they make a condition that they fulfill the mitzvah with whichever pair is valid, while the other is merely ordinary straps.

The Rishonim ask in Rosh Hashanah 16a why the repeated shofar blasts, both sitting and standing, do not violate bal tosif.

Tosafos answers that repeating the same mitzvah does not constitute bal tosif.

The Ritva gives another answer:

If you ask that there should be bal tosif, even if you say that once the first set was established the mitzvah’s time has passed, and we rule that outside the proper time one violates only with intention — here we do intend to perform a mitzvah! This is not a question, because here we do it because of a safek.

We see a new opinion here: an act performed because of a safek is not subject to bal tosif at all.

It is not merely that the person’s intent converts the act into something permissible. Rather, bal tosif simply does not apply to an act performed with the intention of satisfying a doubtful mitzvah.

The Meiri similarly writes (Rosh Hashanah 28b):

Anything done because of a doubt — such as sitting in the sukkah on the eighth day because perhaps it is the seventh, or any other doubt that causes a person to extend the time of a mitzvah or add to the physical form of a mitzvah — involves no bal tosif at all. The Gemara’s question, “Then one who sleeps in the sukkah on the eighth should receive lashes,” refers to those who established the calendar by eyewitness testimony, where the eighth day was definitely weekday. The great commentators, meaning Rashi, who interpret the question as referring to the eighth day that may actually be the seventh, do not appear correct, because if so the same problem would exist regarding every second day of Yom Tov.

Their underlying principle is that safek is a halachic category of its own and does not conflict with bal tosif.

The prohibited intention in bal tosif is always an intention to add to the mitzvah. In a case of doubt, however, the person has no intention to add anything; he intends only to fulfill the mitzvah itself.

The Riaz, quoted in Shiltei Giborim to the Rif, Rosh Hashanah 9b, similarly writes:

One who adds to the mitzvos does not violate bal tosif until he intends to add to the mitzvos. Therefore, we sit in the sukkah on the eighth day, blow shofar on the second day of Rosh Hashanah, and eat matzah on the second night of Pesach and recite the berachah al achilas matzah. Even though perhaps it is actually a weekday and he is thereby adding to the mitzvah, nevertheless, since he does not intend to add and does so only because of the doubt, there is no bal tosif. Likewise, one who adds shofar blasts is merely like one who adds prayers, and one who takes the lulav repeatedly to shake it does not intend to add to the Torah’s command but only to beautify the mitzvah.

He compares adding because of hiddur mitzvah with adding because of safek.

In both cases, since the person does not intend to add to the mitzvah but rather to perform the mitzvah itself more completely, there is no bal tosif.

We therefore have three approaches:

A. Mordechai: Performing a mitzvah because of safek can involve bal tosif.

B. Rashi and Rosh: In a case of doubt, one can avoid bal tosif through a conditional intention.

C. Ritva and Meiri: Anything done because of a genuine safek does not involve bal tosif.

Applying these views to doubtful Tekheiles:

According to the Mordechai, one should not use doubtful Tekheiles because of bal tosif.

According to the Ritva and Meiri, it is permitted.

According to Rashi and the Rosh, based upon the Gemara’s statement in Menachos 40a, “Let it be no worse than lavan,” one should have the following intention:

If these dyed strings are genuine Tekheiles, I intend to fulfill the mitzvah of Tekheiles with them. If they are not, they should simply count as ordinary lavan strings.

Rav Yaakov Ariel shlita challenged this conclusion.

The substance of his argument is that since color is merely an appearance, kela ilan itself can count as lavan. Therefore, once the wearer makes this condition, even the Mordechai should agree there is no bal tosif.

In my opinion, however, since according to the Mordechai the condition itself does not solve the bal tosif problem, and the person is adding an element to the mitzvah whose status is uncertain, it remains a violation of bal tosif. See Chochmas Shlomo, Orach Chaim §31.

E. Concern for Issur if Definite Tekheiles Is Later Discovered

The Gemara states in Beitzah 5b:

Rav Ada and Rav Shalman, both from Bei Kelochis, said: Even after the enactment of Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai, an egg remains forbidden on the second day of Rosh Hashanah when witnesses arrived after Minchah. Why? Because the Beis HaMikdash may speedily be rebuilt, and people will say, “Last year did we not eat an egg on the second day of Yom Tov? Let us eat it this year as well.” They will not realize that last year the two days had separate kedushos, whereas now they form one long kedushah.
If so, should we also refuse to accept testimony after Minchah?
Testimony is entrusted to Beis Din; an egg is entrusted to everyone.

We learn two principles from this sugya regarding Rabbinic enactments.

First, the general public does not necessarily pay attention to the changing circumstances that created the halachic practice.

A temporary heter dependent upon a particular situation can therefore cause people to stumble once the situation changes.

Second, we do not have the same concern regarding Beis Din. A temporary heter can be given to Beis Din because, as Rashi says:

They know the reason for the law and will not err.

Another source illustrating the problem of public enactments where circumstances may change is the Gemara regarding the berachah of Shehecheyanu on Yom Kippur (Eruvin 40b):

Let him make the berachah over a cup and put it down? One who makes a berachah must taste it. Let him give it to a child? The halachah does not follow Rav Acha bar Yaakov, because perhaps the child will become accustomed to it.

Meaning, we are concerned that children will become confused. When they become adults, they may assume that just as they were allowed to taste the cup of blessing on Yom Kippur in childhood, they may do so as adults.

Based on this, we must determine whether using doubtful Tekheiles could create future problems.

Perhaps, by introducing doubtful Tekheiles into the public consciousness until large numbers of people wear it, we will cause the public to err if definite Tekheiles is later discovered.

The situation could develop beyond individual meticulous people using Tekheiles as a personal chumra. People from every part of the community could adopt it.

If they later switch to definite Tekheiles, some might continue using the doubtful Tekheiles, which would then have the same status as kela ilan in the days of the Gemara.

It appears, however, that the concern of causing a future stumbling block applies specifically to prohibitions, not where a positive mitzvah is merely being performed incompletely because it later becomes clear that the mitzvah must be performed differently.

Therefore, regarding the mitzvah itself, there does not appear to be a concern that wearing doubtful Tekheiles now will create a future prohibition.

Future problems could arise, however, if the limitations which apply to tzitzis today are not preserved.

There is a halachic difference between a time when Tekheiles is available and a time when it is hidden.

The Rambam rules (Hilchos Tzitzis 3:5):

On a wool garment one makes the lavan from wool. On a linen garment one makes the lavan from linen of the same material. On garments of other materials, one makes the lavan from that same material — silk threads for a silk garment, hair threads for a hair garment. If one wishes to make lavan for any of these other garments from wool or linen, he may do so, because wool and linen exempt both garments of their own material and garments of other materials, whereas other materials exempt only garments of their own kind.

At first glance, the Rambam appears internally difficult.

He begins by saying that linen lavan is not used on wool and wool is not used on linen, but concludes that wool and linen exempt even garments made from other materials, seemingly implying that wool can exempt linen and linen can exempt wool.

A further problem appears in the following halachah:

What is the law regarding placing wool threads on a linen garment or linen threads on a wool garment? Strictly speaking it should be permitted, because shaatnez is permitted regarding tzitzis, as Tekheiles is wool and is placed on linen. Why then is this not done? Because the lavan can be made from the same material as the garment. Wherever you find a positive commandment and a negative prohibition, if you can fulfill both, that is preferable. Only if you cannot fulfill both does the positive mitzvah override the prohibition. Here both can be fulfilled.

The Kesef Mishneh asks that if the Rambam is discussing a period when Tekheiles exists, why does he permit linen lavan on garments of other materials where, according to the Rambam, the mitzvah is only Rabbinic?

When Tekheiles of wool is then added, one would create kilayim where no Torah mitzvah justifies it.

The Kesef Mishneh answers that the Rambam is discussing a person who uses only lavan. For such a person, one may not use strings of a different material.

On a Torah level, however, where genuine Tekheiles is being placed on a linen garment, woolen lavan can also be used because wool is already present for the Tekheiles.

The Rambam’s rulings would therefore emerge as follows.

When Tekheiles is used:

A wool garment — use wool lavan. Linen is forbidden; see Kesef Mishneh.

A linen garment — lavan may be either linen or wool.

A garment of another material — lavan may be made either from the same material or from wool. Linen is forbidden because of kilayim.

When Tekheiles is unavailable:

A wool or linen garment — lavan must be of the same material.

A garment of another material — lavan may be made from its own material, linen, or wool, but wool and linen may not be combined.

To these laws, Chazal added another gezeirah (Rambam 3:7):

A linen garment does not receive Tekheiles. Rather, only white linen strings are used. This is not because the mitzvah of tzitzis fails to override shaatnez, but because of a Rabbinic gezeirah lest he wear it at night, when there is no obligation of tzitzis, and then violate a negative prohibition at a time when no positive mitzvah exists.

A linen garment therefore has two additional Rabbinic restrictions: one may not place Tekheiles upon it at all, and one may not use woolen lavan even when Tekheiles exists.

Accordingly, the concern about changing from doubtful Tekheiles to definite Tekheiles would arise only regarding a linen garment, since that is the only situation in which kilayim could result.

But Chazal already prohibited both Tekheiles and woolen lavan on such a garment. There is therefore no concern.

Tosafos, Rosh, Semag, and other Rishonim rule that tzitzis applies on a Torah level even to garments of other materials, and that their strings may be made either of the garment’s own material or from wool or linen. See Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 9:1.

At first glance, if linen tzitzis were placed on such garments and wool Tekheiles later added, there could be kilayim where no mitzvah justifies it.

But this is a concern only now, when the Tekheiles is doubtful.

If we observe all the laws now as though we were still in a period without definite Tekheiles, there is no concern.

In the future as well there will be no kilayim problem, because once definite Tekheiles is established, the wool Tekheiles will constitute kilayim in the context of a mitzvah.

Furthermore, for Ashkenazim who follow Tosafos and those who agree with him that other garments are obligated on a Torah level, the Rema nevertheless rules, Orach Chaim 9:2, that initially linen strings should not be used even on other types of garments. See also §6 and Mishnah Berurah §18.

The practical chance of violating kilayim is therefore small in any event.

In conclusion, there appears to be no concern of causing the public to stumble through doubtful Tekheiles, provided that it is treated according to the rules that apply during a period without definite Tekheiles: it should be used only as a chumra, and no leniencies should be adopted based upon treating it as certain Tekheiles.

F. Concern for Error if Definite Tekheiles Is Later Discovered

The Gemara states in Sukkah 31a:

If one cannot find an esrog, he should not bring a quince, pomegranate, or anything else.

The Gemara explains on 31b:

Obviously!
One might have thought that he should bring another fruit so that the concept of esrog not be forgotten. The Mishnah therefore teaches that he should not, because a problem may eventually result: people may become accustomed to it.

Rabbeinu Chananel explains:

Even after an esrog again becomes available, people may still bring the substitute and say, “This one is like that one; both exempt the obligation.” A serious error will result. Therefore, nothing other than an esrog may be used.

In other words, taking any substitute “object of a mitzvah” which is not the object commanded by the Torah is forbidden, even if it is done because of love of the mitzvah and to prevent the mitzvah from being forgotten.

The concern is that the public may eventually mistake the substitute for the genuine article.

At first glance, this should prevent us from observing tzitzis with doubtful Tekheiles.

If definite Tekheiles is eventually discovered, assuming it differs from what is currently used, people might say: “Both the definite Tekheiles and the old doubtful Tekheiles are valid,” without realizing that the latter is merely kela ilan and does not fulfill the mitzvah of Tekheiles.

The responsa Besamim Rosh (§244) writes similarly in response to the suggestion of using dye from a certain fish as a remembrance of Tekheiles. It answers that this should not be done lest people later say that this is the Tekheiles mentioned by the Torah, just as Chazal said that if one cannot find an esrog he should not bring a pomegranate.

At first glance, however, there is room to distinguish between the four minim, where all four are me’akev one another (Menachos 27a; Orach Chaim 651:12), and Tekheiles in tzitzis, which is not me’akev lavan.

Regarding the four minim, substituting a pomegranate for an esrog could cause the person to fail to fulfill the entire mitzvah.

With tzitzis, at worst he would fail to fulfill the mitzvah of Tekheiles while still fulfilling lavan.

One could therefore argue that Chazal were concerned only about an error capable of invalidating the entire mitzvah, not about one element of a mitzvah.

This distinction, however, seems forced.

The principal distinction between the Gemara in Sukkah and our case appears to be something else.

There, it is certain that the substitute is not the correct species.

Here, there is a strong umdena that the present snail really is the chilazon of Tekheiles, although the matter has not emerged from the category of safek.

It is therefore inappropriate to compare this to taking a quince or pomegranate where there is absolutely no doubt that the fruit is not an esrog.

We find a similar idea in the Chasam Sofer, Orach Chaim §183, who permitted using an esrog where there was a doubt whether it was grafted, relying on simanim, and was not concerned with the prohibition against taking a quince or pomegranate.

Nevertheless, it appears proper to take precautions against future confusion if it is eventually established that the present Tekheiles is not genuine.

Therefore, as stated above, those who use this Tekheiles should make it known that they are doing so because of the safek.

If in the future it becomes necessary to use another chilazon to dye pesil Tekheiles, it will likewise be necessary to make it completely clear whether the old identification remains valid or not.

Summary

A. Fulfilling the mitzvah of Tekheiles in tzitzis using the argamonim, as practiced today, is permissible as a middas chassidus. Based upon the present degree of certainty, however, there is no strict halachic obligation to place it in tzitzis.

With Hashem’s help, when definite Tekheiles is discovered and clearly established, all of Klal Yisrael will merit to place Tekheiles upon their garments.

B. Those who do place Tekheiles on their tzitzis must observe the limitations discussed above. It goes without saying that one may not rely upon the present identification of Tekheiles to be lenient and create kilayim in tzitzis.

Chapter IV — The Significance of Wearing Tekheiles Today for the Individual Who Does So

Since we concluded in the preceding chapters that placing Tekheiles today is a middas chassidus, we must discuss additional considerations that could prevent its use — issues arising from the practical act of wearing it and its effect upon the individual himself.

A. Yuhara

We must determine whether wearing Tekheiles involves yuhara.

At first glance, the very question seems strange. How can fulfillment of a Torah mitzvah constitute arrogance or yuhara?

Even if the mitzvah was not fulfilled until now because of lack of knowledge, once we know how to fulfill it we should obviously do so.

That answer would be correct if we had concluded that this is certainly the Torah’s Tekheiles and no doubt remained.

Since doubts do remain — as Rav Dov Lior shlita likewise agreed in a letter from Elul 5756 — using it is an act of chumra and middas chassidus because of the safek.

We therefore cannot avoid asking whether wearing such Tekheiles may involve yuhara.

1. Sources in the Shas

The source for the law of yuhara is the sugyos in Berachos 17b and Pesachim 55a.

The Mishnah in Berachos 16a states:

A chassan is exempt from Krias Shema on the first night until Motzaei Shabbos if he has not yet consummated the marriage.
There was an incident with Rabban Gamliel, who married and recited Krias Shema on the first night. His students said to him, “Did our Rebbe not teach us that a chassan is exempt from Krias Shema?”
He replied, “I will not listen to you to remove from myself the yoke of Malchus Shamayim even for one moment.”

The Mishnah on the next page states:

If a chassan wishes to recite Krias Shema on the first night, he may. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Not everyone who wishes to assume the title may assume it.

Rashi explains:

If he is not publicly established as a chacham and chassid, this is simply arrogance, because he presents himself as though he is capable of properly concentrating.

According to Chachamim, therefore, any chassan may act like Rabban Gamliel and there is no concern of yuhara.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that it is yuhara.

The Gemara asks:

Does this mean Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is concerned for yuhara while Chachamim are not? We have heard the reverse!
The Mishnah says: In a place where the custom is to work on Tishah B’Av, one may work. Where the custom is not to work, one may not. In every place, talmidei chachamim refrain from work. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Every person may make himself like a talmid chacham.
Chachamim contradict Chachamim, and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel contradicts himself!

R’ Yochanan answers:

Reverse the positions.

Rav Shisha the son of Rav Idi answers:

Do not reverse them. Chachamim do not contradict themselves. Regarding Krias Shema, since everyone else is reading and he also reads, it does not appear as yuhara. Regarding Tishah B’Av, since everyone else is working and he does not work, it does appear as yuhara.
Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel likewise does not contradict himself. Regarding Krias Shema, the matter depends on concentration, and we can testify that an ordinary person cannot properly concentrate. Regarding work on Tishah B’Av, an observer may simply say that he has no work available. Go see how many unemployed people there are in the marketplace.

The practical ruling therefore depends both upon which Tanna we follow and upon which Amora’s explanation we accept.

According to R’ Yochanan, the positions in Berachos must be reversed. Chachamim are concerned for yuhara and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is not.

According to Rav Shisha, both Chachamim and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel are generally concerned for yuhara; they disagree only in cases where the person’s behavior can plausibly be explained in a non-arrogant manner.

Rabbeinu Chananel rules like Rav Shisha and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and therefore holds that yuhara is a concern.

The Rosh likewise rules this way.

The Rif rules like the Tanna Kama regarding Krias Shema, that the chassan may read, and the Rambam rules likewise (Hilchos Krias Shema 4:7).

At first glance, it would appear that they are not concerned with yuhara.

The Beis Yosef and Bach, Orach Chaim §70, disagree about the Rif.

The Beis Yosef holds that the Rif follows R’ Yochanan and therefore the words attributed to Chachamim actually belong to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. By ruling like them, the Rif would not be concerned with yuhara.

The Bach holds that the Rif follows Chachamim according to Rav Shisha, because their reasoning is more convincing.

At first glance, according to the Rif and Rambam, whose view the Shulchan Aruch generally follows, there should be no concern of yuhara at all.

The Beis Yosef’s explanation, however, requires analysis.

The Rif does not state in Pesachim which opinion is halachah. The Rambam does not record Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s statement that everyone may present himself as a talmid chacham, while the Shulchan Aruch does quote it in Orach Chaim 554:22.

See the Magen Avraham and Mishnah Berurah, who explain Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s statement according to Rav Shisha.

If the Mishnah in Berachos had been reversed, the Rambam should apparently have quoted Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s view, since that would be the halachah.

It therefore appears more likely that the Bach is correct, and according to everyone there is a halachic concept of yuhara.

Indeed, as will be explained below, the Shulchan Aruch itself is concerned for yuhara. Apparently, even according to R’ Yochanan, the Shulchan Aruch understood that Chachamim were not concerned only under the particular circumstances of the Mishnah.

Another source is Bava Kamma 81b:

Rebbi and R’ Chiya were walking on the road. They moved to the sides of the road, relying upon the enactment of Yehoshua bin Nun. R’ Yehudah ben Kenosa was walking ahead of them, stepping from peg to peg with large steps and refusing to move into the edge of the field.
Rebbi said to R’ Chiya, “Who is this who displays greatness in front of us?”
Rashi: He shows us that he is extremely G-d-fearing and refuses to rely upon Yehoshua’s stipulation; it appears as yuhara.
R’ Chiya answered, “Perhaps it is my student R’ Yehudah ben Kenosa, whose every action is for the sake of Heaven.”
When they caught up with him and Rebbi saw who it was, he said, “Had you not been R’ Yehudah ben Kenosa, I would have cut your legs with an iron saw.”
Rashi explains this as a reference to nidui.

Almost the identical incident appears in the Yerushalmi, Berachos 2:9, with different names:

He said to him: “Was it not taught that regarding something which brings praise, not everyone who wishes may make himself an exceptional individual; only a talmid chacham may do so, unless he has been appointed a leader over the community?”
He answered: “Was it not taught that regarding something involving discomfort, anyone may make himself exceptional, and a talmid chacham may do so and receive a blessing?”
R’ Zeira said: “Provided that he does not thereby disgrace others.”

Part VI

Outline

2. Conclusions from the Two Talmuds
3. The Shulchan Aruch’s Ruling Regarding Yuhara
4. Application to One Who Places Tekheiles on His Garment
5. When a Practice of Yuhara Becomes Ordinary Conduct

B. “One Who Is Exempt from Something and Does It Is Called a Hedyot”

1. Source in the Shas
2. Reasons for the Rule: Yuhara, a Concern of Bal Tosif, and the Proper Measure of Chassidus
3. Distinguishing Foolish Stringency from Chassidus
4. Application to a Great Person

2. Conclusions from the Two Talmuds

From the Bavli it appears that a yerei Shamayim may act stringently even in the presence of his Rabbanim.

According to the Yerushalmi, by contrast, it appears that a person may act stringently specifically where the stringency involves personal discomfort, provided he does not thereby insult others.

The author of Sefer Chareidim explains:

Provided he performs the act privately and does not display it before others in a manner suggesting that they are less G-d-fearing than he is.

The Sdei Yehoshua interprets it slightly differently:

Provided that by presenting himself as an exceptional individual, the act itself does not cause disgrace to others. If it does, even a talmid chacham may not do so.

The Gra in Shenos Eliyahu, Berachos 1:3, appears to understand similarly.

The Yam Shel Shlomo (Bava Kamma 7:41) likewise infers:

According to Rashi’s explanation, the concern exists specifically when he displays yuhara in front of others.

The responsa Shevus Yaakov (§44) states a general rule: when an individual acts privately, there is no concern of yuhara, but if the unusual conduct is public, yuhara is a concern:

Even an individual who publicly does something contrary to the ordinary practice is subject to a concern of yuhara, because everything of this sort should properly be done privately.

The Yam Shel Shlomo implies that a person may even be placed in nidui for the very appearance of yuhara, without any actual intention of arrogance.

R’ Yehudah ben Kenosa did not see Rebbi and R’ Chiya and certainly was not acting in order to show off before them.

If, however, a student deliberately acts stringently in his Rebbe’s presence, the Yam Shel Shlomo writes:

If R’ Yehudah ben Kenosa saw them walking at the sides of the road and nevertheless chose to be stringent upon himself, it is obvious that this is an outright prohibition, because it is as though he disputes his Rebbe. For this and similar behavior one may place him in nidui because of the honor of the Rebbe, not merely because of yuhara.

3. The Shulchan Aruch’s Ruling Regarding Yuhara

We further learn that a genuinely great and pious person whose entire conduct reflects chassidus may be stringent in ways not practiced by the rest of the community.

This also appears from Bava Kamma 59b.

We likewise find in Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim §34, regarding Rabbeinu Tam tefillin:

One should not do so unless he is established and publicly known for chassidus.

The Mishnah Berurah quotes the responsa of Maharash HaLevi that if someone wears Rabbeinu Tam tefillin publicly after davening in front of the congregation, there is a concern of yuhara.

He also quotes the Shevus Yaakov, Vol. II §44, that even where some members of the community do so, yuhara may still apply.

The Mishnah Berurah further writes (§16) that if one wears them in front of a great person who himself wears them only privately, this too constitutes yuhara.

We therefore learn that a person who adopts a chumra and practices it publicly while most of the congregation does not has a concern of yuhara.

He may, however, practice it privately, in which case there is no concern.

Similarly, the Mishnah Berurah, Orach Chaim 70:14, based upon Tosafos, Berachos 17b, writes that today a chassan is obligated to recite Krias Shema.

If he does not read it on the first night, he appears arrogant, as though he always recites Krias Shema with perfect concentration on every other night.

The Shulchan Aruch’s approach to yuhara can also be seen from his ruling in Orach Chaim 639:2 that one need not be concerned for yuhara if he is stringent not to eat or drink anything outside the sukkah.

The implication is that specifically in this case there is no concern, while elsewhere there may be.

The Beis Yosef, Orach Chaim §24, likewise expresses concern for yuhara regarding holding one’s tzitzis during Krias Shema:

Rav David Abudraham wrote in the laws of Krias Shema in the name of Rav Natronai Gaon that one who holds his tzitzis in his hand while reciting Shema displays arrogance. Whenever a person publicly performs as an act of chassidus something he is not obligated to do while the rest of the people do not do it, it appears as yuhara.

The Beis Yosef adds that now that some people have adopted this practice, it no longer appears as yuhara. This will be discussed below.

The Shulchan Aruch likewise expresses concern for yuhara in Orach Chaim 17:2 regarding women wearing tzitzis; in §95:3 regarding positioning the limbs during Shemoneh Esrei; in §123:4 regarding adding to the three steps backward; and in §235:1 regarding repeating Maariv when one davened with the congregation before sunset.

We also find a dispute regarding minhagei chassidus involving discomfort in the context of individual fasts (Ta’anis 10b).

The permissive opinions, R’ Yosi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, permit such behavior where it involves suffering because:

It is painful to him and not arrogance.

Rashi.

It appears, however, both from the Bavli regarding individual fasts and from the Yerushalmi cited above regarding walking at the edge of a field, that the relevant “pain” means physical discomfort, not financial loss.

Therefore, even if a person spends a substantial amount of money purchasing Tekheiles strings, this does not qualify as tza’ara degufa.

Consequently, even the Yerushalmi’s leniency allowing personal stringency where suffering is involved does not apply to our case.

4. Application to One Who Places Tekheiles on His Garment

Applying this to our subject:

Tekheiles itself is not a chumra. It is part of the Torah mitzvah itself.

At present, however, it has not yet been restored to its original halachic certainty. Its use therefore has the status of a middas chassidus, and the rules of mechzi keyuhara apply.

One would not be placed in nidui for it, even according to the Yam Shel Shlomo, because:

It is known to the chacham that the student is certainly acting leshem Shamayim.

Furthermore, the Yam Shel Shlomo himself agrees that according to Rashi, nidui applies only to one who performs the conduct publicly before others.

Nevertheless, wearing Tekheiles publicly, with one’s tzitzis visibly striking the attention of the rest of the community, involves a concern of yuhara according to both the Bavli and the Yerushalmi.

See the strong words of the responsa Panim Me’iros, Vol. II §152, regarding wearing white clothing on Shabbos. He concludes:

If he wishes to fulfill his obligation toward Heaven, it is proper that when he arrives home he put on the white clothing. There the concern of yuhara is not so strong. But before the masses in shul, he is like a bridegroom among mourners, and there is concern for yuhara. Shev ve’al ta’aseh adif.

We also cited above the Yam Shel Shlomo that if a student is stringent in front of his Rebbe regarding something in which the Rebbe is lenient, he may be subject to nidui because of the Rebbe’s honor, even if he acts entirely leshem Shamayim and even where the lenient ruling is not absolutely simple. This is quoted by the Magen Avraham, Orach Chaim 63:2.

Accordingly, where students wear tzitzis with Tekheiles in front of a Rebbe who does not use Tekheiles, they should conceal the tzitzis because otherwise they appear to be disputing their Rebbe.

5. When a Practice of Yuhara Becomes Ordinary Conduct

The Encyclopedia Talmudis, additions to the entry Ga’avah, quotes the Mahari Bruna (§96) that in his time young men, and likewise the general public, did not publicly wear their tallis katan over their clothing. Only Rabbanim did so.

He writes:

Therefore, a young man who does so is among those whose behavior causes wonder. Not everyone who wishes to assume the title may do so.

The responsa Yechaveh Da’as, Vol. II §1, cites additional Acharonim who write similarly.

It also quotes the Imrei Binah, Orach Chaim §13:4, that one who wishes to adopt a stringency in accordance with the view of major Poskim who are stringent need not fear yuhara.

A similar view is cited from the Pesach HaDevir, §146:3.

We learn that not all places and times are equal.

Something considered yuhara in one place may not be considered yuhara elsewhere.

The Raavad likewise writes in his glosses to the Rambam, Hilchos Krias Shema 4:7, that nowadays it is not yuhara for someone technically exempt from Krias Shema to recite it even if he cannot concentrate perfectly, since in our generation people generally do not concentrate perfectly. He brings proofs for this.

The same principle appears from the Beis Yosef regarding holding one’s tzitzis during Krias Shema and from the Chida regarding Rabbeinu Tam tefillin.

The question remains how a practice changes from yuhara to ordinary acceptable conduct.

At the very least, it appears that as long as the Gedolei Yisrael of our generation have not decided that the generation should adopt Tekheiles, and the majority of Klal Yisrael does not use Tekheiles from the argamonim, one must be concerned that public use may constitute yuhara.

Those who wear it should therefore conduct themselves with hatznea leches.

We conclude this section with the words of the Mesillas Yesharim, Chapter XX:

A person is certainly obligated to observe all the mitzvos with all their details regardless of who is present, and he should neither fear nor be embarrassed. As the verse says, “I will speak of Your testimonies before kings and will not be ashamed,” and Chazal taught, “Be bold as a leopard…”
Nevertheless, even here distinction and judgment are necessary. All of this was said regarding the essential mitzvos which are absolutely obligatory, regarding which a person should make his face as hard as flint.
But there are additional practices of chassidus which, if a person performs them before the masses, people will laugh and mock him. They will thereby sin and be punished because of him, while he could have refrained from those practices since they are not absolute obligations. In such a case it is certainly more proper for the chassid to leave them aside than to perform them. This is what the Navi meant by “walk modestly with your God.” Many great chassidim abandoned personal practices of chassidus when among the masses because they would appear as yuhara.

B. Hedyotus

“One Who Is Exempt from Something and Does It Is Called a Hedyot”

Related to the subject of yuhara is the principle:

Anyone who is exempt from something and nevertheless does it is called a hedyot.

This rule relates to halachic stringencies, customs, and safeguards.

Regarding the present observance of Tekheiles, since in my opinion it is a middas chassidus rather than a strict Torah obligation, it must also be examined from this perspective.

1. Source in the Shas

The source is the Yerushalmi, Berachos 2:9 and Shabbos 1:2.

Both tractates record an incident involving R’ Yasa and R’ Shmuel bar Rav Yitzchak, who were sitting in the upper floor of the shul and eating when the time for davening arrived.

R’ Shmuel stopped eating.

They asked him:

Was it not taught that once one has begun eating he does not interrupt, and anyone who is exempt from something and nevertheless does it is called a hedyot?

He answered that he acted like Rabban Gamliel, who said:

I will not listen to you to remove from myself the yoke of Malchus Shamayim.

The Pnei Moshe and the chiddushim of the Rada to the Yerushalmi explain that Chachamim and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagree whether Krias Shema is different because it contains acceptance of the yoke of Malchus Shamayim.

According to Chachamim, there is no yuhara in Krias Shema.

According to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, even regarding Krias Shema one who is exempt is called a hedyot.

Regarding other matters, however, all agree that one is called a hedyot and should not act stringently.

This principle is accepted by the Rishonim and Acharonim. The Sdei Chemed, Ma’areches kaf, rule 16, Vol. III p. 164, gives a long list of authorities who rule this way.

2. Reasons for the Rule

Yuhara

The Beis Yosef explains the Rambam’s ruling that when bowing during the thanksgiving blessing of Shemoneh Esrei, one should not bow excessively.

He explains that excessive bowing appears as yuhara, because the individual bows more deeply than the rest of the congregation.

In the responsa Avkas Rochel (§36), he explains why the entire congregation was not instructed to bow deeply:

Since the congregation is obligated to bow only to an ordinary degree, presumably they do not bow more than required. When one person bows excessively, it certainly appears as yuhara, as though he is criticizing the congregation’s bowing as inadequate. This resembles the Yerushalmi’s statement that anyone exempt from something who nevertheless does it is called a hedyot.

Maharam Padua (§39) similarly explains that:

Anyone who is exempt from something and does it is called a hedyot because it involves yuhara.

The author of Sefer Chareidim, Berachos end of Chapter II, says the same, as does Yad Malachi, Vol. III §334.

The Birkei Yosef connects this with the Shevus Yaakov quoted earlier: publicly it is prohibited, while privately it is permitted.

This must be reconciled with the Gemara in Sukkah 26b regarding a small snack, which may be eaten outside the sukkah.

After citing the conduct of Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai and Rabban Gamliel, the Gemara says:

If one wishes to be stringent upon himself, he may, and there is no yuhara.

The Ran on the Rif writes that one is permitted to do so and is not considered a hedyot.

The Rambam, Hilchos Sukkah 6:6, writes that one who is stringent upon himself and eats such food in the sukkah is praiseworthy.

The question therefore arises: what makes this particular stringency permitted rather than yuhara?

Maharatz Chajes answers that just as regarding refraining from work on Tishah B’Av, people may assume, “He simply has no work to do,” so here people may assume he is actually eating a meal rather than merely tasting a small amount.

According to this explanation, how the act of chassidus will be interpreted by the public is very important.

If it will be understood as a personal chumra, it should not generally be practiced publicly.

If, however, people can give it an ordinary non-pious explanation — he is actually eating rather than tasting, he has no work to do, and so forth — it may be permitted.

A Concern Related to Bal Tosif

A different reason appears from the Ramban, Gittin 36a.

He explains that a Torah mitzvah which no longer applies and which Chazal did not reinstitute Rabbinically — such as, according to some opinions, cancellation of debts by shemittah nowadays — is not a proper act of chassidus. One who nevertheless does it is called a hedyot.

He similarly writes in Kiddushin 31a:

If you ask that one is called a hedyot… there the person performs something which is not a Torah mitzvah at all, and it is as though he adds to the Torah. But one who performs the Torah’s mitzvos properly even though he was not commanded in them, such as women performing mitzvos from which they are exempt, receives reward, for all the Torah’s ways are ways of pleasantness and all its paths are peace.

The Ritva likewise cites this in the Ramban’s name.

The Meiri in Rosh Hashanah 33a similarly explains the position of the French sages that women may perform time-bound positive mitzvos and recite berachos:

Even though Chazal said that anyone exempt from something who nevertheless does it is called a hedyot, that applies specifically where everyone is exempt.

The editor of the Mossad HaRav Kook edition refers to Birkei Yosef, Yoreh De’ah 333:1, which questions the Ramban from the case of a chassan exempt from Krias Shema and one who is eating and need not interrupt for davening.

According to the Yerushalmi, those who perform the mitzvah anyway are considered hedyotos, despite the fact that the mitzvah certainly applies to other people.

The Birkei Yosef answers that even the Ramban agrees in these cases because their exemptions are temporary, whereas women are completely exempt from time-bound positive mitzvos.

His answer, however, seems difficult.

Logically, one might have expected the opposite. A person who is ordinarily obligated but temporarily exempt due to some circumstance should surely not be called a hedyot for fulfilling the mitzvah anyway.

By contrast, someone who was never commanded at all might seem more like one who adds to the Torah.

It appears that this is the Chida’s meaning:

One who is not personally obligated while others are obligated is not called a hedyot for performing the mitzvah. The Torah never forbade him from doing it; it merely did not impose the obligation upon him.

But a person who is ordinarily obligated and whom halachah specifically exempted because of a particular circumstance — how can he supposedly be “wiser” than the halachah and perform what he was exempted from?

Therefore, if he does so he is called a hedyot.

The Proper Measure of Chassidus

The Chida understands the principle for a third reason.

It is not based on yuhara and not upon bal tosif, but upon a defect in the act itself: the person’s chassidus is unbalanced.

The Rambam’s commentary to the Mishnah in Sotah 3:3, R. Kapach edition, appears to support this:

A “foolish chassid,” as the Talmud explains, means one who exaggerates caution and meticulousness until people find him repulsive, performing acts in which he has no obligation. It is as though Chazal say: foolish in his chassidus. The Yerushalmi in Shabbos likewise says: Anyone exempt from something who nevertheless does it is called a hedyot.

The Rambam clearly does not base the problem on yuhara. Rather, there is something inherently odd about a person whose overall conduct is ordinary suddenly behaving with excessive meticulousness and piety.

The Meiri similarly writes in Kiryas Sefer, First Essay, Part III:

The rule that he is called a hedyot applies only to a case where he acts piously in a manner people do not normally practice, especially where the matter is a complete obligation from which he is presently exempt, such as one who interrupts his meal and thereby shows everyone that he thinks he is obligated to do so. But where his intention is simply to perform his work beautifully and properly, such as a sofer who is careful in writing tefillin straight and without distortion, this is not foolish behavior. On the contrary, it is refinement and a proper quality.

A similar statement is quoted by the Shitah Mekubetzes in Bava Kamma 87a in the Meiri’s name.

The Maharshal in Yam Shel Shlomo, Chullin 8:6, appears to express a similar idea regarding Maharam’s stringency not to eat meat after cheese:

Once the Talmud was completed, it is obvious that one should not adopt a stringency contrary to the Talmud unless some particular reason or problem occurred to him, combined with the fact that earlier authorities also adopted such stringencies. Certainly, one who refuses to eat meat even after a cooked cheese dish can appear almost heretical…

He continues:

Nevertheless, even a person who is careful in all forms of abstinence cannot prohibit himself from eating meat after cheese merely as an act of abstinence, unless some problem actually occurred to him, or his teeth have holes and it is almost certain he cannot clean them properly and will come to a stumbling block.

There are practical differences between these explanations.

The Chida, Orach Chaim §32, writes that according to the view that the person is called a hedyot because of yuhara, the stringency may be practiced privately.

According to his own view, however, that the problem lies intrinsically in the imbalance of the conduct, it remains forbidden even in complete privacy, because the level of chassidus is inconsistent with the person’s overall behavior.

Another practical difference may arise regarding mitzvos between one person and another.

In Pesach Einayim, Bava Metzia 30b, quoted in Yabia Omer, Vol. III, Yoreh De’ah §27:6, the Chida writes that the rule “one who is exempt and does it is called a hedyot” applies specifically to mitzvos between man and Hashem.

Regarding mitzvos between one person and another, one is not called a hedyot for doing more than required.

It appears that this depends upon the reason for the rule.

According to the Chida’s own explanation in Birkei Yosef, that there is an intrinsic problem of improperly measured chassidus, one could argue that there is likewise something wrong with excessive voluntary behavior in interpersonal matters.

Even if acts of kindness performed personally have no maximum measure, there is a limit regarding giving away one’s money, namely one-fifth. It would then follow that one who exceeds the proper measure could likewise be called a hedyot.

3. Distinguishing Foolish Stringency from Chassidus

The responsa Be’er Sheva (§21) writes:

All my life I have wondered about this teaching and about the statement, “Is it not enough for you what the Torah has forbidden?” How then do we find our hands and feet in the Beis Midrash? We perform hundreds and thousands of things from which we are strictly exempt because of chumra and perishus. Chazal themselves commanded, “Sanctify yourself with what is permitted to you,” and “Guard My safeguards” — make a safeguard around My safeguard!

The Magen Avraham, Orach Chaim 32:8, raises essentially the same question:

This law genuinely requires explanation, because we find many stringencies that we accept upon ourselves and do not say that the person is called a hedyot.

The Be’er Sheva gives a partial answer:

Perhaps “Sanctify yourself with what is permitted to you” refers specifically to avoiding indulgence and excess, but not to completely forbidding upon oneself something that the Torah permitted. The same applies to “Make a safeguard around My safeguard.” The matter still requires analysis.

We will review several distinctions offered by the Rishonim and Acharonim, although questions can be raised on them as well.

The Meiri in Gittin 6b writes:

When Chazal said, “Anyone exempt from something who nevertheless does it is called a hedyot,” they meant where everyone is exempt and there is no element of mitzvah, proper character, or ethical conduct involved.

The Shulchan Aruch HaRav, Orach Chaim 32:8, writes similarly:

Chazal said that one who is exempt and nevertheless does it is called a hedyot only when he acts as a chumra, in a situation where failure to adopt that stringency will not bring him to any prohibition, and the act likewise contains no hiddur mitzvah.
But if the practice contains some enhancement of a mitzvah, or if he practices it as a safeguard and fence to avoid a prohibition, he is not called a hedyot.
This explains all the stringencies adopted by the Acharonim. They fall into one of two categories: either a safeguard and fence against violating some prohibition — even a minor Rabbinic prohibition when they saw that such a safeguard was needed — or an enhancement of some positive mitzvah, even one that is only Rabbinic.

The Gra in Shenos Eliyahu, Berachos 1:3, explains:

In many places we say that anyone exempt from something who nevertheless does it is called a hedyot, while in other places we find that even though a person is exempt, if he does it he performs the mitzvah in its finest manner.
It appears that wherever the act is inherently a mitzvah but Chazal simply did not require him to go to the trouble, if he nevertheless performs it he receives reward for doing the mitzvah in its finest form.
This resembles the person who acted according to Beis Shammai and found a golden purse… Chazal simply did not trouble him. Likewise with the ten requirements of a cup of wine, where certain sages were stringent upon themselves. Likewise regarding sukkah, where they were stringent to drink water only in the sukkah. Likewise, one need not interrupt a meal for davening, but if he does so he receives a blessing.
The Yerushalmi likewise says regarding the incident with Rabban Gamliel and R’ Yehoshua that R’ Zeira said, “Provided that he does not disgrace others.” Therefore, it was necessary to explain regarding Yehudah ben Pappus that all his actions were leshem Shamayim and he did not intend to disgrace us. Where there is no possibility of disgracing others, it is permitted.

According to the Gra, the basic distinction between chassidus and hedyotus is whether there is an underlying obligation which Chazal merely limited.

If so, the person may return to the fullest form of the obligation.

Where no obligation exists at all, however, his act is an addition of his own invention and is improper.

Perhaps Yad Malachi, Vol. III §336, intended a similar distinction.

R’ Akiva Eiger in Berachos 1:3 likewise explains, based upon the Rosh at the end of Berachos and Tosafos Yom Tov, Shabbos 1:9, that where even the authority whose view is accepted agrees in principle with the stringent opinion but simply rules that Chazal did not require the extra effort, one who nevertheless performs it is not called a hedyot.

Another distinction appears in the responsa of the Rema (§91).

He writes that one cannot prove otherwise from the student mentioned at the end of Chapter VIII of Berachos who acted according to Beis Shammai and found a golden purse.

Specifically where following the stricter opinion produces no leniency elsewhere, one may follow the dissenting opinion and is not a hedyot.

If, however, his stringency also results in a leniency, the practice is forbidden and considered hedyotus.

The Mishnah Berurah writes similarly on the Rema’s ruling, Orach Chaim 639:7:

Anyone exempt from the sukkah who nevertheless refuses to leave receives no reward and is merely acting foolishly.

The source is Hagahos Maimoniyos, Chapter VI, and Mahari Weil §191.

The Biur Halachah there, s.v. Kol, quotes the responsa Olas Shmuel §98 that this applies specifically where some element of prohibition is involved, such as on Yom Tov or Chol HaMoed when one is obligated to honor the festival, or where the person is suffering.

If he is not suffering, he may be stringent. A similar idea appears there in the name of the Bikkurei Yaakov.

The Chida in Ayin Zocher, system pei §13, gives the following distinction:

Whenever there is a dispute and the halachah follows the lenient opinion, if the stricter practice nevertheless represents greater care and vigilance even according to the lenient opinion, then we say that one who is stringent deserves a blessing. But where, according to the lenient opinion, the stringency contains no extra care or benefit at all, then we say, “Anyone exempt from something who nevertheless does it is called a hedyot.”

The Shaar Yosef (§8) gives an additional rule: where no Tanna or Amora holds the stringent opinion at all, and a person invents a stringency for himself, he is a hedyot.

This resembles the Maharshal’s position in Chullin, Chapter VIII.

All these distinctions require investigation regarding our case.

The practice here is not an ordinary hiddur. It is an act performed because of a genuine safek.

Therefore, in my opinion we must return to the underlying reasons for the prohibition discussed above.

4. Application to a Great Person

We find a significant distinction between different types of individuals regarding this rule.

The Mordechai at the beginning of Berachos writes:

The Raavyah wrote… those who delay Krias Shema and Maariv until night, not relying upon Rabbeinu Tam’s view that the Krias Shema recited in shul may be relied upon, appear to be acting with yuhara, because anyone who does something unnecessary is called a hedyot — unless he is generally accustomed to perishus in his other conduct as well.

We learn that one may act stringently without appearing arrogant specifically when his general conduct in other areas likewise reflects that level of perishus.

Maharam Padua (§39) writes similarly.

He explains the Rosh’s ruling in Berachos like Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel that not everyone may “assume the title.”

The Rosh had written that in our generations people generally do not possess perfect concentration during Krias Shema, and therefore even a chassan, who according to the Mishnah is technically exempt, should read.

Maharam Padua explains the practical implication of this ruling — although the specific case is theoretical for us today — as follows:

Where a person is exempt from something even though others remain obligated, he should nevertheless not perform it if doing so appears as yuhara. If he does, he is called a hedyot:

Unless all his actions are conducted with chassidus.

Tosafos in Berachos 16a similarly explains that there is no contradiction from Rabban Gamliel’s reading Krias Shema on the first night of his marriage, because a great person who trusts himself to maintain proper concentration may do so and has the right to recite it.

The Meiri, Berachos 17b, concludes that the halachah follows Chachamim regarding a chassan’s Krias Shema and writes:

But where an ordinary person displays himself as though he were among the greatest of the chassidim, there is yuhara and brazenness. Nevertheless, halachah follows Chachamim regarding Krias Shema and we do not prevent him from reading. Still, someone who is not regarded by everyone as an important person should not publicly display such behavior. If he knows himself to be capable of it, let him recite it privately and a blessing will come upon him.

Summary

The conclusion regarding the present use of Tekheiles from the argamonim is as follows.

On the one hand, Tekheiles itself is not a chumra. It is part of the actual Torah mitzvah.

On the other hand, at present there is no definite Torah obligation to use this particular Tekheiles, and wearing it therefore has the status of an act of chassidus.

Consequently, although the Ramban’s concern of something resembling bal tosif does not apply here, the other two considerations — yuhara and maintaining the proper measure of chassidus — certainly do apply.

A person whose entire conduct is on the level of a genuine chassid is not considered a hedyot and may wear the Tekheiles publicly.

Someone who has not yet reached that high level should, according to the concern of yuhara, use this Tekheiles privately.

And according to the Rambam’s explanation in Peirush HaMishnayos, it would be proper for him first to elevate his overall conduct to the level of chassidus. He can then adopt the practice of wearing Tekheiles which has not yet been accepted by Klal Yisrael generally.

Until then, according to this approach, he should not adopt the practice even privately, and certainly not publicly.