INTRODUCTION

 

Presented here is an exchange of letters between R’ Shlomo Aviner and R’ Shmuel Ariel regarding the renewal of Techeiles in our time. We first present R’ Aviner’s letters on the subject that were published in Iturei Kohanim, since those letters form the basis of the discussion, followed by the correspondence in chronological order.

 

Two notes:

 

1. By their nature, these are not organized articles but letters. Accordingly, there is no attempt here to cover the subject completely and systematically, but only to address certain specific points. The style and manner of explanation are likewise those of letters rather than articles.

 

2. In general, the material was not edited, but is presented as originally written. The only change was to the references to R’ Aviner’s letters, which are designated here by letters, and the citations were adjusted accordingly. A number of passages dealing with unrelated subjects were omitted; these omissions are marked by a broken line.

 

R’ AVINER’S LETTERS REGARDING TECHEILES

(Iturei Kohanim, Issue 140, pp. 15–18)

 

A. TECHEILES TZITZIS IN OUR TIME

 

It is true that the proofs identifying Techeiles with the Murex trunculus [argamon keha-kotzim] are strong. But the proofs brought in his time by the Radzyner Rebbe for a type of cuttlefish also seemed strong, and nevertheless the Gedolei Yisrael did not accept his position, as the Aruch HaShulchan notes (O.C. 9:12). Likewise, the strong proofs of R’ Yitzchak Isaac Herzog for a type of Janthina were not accepted by the major talmidei chachamim of that generation. We have now reached a third identification; how do we know that a fourth identification will not come afterward? This is the nature of scientific proofs: the mark of uncertainty is built into them, since they are hypotheses based on the present state of our knowledge, and an expansion of our knowledge may cause the theory to collapse.

 

Furthermore, the Gedolim of previous generations, as well as those of our generation, did not even see a reason to be machmir out of concern that perhaps the identification was nevertheless correct. After all, they did not reject it as an absolute certainty, but because of the safek. They were concerned with various difficulties mentioned by the Radzyner Rebbe himself, such as the concern of kala ilan mentioned in the Gemara (Bava Metzia 61b; Menachos 41b; see also Igros Moshe, Y.D. II, 133). They were also concerned that one is required to be machmir only when he knows that the chumra will actually resolve the issue, whereas a safek resulting from lack of knowledge is not necessarily a safek to which we apply the rule of going l’chumra. They were also concerned about casting aspersions on the earlier generations. Thus, it is related that a talmid chacham asked Maran R’ Kook whether he should put a strand of Techeiles on his tallis gadol, and R’ Kook told him not to, so that it should not appear as though he were casting aspersions on the earlier generations who did not wear it (Sefer HaTecheiles by R’ Menachem Burstein, p. 192).

 

Therefore, as long as the Gedolei HaDor of our generation have not paskened that we should put Techeiles in our tzitzis, we will not do so, because with a renewed matter of this sort, the psak belongs to them. At the same time, it cannot be said that it is forbidden to wear Techeiles. A person may, after all, rely on the Radzyner Rebbe, R’ Herzog, or a great rav in our generation who paskens in accordance with the third identification. Nevertheless, if someone asks us, we will tell him to refrain and not display yuhara in opposition to our rabbanim, the Gedolei HaDor, who do not act this way. He should follow the example of the Chafetz Chaim, whose son-in-law related that on this subject he said that he did not wish to put his hand into the fire.

 

B. PUTTING A STRAND OF TECHEILES ON A TALLIS

 

Question:

 

Regarding Techeiles, today there are those who claim that the chilazon of Techeiles has been identified, although the matter is still in doubt and there are several different identifications. Is there any issur in placing a strand of doubtful Techeiles in one’s tzitzis, because of kala ilan, yuhara, lo sisgodedu, or bal tosif?

 

Answer:

 

The poskim did discuss bal tosif, the concern of kala ilan, and lo sisgodedu, and there is an extensive shakla v’tarya on the subject. One must also be careful regarding yuhara. Obviously, someone who tucks his tzitzis into his trousers and keeps them hidden has no issue of yuhara when it is done privately. Likewise, for example, if someone is a Radzyner chassid and does this because his rebbe instructed him to do so, then for him it has the status of an actual din and not merely a chumra. But for someone who does it only as a chumra, there is a concern of yuhara. Since only exceptional individuals conduct themselves this way, someone who is not on the level of those individuals but acts like them is displaying yuhara.

 

C. TALMIDEI CHACHAMIM WHO DO NOT WEAR TECHEILES

 

Question:

 

If there is no prohibition against putting Techeiles into one’s tzitzis, why do we not see talmidei chachamim using Techeiles?

 

Answer:

 

The reason Gedolei Yisrael did not adopt this chumra is because of all the doubts mentioned in the previous answer; it is possible that what is gained by the chumra is lost through its disadvantages. Furthermore, there are those who say that the whole basis for being machmir is when the chumra definitely fulfills the view one is trying to satisfy. Here, however, even if the tzitzis are dyed with Techeiles, it is not clear that one has escaped the safek, because perhaps this is not Techeiles at all.

 

Some completely question the identifications of both the Radzyner Rebbe and R’ Herzog and do not even regard them as a genuine safek. In their view, Techeiles can be known only through a mesorah, and we do not have such a mesorah. Even if we knew with certainty what the Techeiles source was, the manufacture of the dye itself is a sophisticated process that must be carried out precisely, and that too is something that can only be transmitted through mesorah.

 

In addition, most poskim rejected the matter entirely, as the Aruch HaShulchan writes (O.C. 9:12), and they hold that Techeiles will be restored only with the coming of the righteous Redeemer. We also see that the great geonim of earlier generations did not take on this chumra and did not issue a major call to search for Techeiles. If we now begin walking around with such tzitzis, it is as though we are slighting the honor of those departed geonim, and certainly this should not be done on the basis of weak proofs.

 

The Mishnah Berurah likewise does not even hint at the question of Techeiles, even though Radzyner chassidim were already wearing it in his time. And when a Radzyner chassid who learned in his yeshiva asked the Chafetz Chaim whether he should be particular to wear Techeiles, the Chafetz Chaim instructed him to maintain the practice of his fathers and not change it (R’ Yashar, Chafetz Chaim, p. 1105).

 

D. TZITZIS WITH TECHEILES: ONE MITZVAH OR TWO?

 

Question:

 

Regarding the Mishnah in Menachos which says that Techeiles and white do not prevent one another, the Rishonim say that nevertheless this is one mitzvah rather than two separate mitzvos. I do not understand what that definition means. If one can fulfill the mitzvah completely with white strands alone, why did the Torah command Techeiles? Did the Rishonim mean that it is considered one mitzvah only for purposes of counting the mitzvos?

 

Answer:

 

There are indeed Rishonim who hold that these are two separate mitzvos (see R’ Yerucham Fishel Perla on the Sefer HaMitzvos of Rav Saadia Gaon, positive commandment 7). Most Rishonim, however, hold that it is all one mitzvah. The apparent difficulty—that Techeiles and white do not prevent one another—was already addressed by the Rambam in Sefer HaMitzvos. One should not mistakenly assume that because one component is not indispensable to the other, they must therefore be separate mitzvos (Introduction, Shoresh 11, at the end).

 

R’ Yerucham Fishel Perla explains that although l’chatchilah the Torah obligates a person to put Techeiles in his tzitzis, b’dieved the absence of Techeiles does not invalidate the mitzvah at all (commentary to Sefer HaMitzvos of Rav Saadia Gaon, vol. I, p. 92). In other words, it is one mitzvah consisting of several parts, with no one part preventing the fulfillment of another. The building of the Beis HaMikdash and its vessels is likewise all counted as one mitzvah.

 

E. THE APPROACH OF MARAN R’ KOOK AND R’ TZVI YEHUDA KOOK TO TECHEILES

 

Question:

 

Is there any known statement from Maran R’ Kook or R’ Tzvi Yehuda regarding Techeiles?

 

Answer:

 

Regarding Maran R’ Kook: a talmid chacham who wore Techeiles on his tallis katan asked whether he should do the same on his tallis gadol. R’ Kook answered: “Be satisfied with the tallis katan with Techeiles. Techeiles on a tallis gadol would appear to cast aspersions on the earlier generations who did not put Techeiles in their tzitzis” (Sefer HaTecheiles by R’ Menachem Burstein, p. 192).

 

It is also related: “When Maran R’ Kook saw R’ David Cohen, the Nazir, wearing Techeiles in his tzitzis, he said to him: Do you feel that your tzitzis are lacking without Techeiles, and that you need it? The Nazir understood this as a criticism and stopped wearing Techeiles. A short while later Maran R’ Kook came in again and said to him: Nu, nu, continue wearing the Techeiles on your tallis. Nevertheless, the Nazir followed the first statement and refrained, and only after Maran R’ Kook’s passing did he again wear Techeiles privately” (ibid., p. 188).

 

I myself heard the story in the following version: When Maran R’ Kook saw the Nazir wearing Techeiles in his tzitzis, he rebuked him for following a path from which nearly all the Gedolei Yisrael had distanced themselves. R’ Kook then went into his room, and after several minutes came out again and told the Nazir that there was nevertheless room for such a practice. Although it was not a path for the public, there had been exceptional individuals who followed it, and since the Nazir himself was an unusual and exceptional individual, he could follow an unusual path.

 

LETTER A

 

B’siyata D’Shmaya, Kislev 5759

 

To the honored R’ Shlomo Chaim HaKohen Aviner shlita,

 

Shalom rav,

 

With the Rav’s permission, I would like to make several comments on his statements regarding the renewal of Techeiles in our generation. My comments are based primarily on the Rav’s letters on this subject printed in Iturei Kohanim, Issue 140 (Elul 5756).

 

THE BASIC OBLIGATION OF TECHEILES

 

From the words of a number of talmidei chachamim in our generation who have discussed Techeiles, one can get the impression that even in a situation in which a person has the ability to put Techeiles in his tzitzis—definite Techeiles, as in the time of Chazal—if he nevertheless uses only white, he has fulfilled the mitzvah of tzitzis and has committed no aveirah. Techeiles is treated as though it is merely the preferred, l’chatchilah form of the mitzvah, but one who leaves it out has not actually been mevatel a mitzvas aseh, since “Techeiles does not prevent the white.” I understood the Rav’s words in Letter D this way as well, although I am not certain that this was his intention.

 

In my humble opinion, however, it seems clear that this is not the case, and this is not what the Mishnah means when it says that Techeiles does not prevent the white. The very same Mishnah (Menachos 4:1) also says that the tefillin shel rosh does not prevent the tefillin shel yad. Does this mean that a person who has both but puts on only the shel yad and not the shel rosh has not been mevatel a mitzvah and has no aveirah? The following Mishnah similarly says that the bulls, rams, and sheep do not prevent one another. Those animals are directly parallel to Techeiles and white: they are not separate mitzvos, like the tefillin shel yad and shel rosh, but different components of a single mitzvah—the day’s Mussaf offering. Are the Kohanim permitted, when all the required animals are available, to offer only some of them and then stop the Avodah without offering the rest? Obviously, if they did so they would be sinning like anyone else who is mevatel a mitzvas aseh. The fact that the offerings do not prevent one another does not change the fact that there is a full obligation to bring all of them when possible.

 

In other words, the rule that the components are not me’akev one another means that there is value in fulfilling part of the mitzvah when one is unable to fulfill all of it. When the Mishnah says (Menachos 3:5–7) that the parts of certain mitzvos are me’akev one another, then if one piece is missing there is no point in doing the remainder—for example, placing three parshiyos in tefillin when the fourth cannot be obtained, because the mitzvah exists only when all the parts are present together. But where the components are not me’akev one another, each component has value on its own, and there is value in fulfilling whatever portion one can.

 

The Mishnah certainly does not mean that because partial fulfillment has value, there is therefore no full obligation to fulfill the entire mitzvah. The practical difference of “not me’akev” applies to a case of ones: if one cannot obtain everything, he should nevertheless fulfill the part that he can. But when there is no ones, a person is obligated to fulfill the entire mitzvah and may not settle for only a part of it. The obligation of the second component is no less serious than the obligation of the part he has already fulfilled.

 

Accordingly, with Techeiles as well, the statement that “Techeiles does not prevent the white” means that when Techeiles is unavailable there is still value and a mitzvah in using white alone. It certainly does not exempt a person from adding Techeiles if the possibility becomes available. If a person can obtain Techeiles but deliberately refrains from using it and wears only white, he is comparable to those Kohanim who offered only part of the Mussaf and then stopped the Avodah: he is mevatel a mitzvah and has committed an aveirah.

 

This, in my opinion, is the straightforward meaning of the Mishnah, as demonstrated by its parallel examples. The Rambam states this explicitly as well (Hilchos Tzitzis 1:4): “Techeiles does not prevent the white… How so? If he has no Techeiles, he makes white alone.” In other words, the entire practical consequence of “not me’akev” is the case of ones, where he does not have Techeiles. When Techeiles can be obtained, the rule that Techeiles does not prevent the white has no relevance to relieving the obligation; both are fully required.

 

The same point is clear from the Shaagas Aryeh at the end of siman 32. The Shaagas Aryeh asks what permits us nowadays to wear white without Techeiles. He does not answer that it is because Techeiles does not prevent the white. Rather, he explains that there is no prohibition against wearing a garment without tzitzis; instead, when a person wears a four-cornered garment a positive commandment takes effect requiring him to put tzitzis on it, and regarding the Techeiles component of that obligation we are presently in a state of ones. Thus, the entire heter to use white without Techeiles is because of ones. At a time when Techeiles was available and there was no ones, one who used only white was mevatel the mitzvas aseh of Techeiles. Throughout his discussion the Shaagas Aryeh treats Techeiles and white as completely equal in the seriousness of their obligation: when there is ones one is exempt from either component, and when there is no ones one is equally obligated in both.

 

The Rav brings support from R’ Yerucham Fishel Perla’s commentary to the Sefer HaMitzvos of Rav Saadia Gaon, who writes that “b’dieved, the absence of Techeiles does not prevent the mitzvah at all.” But the continuation there makes clear that this is only a definition of the structure of the mitzvah itself, with a practical difference regarding bal tigra; he does not mean that a person may use white without Techeiles when there is no ones. On p. 184, s.v. “v’chein,” he says that one may use white without Techeiles only when he does not presently have Techeiles and intends to complete the mitzvah by adding Techeiles as soon as it becomes available. If he has no intention of completing the mitzvah, he violates bal tigra. He later says that R’ Yochanan ben Nuri was not speaking about someone who intends to remain with white alone and never add Techeiles, “for we are not dealing with resha’im.” In other words, someone who uses white without Techeiles when he is not in a state of ones is committing an aveirah.

 

In my opinion this is also clear from the Gemara in Menachos 43b, codified by the Rambam (Hilchos Tzitzis 2:9): “The punishment for [neglecting] white is greater than the punishment for [neglecting] Techeiles….” This means that there is a punishment for failing to fulfill Techeiles as well; it is merely less severe because Techeiles is more expensive.

 

Everything above concerns the basic obligation of Techeiles in a situation where we possess definite Techeiles. But in my opinion it also has major implications for the renewal of Techeiles in our time. I will, im yirtzeh Hashem, discuss below various specific points that relate to this question. Before anything else, however, this changes the entire way the subject should be approached. I think many talmidei chachamim today assume that “it is not so terrible if we do not wear Techeiles, since we are fulfilling the mitzvah of tzitzis anyway.” As a result, they do not investigate the matter at all, or dismiss it without serious examination, or raise weak arguments against it that nobody would accept as a reason to abandon lulav or tefillin. If the talmidei chachamim of the generation regarded the absence of Techeiles in the same way they would regard the absence of tefillin or any other missing mitzvas aseh, and understood that the entire basis for wearing white without Techeiles is ones, the whole attitude toward the question would be very different.

 

[Because these last words could, chas v’shalom, be understood as disrespectful to talmidei chachamim, I would like to make two clarifications. First, I do not mean the Rav. In fact, this is precisely why I am writing this letter to the Rav, since in the Rav’s writings I did find a serious attempt to address the issue. Second, I will give an example of what I consider a weak argument, which I think anyone who sees it will agree has no substance. I heard, on reliable authority, in the name of a well-known rav that one should not wear Techeiles because the Shulchan Aruch codified all the halachos that apply nowadays, and since it says nothing about Techeiles, there is no Techeiles nowadays. This argument is extremely strange. The Shulchan Aruch did not discuss Techeiles because Techeiles was not available in its time. Was the Mechaber a navi who informed us prophetically that Techeiles would not be found in any later generation either? I cannot imagine any posek making such an argument in another area. According to that logic, Shemittah would not apply nowadays either, since the Shulchan Aruch did not codify Hilchos Shemittah. The only limud zechus I can offer for that talmid chacham is that he assumes white alone fulfills the mitzvah of tzitzis completely, so he saw no need to deal seriously with Techeiles and brushed off the question.]

 

SHOULD WE BE CONCERNED THAT A FUTURE IDENTIFICATION MAY APPEAR?

 

The Rav argues (Letter A) that because the Radzyner Rebbe first proposed one identification, R’ Herzog later proposed another, and now the Murex identification has appeared, we cannot rely on any of them, since how do we know that a fourth identification will not arise? The Rav attributes this proliferation of identifications to the fact that every scientific proof contains an element of hypothesis, and therefore scientific proofs cannot be relied upon for halachah.

 

It seems to me that this argument could be made not only against scientific proofs, but against halachic proofs as well. Almost every siman in Shulchan Aruch contains machlokes—among Amora’im, Rishonim, and Acharonim. According to the Rav’s argument, it would never be possible to pasken like any one opinion. If there are presently two or more opinions, how do we know there will not be additional opinions? Perhaps in the next generation a great talmid chacham will develop a new shittah that nobody has yet considered. More than that: even among the opinions before us, how can we decide? Even if a posek believes that one side has a strong sevara and powerful proofs from the Gemara, how does he know that in the next generation a talmid chacham will not arise with even stronger proofs for the other side?

 

A striking example is the machlokes between Rabbeinu Tam and the Geonim regarding bein hashmashos. As is well known, for many generations after Rabbeinu Tam, virtually all Jewish communities followed his view; this was taken for granted by many Rishonim and poskim, who were not even aware that the Geonim had held differently. The Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 261:2) rules accordingly even l’kula regarding the beginning of Shabbos. Nevertheless, centuries later the Gra demonstrated that the Geonim and the Rambam disagreed with Rabbeinu Tam and supported their position with strong proofs. Today almost all Klal Yisrael follows that view, and most Jews rely on it even l’kula at the end of Shabbos. Even poskim who say that l’chatchilah one should be machmir for Rabbeinu Tam agree that regarding a baby born after sunset at the beginning of Shabbos but before Rabbeinu Tam’s bein hashmashos, one may perform the bris on the following Shabbos, even though according to Rabbeinu Tam this would unquestionably involve an issur carrying sekilah.

 

According to the Rav’s approach, the Acharonim should have said: We saw that Rabbeinu Tam’s shittah once appeared strong and clear, and then the Gra arose and proved otherwise; how do we know that a third shittah will not arise, or that a new proof for Rabbeinu Tam will not be discovered? How can we decide such a matter and enter a possible issur sekilah? This is only one striking example. In truth, the entire world of halachah is filled with decisions between competing shittos, and we do not refrain from deciding because perhaps some new shittah will appear in the future or because perhaps the position we reject will later be vindicated.

 

We therefore have no choice but to apply the principles of “you have only the judge who is in your days” and “a dayan has only what his eyes see.” A posek is permitted—and obligated—to weigh the opinions and evidence as they presently stand. He need not be concerned with shittos or proofs that do not yet exist. The same applies to Techeiles. If the Murex identification appears much clearer and far better proven than the others, one may pasken accordingly, without worrying that some other identification might appear in the future.

 

Moreover, perhaps there could be some room for such an argument as a reason not to rely on a particular view l’kula, out of concern that a future opinion might arise l’chumra—although, as explained above, it is clear that poskim do not generally take this approach either. Here, however, the situation is reversed. There is an opinion l’chumra that there is presently a mitzvah to wear this Techeiles, while the Rav exempts us from that mitzvah because perhaps some other identification will arise. This would be similar to a person refusing to put on tefillin at all because Rashi and Rabbeinu Tam disagree about the order of the parshiyos, and perhaps someday Rabbeinu Tam will be proven correct—or perhaps an entirely new shittah will be developed that agrees with neither Rashi nor Rabbeinu Tam.

 

DEFINING THE IDENTIFICATION AS A “SAFEK”

 

From the possibility that a fourth identification may someday arise, the Rav concludes that “this is the nature of all scientific proofs: the mark of safek is built into them.” The Rav repeatedly describes the identification of Techeiles as merely a safek, because there are several competing identifications and none has been proven with absolute certainty.

 

But are scientific proofs alone subject to uncertainty, while every halachic proof is based on absolute certainty? As I wrote above, almost every halachah contains machlokes and differing opinions, and each side generally has proofs and sevaros that cannot simply be dismissed. When we pasken a matter according to one opinion, are we one hundred percent certain that this is the truth and that the opposing opinion is completely mistaken? Of course not. A posek weighs the proofs on both sides and reaches a conclusion about which view is more reasonable. That is not one hundred percent certainty.

 

The Ramban says this explicitly in his introduction to Milchamos Hashem: “Every student of our Talmud knows that in the disputes among its commentators there are no absolute proofs… in this wisdom there is no clear demonstration like the calculations of geometry and the observations of astronomy.” In some sciences there can actually be absolute proofs—obviously I am not comparing the identification of Techeiles to a mathematical or astronomical proof, which is what the Ramban was discussing—while in halachah itself we do not demand that level of proof. The Ramban continues that when a posek brings reasonable proofs for one side and difficulties against the other from the sugyos and from sevara, that is sufficient to decide the halachah even though the proofs are not absolute.

 

Accordingly, just as in every other machlokes a posek does not say that the mere existence of two sides automatically leaves the matter permanently in safek, but rather weighs the sides and reaches a decision, the same must be true here. The existence of several opinions does not prevent a psak. Just as in any other machlokes the posek decides according to the side that appears more reasonable without requiring one hundred percent proof, so too here: if the Murex identification has much stronger evidence than the competing identifications, a posek is entitled—and required—to decide in its favor even without one hundred percent certainty.

 

The same is true not only of halachic disputes but also of factual inquiries relevant to Torah law. The general principle is that only an evenly balanced safek is treated as a safek, while a rov is treated as certainty for halachic purposes. Torah law does not require absolute certainty. Once the evidence passes the threshold of a majority, the halachah may treat the matter as established.

 

Certainly, after weighing all of the evidence, some poskim may conclude that the Murex identification remains only a safek, and some may even conclude that it does not rise to the level of a serious safek. But the Rav presents the matter as inherently a safek—as though the mere existence of several identifications makes a decision impossible and eternally fixes the issue in the category of safek. In my opinion that is not so. It depends on the judgment of each posek. Some poskim may conclude that it is a safek, while others may very well conclude that this is Techeiles with the halachic status of certainty rather than mere doubt.

 

Furthermore, the Rav does not address the actual evidence for the Murex identification, because the Rav’s underlying approach seems to be that regardless of how strong the evidence is, the matter will always remain only a “safek.” In my opinion one cannot define it in advance as a safek. The proofs themselves must first be weighed, and only then can one decide whether the matter remains doubtful or should be treated as certain.

 

If so, the whole Techeiles question does not necessarily depend on whether safek d’Oraisa l’chumra applies when one cannot be certain that the chumra will resolve the issue (Letters A and C). If we conclude that the identification is not merely a safek but close to certain, then it is not a case of safek d’Oraisa at all; it obligates us like a matter treated as certain. For the same reason, the issue of a safek caused by chisaron yediah, lack of knowledge, may not be relevant either.

 

As for those two arguments themselves: in Letter A the Rav describes the issue of safek d’Oraisa as a “concern”—“they were concerned that one should be machmir only if…” —as though this reasoning creates some possible issur in wearing the Techeiles. I do not think that is correct. The poskim’s discussion is whether there is an obligation to wear doubtful Techeiles because of safek d’Oraisa l’chumra. The argument that this rule applies only when the chumra will definitely resolve the doubt is an argument that there is no obligation to be machmir; it is not an argument that there is an issur in doing so.

 

In Letter C the Rav phrases it differently: “Some say that the entire concept of being machmir applies when by doing so one definitely fulfills the stringent opinion.” In my opinion this formulation is also not exact. The question is whether there is an actual obligation to be machmir in such a case because of safek d’Oraisa l’chumra, which may itself constitute a full obligation, either d’Oraisa or d’Rabbanan. Even if there is no formal obligation to be machmir, there can still certainly be value in doing so. Saying that “there is no reason to be machmir” would mean there is no value in it at all, whereas the real debate is whether one is required to do it.

 

I also do not understand the argument from chisaron yediah. The Shulchan Aruch (Y.D. 98:3; see Shach and Taz there) rules the opposite: in a safek caused by lack of knowledge one is machmir even in a d’Rabbanan, not that one may be lenient even in a d’Oraisa.

 

DOES MIDDAS CHASSIDUS JUSTIFY ENTERING A POSSIBLE BITTUL MITZVAH?

 

Even if we define the Murex identification as a safek, and even if we say that safek d’Oraisa l’chumra does not create an obligation here, there is still another question: why should a person willingly place himself into a safek of actively being mevatel a mitzvas aseh?

 

There is no obligation to wear a four-cornered garment. Rather, if one chooses to wear such a garment, he is obligated to put tzitzis on it. Our practice of deliberately wearing four-cornered garments so that we can fulfill tzitzis is a middas chassidus, not an absolute obligation. The question is therefore: because we want to act with middas chassidus, should we enter a safek of violating a full obligation? Our ancestors who wore white tzitzis alone were anusin regarding Techeiles, so they fulfilled as much as they could as a middas chassidus, and there was no bittul mitzvah because they were unable to do more, as the Shaagas Aryeh explains. But we may now have the ability to fulfill Techeiles and may no longer be anusin. Why should we enter a safek of bittul mitzvah merely in order to practice the middas chassidus of wearing a four-cornered garment?

 

Even if it is only a safek, it would seemingly be preferable not to wear a four-cornered garment at all—which is only a middas chassidus—rather than enter a possible bittul of a full mitzvas aseh. Admittedly, it sounds extremely strange to say that we should stop wearing tzitzis entirely, but logically that seems to be the din: it is better to forgo a middas chassidus than to enter a safek of violating a full obligation.

 

THE CONCERN OF KALA ILAN

 

Regarding the concern of kala ilan mentioned by the Rav in Letter A: first, this too depends on the Rav’s assumption that the identification is a safek. If we conclude that the Murex identification is close to certain and pasken that it is most probably the Techeiles, that very decision also disposes of the kala ilan concern. If, in our assessment, there is a ninety percent likelihood that this is Techeiles, then there is only a ten percent likelihood that it is kala ilan, and we do not generally need to be concerned for such a minority.

 

But even if we accept the Rav’s position that the matter is an evenly balanced safek, I do not think there is grounds to refrain from Techeiles because of kala ilan, for several reasons. The Rav cites the Gemaros in Bava Metzia and Menachos, from which it appears that one may not put kala ilan into tzitzis. But neither Gemara seems relevant to our case.

 

In Bava Metzia the Gemara discusses various cases of fraud: a person attributes his money to a non-Jew in order to lend with ribbis, hides his weights in salt, or hangs kala ilan on his garment and claims that it is Techeiles. HaKadosh Baruch Hu warns that even though such fraud may be hidden from people, He knows what is in the heart and will punish the deceiver. That is a case where a person puts something on his garment that he knows with certainty is not Techeiles; he knows he is a faker, and his entire purpose is to fool the public into thinking that he is fulfilling the mitzvah. How can that Gemara prove anything about our situation, where we are not dealing with a known fake but with possible Techeiles, and where the motivation is not deception but a desire to fulfill the mitzvah?

 

In Menachos the Gemara discusses a person who puts both Techeiles and kala ilan on the same garment, using the kala ilan in place of white. The Gemara prohibits this out of concern that later people may mistakenly assume that all of the colored strands are Techeiles, transfer the kala ilan to another garment, and thereby exempt that second garment with kala ilan but no real Techeiles, potentially also wearing shatnez. Our case is entirely different. There are not two different materials—known Techeiles and known kala ilan—that look alike and can be confused. There is one material whose status is doubtful: perhaps Techeiles, perhaps kala ilan. Everyone knows that this is the same disputed Techeiles, and no one will confuse it with some separate, definite Techeiles, because we do not possess any acknowledged definite Techeiles.

 

One also cannot say that even if the reason for Chazal’s gezeirah no longer applies, the gezeirah against kala ilan remains in force. This is not even the act Chazal prohibited. There the gezeirah was against putting kala ilan into the garment as though it were the white component, whereas here we wish to use the disputed dye specifically as Techeiles. Moreover, there the person already fulfills the mitzvah of Techeiles and merely adds kala ilan. Can that gezeirah be extended to tell us to abandon the mitzvah of Techeiles entirely when we have no other Techeiles? Where do we find that Chazal maintained such a gezeirah even at the cost of bittul of the mitzvas aseh of Techeiles?

 

There is an additional straightforward point. We are not dealing with definite kala ilan, but with safek kala ilan—because even according to the Rav there is a possibility that it is Techeiles. A safek in a d’Rabbanan is generally treated l’kula. There are certainly situations in which we are machmir even in a safek d’Rabbanan, but here that cannot simply be called a chumra, because the “chumra” regarding the Rabbinic concern of kala ilan simultaneously becomes a kula regarding the Torah mitzvah of Techeiles.

 

The Rav also cites Igros Moshe, Y.D. II, 133, where kala ilan is mentioned. But that teshuvah discusses a completely different situation: a single thread that was dyed both with Techeiles and with kala ilan. Such a thread has the status of kala ilan and does not fulfill the mitzvah of Techeiles. I do not understand how this applies to us. R’ Moshe does not say that there is any prohibition against hanging kala ilan itself; he says only that it does not fulfill Techeiles. Nobody disputes that if the identification is wrong, one has not fulfilled Techeiles. But that does not mean that one has committed an issur.

 

CASTING ASPERSIONS ON THE EARLIER GENERATIONS

 

The Rav writes in Letter A that we must be concerned about hotza’as la’az on the Rishonim and earlier generations who did not wear Techeiles.

 

First, this concern appears in the Gemara and poskim only in a very small number of cases. It is clear that in many areas we adopt newly developed chumros without worrying that this casts aspersions on earlier generations who did not observe them. To return to the example of Rabbeinu Tam and the Gra: when we begin Shabbos at sunset in accordance with the Gra, one could seemingly say that we cast aspersions on earlier generations who began Shabbos later in accordance with Rabbeinu Tam.

 

Many poskim explain that the concern of hotza’as la’az applies only where one is adopting a chumra that is clearly not required by the din. Where there is a genuine halachic basis for being stringent, we are permitted—and sometimes required—to be machmir and need not worry about casting aspersions on earlier practice. See, for example, Yabia Omer, vol. V, E.H. 5, which discusses this issue at length. R’ Ovadia Yosef quotes the Terumas HaDeshen (siman 232): “We say that one would thereby cast aspersions on the earlier generations only in a case like that of gittin, where the matter is plainly permitted according to the din… But where there is a safek in the law and there are grounds to be stringent, it is preferable that we act in accordance with the law and Torah… rather than be concerned with casting aspersions on earlier gittin.” Here, even the Rav agrees that perhaps this is Techeiles and that there is at least a side l’chumra. If so, there should be no concern of hotza’as la’az.

 

More than that, our case is fundamentally different from the cases where this concern is raised. Hotza’as la’az applies when someone adopts a new chumra that the earlier generations could have practiced but did not. Here, the identification of Techeiles with the Murex was not known in earlier generations and this dye was not available to them. How can wearing it today cast aspersions on people who could not possibly have done so? R’ Ovadia Yosef makes a similar point in the teshuvah cited above when discussing a changed modern reality: “In any event, when there is a reason to be more stringent today than in previous generations, the concern of casting aspersions on the earlier generations falls away.”

 

In Letter C the Rav goes further and says that the earlier generations did not issue a call to search for Techeiles. This seems to me very far-reaching. Our circumstances have changed completely because of the enormous expansion of scientific knowledge and the improvement in technical means available for such a search. How can we compare our situation to that of the earlier generations and say that they could have searched for Techeiles just as we can? This would be like arguing that the establishment of the State of Israel casts aspersions on the earlier generations because they did not call upon Klal Yisrael to move to Eretz Yisrael and establish a Jewish state, or that growing insect-free vegetables today casts aspersions on earlier generations because they did not call for such agriculture.

 

In many areas we use new possibilities now available to us in order to improve our fulfillment of mitzvos, and nobody raises the concern of hotza’as la’az. We should thank HaKadosh Baruch Hu that our generation has been given these opportunities and use them to increase Torah and fulfill it in a more complete fashion, rather than mechanically copying the practice of earlier generations in areas where circumstances forced them to fulfill the mitzvah only partially. This does not cast any aspersions on those earlier generations, who kept the Torah with mesirus nefesh and under difficult conditions to the best of their ability.

 

THE CONCERN OF YUHARA

 

The Rav says in Letter A that someone who asks him will be told not to display yuhara against the Gedolei HaDor who do not practice this. In Letter B the Rav likewise writes that for someone who is not a Radzyner chassid this is merely a chumra and therefore there is a concern of yuhara.

 

I do not understand why this is merely a chumra. A person who puts Techeiles into his tzitzis is doing so because he is concerned about being mevatel a mitzvas aseh d’Oraisa. This is not simply an optional act of chassidus, but a possible bittul of a Torah mitzvah. Even the Rav, who holds that there is no obligation to wear this Techeiles, agrees that it may in fact be the Torah’s Techeiles. If so, surely this cannot be dismissed as a private chumra for which the person should be faulted for yuhara.

 

I will again quote R’ Ovadia Yosef, this time from Yechaveh Daas II, 1: “One who acts this way because he wishes to satisfy all of the opinions need not be concerned about yuhara. Similarly, the Imrei Binah (O.C. 13:4) writes that a person who wishes to be machmir in accordance with the view of certain great authorities need not be concerned with yuhara. The Pesach HaDevir likewise writes (146:3) that wherever there is a machlokes among poskim, one who wishes to take account of the stringent opinion is deserving of blessing and need not fear yuhara.” Here too, there are opinions that this is Techeiles, and there are poskim, such as R’ Dov Lior shlita and others, who pasken to wear this Techeiles. Even most of those who disagree do not claim that it is certainly not Techeiles. There is therefore certainly room for a person to follow the stringent opinion without concern for yuhara.

 

And with regard to both of these concerns—yuhara and hotza’as la’az on the earlier generations—I must return to the point made above. Even if we grant that these are genuine concerns and that they would prevent us from putting Techeiles in the garment, that still would not permit us actively to be mevatel the mitzvas aseh of Techeiles. It would be preferable not to wear a four-cornered garment at all, rather than put it on and enter a bittul mitzvah.

 

THE WORDS OF THE CHAFETZ CHAIM

 

The Rav quotes in Letter A the Chafetz Chaim’s statement to his son-in-law that he “did not want to put his hand into the fire.” But that statement was made in a completely different context. As quoted in R’ Burstein’s Sefer HaTecheiles, p. 189, the Chafetz Chaim was asked whether one could rely on the Radzyner Rebbe’s identification to weave that Techeiles into the bigdei kehunah and thereby renew the Avodah in the Beis HaMikdash. He answered: “I would not put my head into the fire and risk performing the Avodah of the Beis HaMikdash on the basis of his teaching.”

 

That is obviously entirely different from putting Techeiles in tzitzis. In the Avodah, if the identification is wrong, the Kohen performs the service as a mechusar begadim; the Avodah is invalid and he is liable to misah bidei Shamayim (Hilchos Klei HaMikdash 10:4). That is the risk regarding which the Chafetz Chaim said he would not put himself into the fire on the basis of the Radzyner identification. With tzitzis, by contrast, even if the identification is mistaken, no issur has been committed. There is no comparable danger or “putting oneself into the fire.”

 

Furthermore, the statement was specifically about the Radzyner Techeiles: “I would not put my head into the fire… on the basis of his teaching.” That means that the Chafetz Chaim was not sufficiently convinced by the Radzyner Rebbe’s proofs to permit the Avodah on their basis. How can we infer from that how the Chafetz Chaim would have evaluated Murex Techeiles? Perhaps he would have found these proofs convincing even though he did not find the Radzyner proofs convincing. Surely the Chafetz Chaim did not issue a blanket declaration in advance that no identification could ever convince him. If he rejected the Radzyner evidence, the reasonable assumption is that he considered those proofs and did not find them sufficient. That tells us nothing by itself about a different identification based on different evidence.

 

In Letter C the Rav also cites the story that the Chafetz Chaim told a Radzyner chassid to maintain the practice of his fathers. The Rav understands that to mean that he should wear white tzitzis in accordance with the earlier general practice. But in the version quoted in Sefer HaTecheiles, it seems to me that the meaning is exactly the opposite. The young man was the son of a Radzyner chassid. When he came to the yeshiva he wondered whether he should continue wearing Techeiles as he had at home, and the Chafetz Chaim told him “to wear the same type of tzitzis he wore in his father’s house”—meaning Techeiles tzitzis.

 

THE POSITION OF THE POSKIM IN THE RADZYNER REBBE’S GENERATION

 

The Rav repeatedly states that most poskim in the Radzyner Rebbe’s generation did not accept his position and rejected it entirely.

 

First, as I wrote above, the fact that the Radzyner identification was not accepted tells us nothing about whether a different identification should be accepted. Each identification must be judged on its own evidence.

 

Beyond that, with the Rav’s permission, I would like to borrow something the Rav himself wrote elsewhere (Iturei Kohanim, Issue 23, the letter “Regarding Maran R’ Kook”) concerning opposition to Zionism. A parallel claim is often made there, namely that “most of the Gedolim opposed Zionism.” In my opinion, what the Rav wrote there about Zionism fits the Techeiles question almost word for word.

 

1. It is not accurate to say that most Gedolim opposed Techeiles. The truth is that a minority opposed it, a minority supported it, and the majority were silent and took no definite position.

 

This picture emerges clearly from the survey of supporters and opponents of Radzyner Techeiles in Sefer HaTecheiles, pp. 182–196. There are several strong opponents and several enthusiastic supporters, while most of the recorded responses are complex and uncertain—neither a clear yes nor a clear no. It is certainly impossible to say that “most poskim rejected the matter and nullified it entirely.” More than that, the very fact that this broad survey contains only twenty-eight poskim out of all the talmidei chachamim of the generation indicates that most poskim never expressed a position at all, just as was the case regarding Zionism.

 

The same is true in our generation. It is certainly true that most talmidei chachamim today do not wear Techeiles. But when one examines what contemporary poskim have actually said, the picture is more complicated. Several poskim have ruled to wear Techeiles. Several reject it entirely. A significant number who do not wear it explain their position because of safek, rather than as a definite psak that it is not Techeiles. Most poskim do not address the matter at all. In my opinion, such a situation cannot fairly be described as a clear halachic decision against the renewal of Techeiles.

 

1. This is not a formal “majority out of the whole,” because there was never a gathering of all the chachamim to discuss and decide the matter together.

 

1. With all due respect to the greatness of all the Gedolei HaDor, when it comes to this particular field of Techeiles one cannot compare their expertise to that of the great talmidei chachamim who devoted themselves specifically to the search for Techeiles. Those who investigated Techeiles invested enormous effort, learned the relevant sugyos in depth, and examined the factual questions involved, while most talmidei chachamim of our generation have hardly dealt with the subject because they regard it as hilchesa l’Meshicha.

 

IS A MESORAH REQUIRED?

 

The Rav writes in Letter C that “it is impossible to know what Techeiles is except through mesorah.” But the Rav cites no source for such a rule. Where do we find in halachah that factual investigation has no value and that a halachic decision specifically requires mesorah? In every area of Torah law we rely on various methods of establishing facts and do not demand living testimony—which would be the parallel to mesorah—in every case. Even in capital cases, where the actual offense must be established through witnesses, halachah relies on other factual presumptions to determine facts necessary to the ruling. See Kiddushin 80a, “we stone and burn on the basis of chazakos,” and Sanhedrin 69a, where even in dinei nefashos we follow rov. Only the actual testimony that the prohibited act occurred must come from witnesses.

 

Where, then, is the source for creating a special rule for Techeiles that it cannot be identified through factual evidence and can be known only through mesorah? Can such a major chiddush be established from sevara alone, without a source, and then used to exempt us from a mitzvas aseh d’Oraisa?

 

I heard that in an oral discussion the Rav brought as a proof the halachah of identifying kosher birds. The Rema rules (Y.D. 82:3–4) that today we do not identify a kosher species merely through its simanei taharah but require a mesorah. One might infer from this that factual questions needed for halachic psak can be resolved only through mesorah, not through proofs and simanim.

 

In my opinion, however, an examination of that sugya shows otherwise. The Gemara in Chullin 61–65 discusses the simanim of birds at length. It is clear from the cases and statements there that in the time of Chazal people did in practice rely on those simanim and ate birds possessing the simanei taharah even without a mesorah that the particular species was kosher. The Amora’im disagreed only about how many simanim were required in order to permit the bird in practice (see Chullin 62a).

 

The statement “a kosher bird is eaten on the basis of mesorah” (63b) does not mean that a kosher bird may be eaten only on the basis of mesorah. It means that mesorah is also an independent basis for permitting it: if there is an accepted mesorah that a species is kosher, there is no need to examine its simanim. This is clear from all the Rishonim. According to the basic din of the Gemara, simanim are sufficient and a mesorah is not required.

 

For practical halachah, the Rishonim disagree about how much caution is required. The Rambam and Rabbeinu Chananel rule according to the Gemara and permit birds based on the simanim stated there, each according to his understanding of the sugya. The Razah, Rashba, Rosh, Ran, and Maggid Mishneh are more stringent and require additional signs, such as a broad beak and broad foot, to establish that the bird is not a dores. But they too still permit birds on the basis of simanim without requiring a mesorah that the species is kosher. Rashi is more stringent still and holds that we should not rely on simanim at all. But it is clear even from Rashi that in the era of Chazal simanim were relied upon. His stringency is not based on a general rejection of factual signs, but on a specific problem in bird identification: a bird may appear not to be a dores for a long period and only later display predatory behavior. The Rema paskens in accordance with this more stringent approach.

 

It therefore makes no sense to derive a general rule about Techeiles from the law of birds, for two reasons. First, the requirement of mesorah in birds is a specific stringency caused by a specific weakness in the simanim of birds. It is not a rule for all of Torah that halachah accepts mesorah but rejects simanim. To the contrary, everyone agrees that in the time of the Gemara simanim were sufficient, which demonstrates the basic principle that halachah does rely on simanim.

 

Second, the Rema’s ruling is a chumra beyond the strict din. Even Rashi agrees that the basic Gemara permits reliance on simanim; he simply requires greater caution. Most Rishonim disagree with Rashi, and the practical ruling follows him only as a chumra (see Darchei Moshe there). Can we derive from that chumra a kula here—namely, that we should refrain from Techeiles because we refuse to rely on simanim?

 

I have also found an explicit source among the Rishonim that Techeiles can be restored on the basis of simanim without a mesorah. In the new responsa of the Maharil, siman 5, he discusses a linen tallis. As is well known, Chazal decreed against putting tzitzis on a linen garment because of a concern of shatnez. Some Rishonim nevertheless permitted a linen tallis with linen tzitzis nowadays, arguing that since we have no Techeiles there is no realistic shatnez concern.

 

The Maharil responds: “The rest of our rabbanim were stringent [not to put tzitzis on a linen tallis]… and it is reasonable, because perhaps the situation will return to its former difficulty [and there will again be a shatnez concern] when Techeiles becomes available; especially according to what the Semag writes, that the chilazon fish is in the Salt Sea and he gives its simanim, so it would be easy to make Techeiles….” In other words, because we possess simanim of the chilazon, there is a realistic possibility that it could be identified and Techeiles restored; therefore the concern of shatnez remains. This is explicit: Techeiles need not be restored specifically through a mesorah. It can be restored through the simanim. One should not ask why the Maharil himself did not actually undertake such a restoration; as explained above, the practical means available in his period did not make such a search feasible.

 

“TECHEILES WILL BE RESTORED ONLY BY MASHIACH”

 

The Maharil’s words also refute the claim that “Techeiles will be restored only with the coming of the righteous Redeemer” (Letter C), since the Maharil explicitly says that Techeiles can be restored in our time on the basis of simanim.

 

More generally, I do not understand how the Rav can bring such an argument. I can perhaps understand this claim coming from talmidei chachamim who place every aspect of geulah entirely in the future, envisioning all parts of the complete redemption returning at once, so that Techeiles too would return only through Mashiach together with everything else. Even that is difficult, since the mitzvah of Techeiles is not halachically dependent on the Beis HaMikdash or the geulah at all.

 

But we believe that the establishment of the State is reishis tzemichas ge’ulaseinu, and several aspects of geulah—Jewish sovereignty in Eretz Yisrael and kibbutz galuyos among them—have already begun to be restored in our time. How do we know that Techeiles is not likewise one of the things that HaKadosh Baruch Hu wishes to restore now, at the beginning of geulah?

 

Please forgive me for writing at such length. I find the matter very difficult: how can a mitzvas aseh d’Oraisa be set aside without reasons that seem sufficient to me? Please also forgive me if I inadvertently expressed myself too sharply at any point. I want to emphasize that I have no intention, chas v’shalom, of attacking or provoking, but only of clarifying the matter according to the truth of Torah. I would be extremely grateful if the Rav would merit me with a reply to my questions. (A stamped envelope is enclosed.)

 

With great respect,

Shmuel Ariel

Yeshivat Otniel

 

REPLY A

 

B’ezras Hashem, to R’ Shmuel Ariel,

 

Shalom,

 

Thank you very much for your letter. I took great pleasure in reading it. Because of my workload, I will not be able to address everything you wrote, only a few points—not necessarily the most important ones, but those that happened to come to mind. Many matters have also already been clarified in previous generations and in this generation, and I have nothing to add. Let each person choose as he sees fit.

 

Regarding what you wrote that Techeiles does not prevent the white: you are certainly correct. What I wrote was a general clarification, but in practice, if we have Techeiles, then of course it must be put on.

 

1. Before anything else, I must point out that my entire discussion is l’halachah and not l’maaseh.

 

Once the basic ruling on a subject has been established by the Gedolei HaDor, lesser talmidei chachamim can also pasken details within certain limits. But restoring Techeiles after it has not been practiced for many generations requires the Gedolei HaDor. Therefore, a person who wears Techeiles now has an element of yuhara, as though he were greater, wiser, and more righteous than the Gedolei HaDor.

 

Some people say that by not wearing Techeiles we are being mevatel a Torah mitzvah. But that argument turns back on them: do the Gedolei HaDor not know what a Torah mitzvah is? Are these people more righteous or wiser than the Gedolei HaDor? Do the Gedolei HaDor not know that a new identification of Techeiles has been proposed? Have they not been asked about it? And yet they do not put Techeiles on their own garments.

 

2. You argue that regarding Shivas Tzion and building Eretz Yisrael there was also a situation in which a minority of the Gedolei Olam supported the movement, a minority opposed it, and the majority took no position, and you say that the situation is similar regarding the renewed Techeiles identification. I do not think the cases are comparable.

 

To this day I have not seen a halachic teshuvah—meaning a full clarification of the relevant sources through shakla v’tarya in Torah sheb’al peh—from one of the Gedolei HaDor that paskens that one should wear tzitzis according to the new identification. If that changes, we can reconsider the matter.

 

3. You challenge my statement that since the identification is not certain we should not follow it, noting that halachic proofs are not certain either, as the Ramban says in the introduction to Milchamos. Of course halachic proofs are not certain like mathematics. They are sevaros, and we weigh which sevara is more convincing. But that is the method by which the Ribbono Shel Olam commanded us to pasken.

 

The reconstruction of a mesorah that disappeared through various scientific identifications is a different matter. Did the Ribbono Shel Olam command us to pasken this way? Do we find an example of doing so?

 

Every scientific proof is by its nature doubtful, because it is built on a finite set of facts. Perhaps a new fact will appear that overturns the entire theory. Every scientist presenting a theory cautiously prefaces it with the qualification, “given the present state of our knowledge.” A scientific theory is a hypothesis. Where do we find that the Torah told us to establish a lost mesorah on the basis of hypotheses of this kind?

 

There is something somewhat similar in the story of Rabbah bar bar Chanah, who wished to determine whether the number of chulyos and strings in tzitzis followed Beis Hillel or Beis Shammai by examining the garments of the dead of the wilderness, but he was unable to do so (Bava Basra 74a).

 

There is also something similar in the machlokes whether tefillin should follow Rashi or Rabbeinu Tam. It was reported from Eretz Yisrael that the cover of the grave of Yechezkel HaNavi fell away and tefillin in accordance with Rashi’s shittah were found there. The question was raised whether perhaps those tefillin had been buried there precisely because they were pasul (Bach, O.C. 34).

 

In his sefarim on Techeiles, the Radzyner Rebbe reports that this was the reason the Brisker Rav, the Beis HaLevi, opposed his identification. R’ Yosef Dov Soloveitchik, however, transmitted a somewhat different formulation: “Since the mesorah concerning the identification of the chilazon has been interrupted—for several generations we no longer know which creature is the chilazon—even if we succeed in reconstructing this information through technical and scientific proofs and clear demonstrations, this knowledge can no longer enter the category of mesorah. We cannot pasken the halachah on the basis of this knowledge without a halachic mesorah” (Nefesh HaRav, pp. 52–53).

 

Similarly, according to this approach, one cannot reconstruct the precise mesorah of chaser and malei in a Sefer Torah (Kiddushin 30a) merely by discovering an old Sefer Torah, because that is not a mesorah but only information. For something to have the status of mesorah it requires transmission from person to person.

 

R’ Soloveitchik also said that the machlokes concerning the identification of orez and dochan (Berachos 37a) cannot be resolved by similarities between names in other languages, because what is required is a mesorah transmitted from one person to another from generation to generation, not proofs and investigations.

 

R’ Yosef Shalom Elyashiv writes similarly. He compares the new identification to that of the Radzyner Rebbe, which the Gedolei Yisrael did not accept; afterward another identification appeared, and later yet another, “and we do not know whether after some years others will come and overturn their words.” He cites the above argument of the Brisker Rav, as well as the statement of the Yeshuos Malko that Techeiles was hidden away and that we likewise do not know the proper craft of dyeing it. “If so, the tallis and tzitzis must necessarily be white” (letter dated 19 Iyar 5757, cited in Halichos Sadeh 109).

 

In summary, there are two main arguments:

 

1. From the standpoint of halachah, a scientific proof—such as an archaeological identification and similar methods—used to reconstruct a lost mesorah is considered weak.

 

1. From the standpoint of hora’ah, a ruling of this kind must come from the Gedolei HaDor.

 

Again, I apologize that because of my workload I have responded to only a small part of what you wrote. In any event, I have no new chiddushim to offer in this field, and I am not saying, “Accept my opinion.” Each person may choose.

 

B’virkas haTorah,

Shlomo Aviner

 

LETTER B

 

B’siyata D’Shmaya, 4 Teves 5759

 

To the honored R’ Shlomo Chaim HaKohen Aviner shlita,

 

Shalom rav,

 

First, I want to thank the Rav very, very much for honoring me with a response to my letter, and so soon after I sent it. In terms of the substance of the reply, I am especially grateful because the Rav’s words caused a major change in the way I understand this machlokes.

 

My own limited view still favors the renewal of Techeiles l’halachah u’l’maaseh. Nevertheless, the Rav’s letter opened my eyes to the conceptual foundations underlying the position that opposes its renewal. I can now, baruch Hashem, say of this machlokes that “these and those are the words of the living God,” not merely as a nice expression, but because I can actually see the element of truth in each side. For that I am very grateful.

 

As to the substance of the matter, I would like to offer several comments. I want to say in advance that I am not trying to present unanswerable kashyos or prove my position with signs and wonders. I am only raising points for thought in order to clarify the subject. I hope the Rav will not find them burdensome.

 

(A photocopy of the Rav’s letter is enclosed.)

 

RESTORING A FORGOTTEN MESORAH

 

The Rav distinguishes between the ordinary methods of Torah learning, which are built on sevaros and proofs and which the Giver of the Torah instructed us to use, and the restoration of a forgotten mesorah, which is a different category. In this latter area, according to the Rav, we were not instructed to use the ordinary tools of psak and there is no precedent for doing so. Therefore the only way to establish the matter is through mesorah from person to person.

 

First, however, it is not at all simple to draw a clear line between these categories. Many halachic investigations include factual questions. I am doubtful whether one can clearly define what counts as an ordinary halachic inquiry that happens to include factual investigation, and is therefore governed by the normal rules of psak, and what has crossed the line into “restoring a mesorah,” to which completely different rules apply.

 

Admittedly, the fact that the boundary is difficult to define is not by itself a proof that the distinction is false. It may be possible to say conceptually that the two categories are different even if we cannot presently define their exact border.

 

The Rav brings two comparisons, but in my opinion, if they prove anything, they actually point in the opposite direction.

 

In the story of Rabbah bar bar Chanah (Bava Basra 74a), he wanted to take the corner of the tzitzis as an archaeological artifact that would serve as evidence for the halachah. He was simply unable to do so. The conclusion of the story is that the Rabbanan criticized him because he should have counted the strings and chulyos. That means that it would have been possible to derive halachah from this archaeological find.

 

Likewise regarding the ancient tefillin: the Semag, Mordechai, and Beis Yosef do cite that incident as evidence for Rashi’s shittah. Even the Bach ultimately accepts the evidence, since he rejects the attempted rebuttal with “v’lo nahir….” Certainly there are proofs for Rashi from the Gemara itself, and this archaeological evidence was not the sole basis for following Rashi. But it was treated as admissible evidence.

 

Even the “some reject this proof” quoted by the Bach do not reject it on the general principle that archaeological evidence has no place in halachah. They argue against this particular piece of evidence: perhaps the fact that these tefillin were buried shows that they were pasul. In other words, everyone treats archaeological evidence as something that can be considered in halachah and weighed on its own merits, not something that is automatically rejected because only mesorah can count.

 

[An aside: regarding the story of Rabbah bar bar Chanah, I am not sure that it can actually be used as a proof at all. It seems clear to me that these stories are meshalim and should not be understood literally, but as allusions to deeper matters, as the various meforshei aggadah explain them, each in his own way. There were certainly Gedolei Yisrael who took these aggados literally, but this is not the place to discuss that at length. If there were no literal dead of the wilderness, no literal tzitzis, and no literal claim that “you should have counted the strings,” then there was never any actual attempt to derive halachah from archaeology.

 

On the other hand, the Gemara in Zevachim 113b brings one of these aggados—the account of the enormous re’em—as evidence in a halachic discussion. The Gemara tries to infer from it that the Mabul did not descend on Eretz Yisrael, which would mean that we need not be concerned about tumah in Eretz Yisrael, with a practical consequence for the Parah Adumah, as explained there. Perhaps one must say that although these stories are meshalim for deeper matters, the external form of the mashal must still be constructed in a way consistent with halachic rules. Therefore, even the literal framework of the mashal can have halachic implications. Rabbah bar bar Chanah would not have used a mashal involving halachic proof from an archaeological object if such evidence were completely inadmissible in halachah.

 

Still, this does not fully resolve the Gemara in Zevachim for me. There the proof seems to depend not merely on the general form of the mashal but on the detailed dimensions of the re’em, which would have to be taken literally. Those dimensions, however, are impossible literally—an animal sixteen kilometers long according to the version in Bava Basra, or 160 kilometers according to Zevachim. If, as seems more reasonable, these dimensions are simply an exaggeration conveying that the re’em was an exceptionally large animal, it could still have been small enough to fit into the 300-amah-long teivah, itself an enormous size for an animal. I have written at length on this even though it does not directly concern our subject because this Gemara in Zevachim has bothered me for a long time, and I would be very happy if the Rav has an answer.]

 

I also did not understand the Rav’s statement regarding the mesorah of chaser and malei—that it cannot be established from an ancient Sefer Torah but requires oral transmission from person to person. That is precisely how the mesorah of chaser and malei is established: by checking accurate sifrei Torah. We have never heard that a specifically oral mesorah is required. Is there anyone today who knows every chaser and malei by heart and can transmit the entire list orally to the next generation? Even in earlier generations, only R’ Meir is described as capable of writing Megillas Esther by heart (Megillah 18b); ordinary people cannot preserve such a textual mesorah orally.

 

The Yerushalmi in Taanis (4:2) is explicit as well. Three Torah scrolls were found in the Azarah, and where they differed the correct text was established by following the majority of the scrolls. No independent oral mesorah was required.

 

If I understand the Rav correctly, the Rav reads Kiddushin 30a as saying that our Sefer Torah is definitely accurate but we still may not rely on counting its letters because we specifically require an oral mesorah. It seems to me that the meaning is different: we cannot rely on the count because our scrolls themselves are not known to be absolutely precise. This appears to be the straightforward meaning of the Gemara. The proof is that “they,” who were expert in chaser and malei, did rely on their Sefer Torah: “they did not move from there until they brought a Sefer Torah and counted.” They did not require an additional oral mesorah.

 

For our purposes, however, I do not actually think this is a difficulty with the Rav’s position that mesorah is required. A written mesorah is obviously also a form of mesorah. That is precisely how the tradition of chaser and malei is transmitted—from text to text rather than necessarily by word of mouth. Likewise with Techeiles: if we found an explicit old sefer saying “this is the chilazon” together with an illustration of the creature, surely that would count as a complete mesorah. What difference would it make whether the mesorah was transmitted in writing or orally?

 

There is, however, another example in which actual judgment and evidentiary reasoning are used, rather than merely transmitting a written mesorah. The Rambam writes in Hilchos Malveh V’Loveh 15:2 that regarding the issue he is discussing there are two girsaos in the Gemara, and he decides between them by determining which version is older. His evidence is that one version appears in a manuscript “written on gevilim in the manner in which they used to write nearly five hundred years ago.” In other words, the Rambam examined the material and form of the manuscript, concluded from them that the manuscript was roughly five hundred years old, and therefore treated its girsa as more reliable. That is a halachic decision based on archaeological-type evidence. One can certainly distinguish between this kind of identification and the evidence for Techeiles, but if it is not a proof, it is at least a parallel worth noting.

 

These are various examples from other fields in which matters are clarified through evidence rather than exclusively through mesorah. Specifically regarding Techeiles, I already cited in my previous letter the explicit words of the Maharil, who clearly indicates that Techeiles can be restored through simanim and that a mesorah is not specifically required. In my opinion the Maharil’s words are direct and unambiguous. From that point onward, the burden of proof lies on anyone who wants to introduce a new rule that only mesorah can suffice, if he has grounds to disagree with the Maharil.

 

I think the Rambam also implies that Techeiles can be restored through rational investigation. According to the view that only mesorah can establish the identity, once the mesorah has been interrupted for even one generation there is no natural way for it ever to return. The only possibility would be restoration through nevuah or ruach hakodesh.

 

Yet the Rambam writes in Hilchos Melachim 11:1 that Mashiach will restore “all the laws as they were in earlier times,” and specifically mentions renewed korbanos. Korbanos, as is well known, require Techeiles for the bigdei kehunah, as well as argaman and tola’as shani. Yet nowhere in that entire perek dealing with Mashiach does the Rambam mention nevuah or ruach hakodesh. Only in perek 12, halachah 3, regarding determining each Jew’s tribal lineage, does he say that the matter will be established through ruach hakodesh. This seems to imply that the restoration of the mitzvos generally—even those for which the mesorah has been lost—can take place through rational human investigation. Only lineage, which cannot be reconstructed through ordinary human evidence, requires ruach hakodesh. I admit that this inference is not nearly as explicit as the Maharil’s words.

 

Regarding the Beis HaLevi: as the Rav noted, there is a difference between the formulation quoted in the Radzyner Rebbe’s sefarim and the version transmitted by R’ Yosef Dov Soloveitchik, and that difference is very significant.

 

According to the Radzyner quotation, the Beis HaLevi does not say that mesorah is inherently required. His argument is that if the animal and the manufacture of dye from it were known continuously throughout the generations—for example, if non-Jews continued using it to produce dye—and nevertheless Klal Yisrael never used this species for Techeiles, then we possess a negative mesorah demonstrating that it is not the Torah’s chilazon. Nobody would dispute that a continuous negative mesorah would defeat a new identification.

 

But that is not the same as saying that the identification itself requires a positive mesorah. It only requires that there not be an existing mesorah contradicting the identification. Indeed, the Beis HaLevi continues that if the Radzyner Rebbe can prove that the creature and the manufacture of its dye were forgotten and disappeared at some point, so that there was no continuous negative tradition against the identification, “then we would be obligated to listen to him and wear it.” That statement is explicit that Techeiles can be restored even without a positive mesorah, provided there is no contrary mesorah refuting the identification.

 

By contrast, the formulation transmitted by R’ Yosef Dov Soloveitchik really does make the stronger claim that in certain areas—he does not define exactly which areas, which returns us to the boundary problem mentioned above—no factual investigation can ever substitute for mesorah. But this formulation certainly appears to conflict with the Maharil, and apparently with the Rambam and R’ Chaim as well.

 

There is another fundamental difficulty created by this absolute formulation of R’ Soloveitchik’s position. He does not merely argue that scientific proofs are uncertain and therefore cannot be relied upon. He says that even if the proofs were completely clear and there were no doubt whatsoever about their truth, they still would not matter halachically because certain subjects specifically require mesorah and no other kind of evidence can substitute.

 

According to such an approach, halachah is limited in these areas to one particular kind of evidence—mesorah—and ignores other kinds of evidence even where it is clear that they accurately describe reality. This creates a separation between halachah and reality. There is the actual reality, determined by all available factual evidence, and there is a separate “halachic reality” that considers only selected categories of evidence and ignores others. The result would be that the “halachic reality” could differ from actual reality, as though halachah constructs an artificial reality that is not true.

 

Even if we proved the identification absolutely and became completely convinced that this is Techeiles, we would have to say: “In reality this is Techeiles, but halachically it is not Techeiles.” Can this be Toras emes?

 

PSAK BY THE GEDOLEI HADOR

 

The Rav’s second argument, “from the standpoint of hora’ah,” is that a ruling of this sort can come only from the Gedolei HaDor. Even if another talmid chacham—and there are certainly talmidei chachamim among those who wear Techeiles—believes that this is Techeiles, he must ask himself whether he is wiser and more righteous than the Gedolei HaDor. In my opinion several comments should be made about this claim.

 

1. I do not know whom the Rav defines as “Gedolei HaDor.” I am obviously not worthy of assigning grades or titles, but R’ Dov Lior shlita is certainly one of the major poskim of our community, and he has clearly paskened to wear Techeiles. A number of other major poskim in our generation have also taken a positive position regarding Techeiles even if they did not issue a categorical ruling that everyone should wear it. [I do not want to quote their statements because they are reports rather than things I have verified directly, and the statements themselves are nuanced, so there is a concern that a quotation would not be fully faithful.]

 

1. The Rav argues that no Gadol HaDor has written a comprehensive teshuvah from the sources of Torah sheb’al peh that paskens to wear Techeiles. But I do not understand why the psak of the Gedolei HaDor must specifically take the form of a full, comprehensive teshuvah that repeats all the proofs identifying the chilazon and demonstrating its fit with the sources of Chazal.

 

In a subject like this, the Gedolei HaDor do not personally have to carry out every part of the investigation, either the scientific research or the work of comparing the proposed identification with the words of Chazal. Talmidei chachamim and researchers have already done this work from all sides and submitted their findings for the review and decision of the Gedolei HaDor. A clear and organized summary of the main proofs can be found, for example, in the booklet of R’ Eliyahu Tavger shlita, head of the Ptil Tekhelet organization.

 

A posek can therefore evaluate those studies and decide on their basis whether the identification should be accepted. If the posek has no new proofs of his own, he does not have to redo the entire project and rewrite every detail of the evidence when that work has already been done by others. Even if we accept the Rav’s position that the final and decisive judgment must be made specifically by the Gedolei HaDor, the detailed groundwork can certainly be done by lesser talmidei chachamim who have specialized in the subject.

 

1. Have the opponents of renewed Techeiles themselves written reasoned teshuvos from the sources of Torah sheb’al peh explaining why this is not the chilazon? Until now, I have heard and seen a number of answers for why one should not wear Techeiles, and in most cases the answer consists of one sentence, one short reason, and nothing more.

 

R’ Elyashiv’s teshuvah, which the Rav mentioned, is more detailed and reasoned than most, but even that teshuvah is very far from covering all aspects of the question. In truth, I think the Rav’s question is much stronger against those who reject the identification than against those who support it. A posek who accepts the identification does not need to spell out all of his arguments because the arguments and proofs have already been set out by those who made the identification; he needs only to say that he accepts those arguments and believes they can be relied upon l’halachah u’l’maaseh. A posek who rejects the identification, however, has to explain why he rejects the arguments of those proposing it.

 

In practice, I have not seen any of the Gedolei HaDor address the specific proofs for the Murex identification. Even R’ Elyashiv’s teshuvah raises several general difficulties with identifying the chilazon but does not discuss the specific evidence identifying it as the Murex trunculus.

 

To illustrate the problem, I must mention the point in that teshuvah that especially surprised me when it was published. R’ Elyashiv cites the Beis HaLevi’s original argument: a chilazon can be identified only if we are dealing with a creature that was not known and whose dye production was not practiced throughout the intervening generations; otherwise there would be a negative mesorah against the identification. R’ Elyashiv then concludes: “And I do not know regarding the discovery that the researchers of our time have discovered whether the above argument applies to it as well.”

 

Here I simply do not understand—and although we are discussing a Gadol HaDor, I feel compelled to ask: what does “I do not know” mean? It is simple and obvious to anyone who reads even a little of the literature on the Murex that this mollusk was not used for more than a thousand years and that neither Jews nor non-Jews produced dye from it throughout that long period. If so, the Beis HaLevi’s argument plainly does not apply to it.

 

The apparent conclusion is that R’ Elyashiv had not examined the literature dealing with this chilazon or studied the descriptions of the creature and the arguments for identifying it. Therefore he was left with this doubt. That fits the character of the teshuvah as a whole: as noted, it does not address the specific identification but only raises general doubts that could be raised against essentially any proposed identification. The same is true of other answers I have seen from poskim: I have not seen a teshuvah from the Gedolei HaDor that engages substantively with the actual evidence for this identification.

 

It pains me very much to say this, but a very unfortunate situation has developed. The eyes of all Klal Yisrael are turned toward the Gedolei HaDor. Talmidei chachamim are unwilling to pasken because they say that a decision of this type belongs only to the Gedolim. Yet the Gedolim themselves do not enter deeply into the matter and do not investigate the proofs and arguments on their merits.

 

It is true that Gedolei Yisrael are burdened with many enormous problems, sometimes literal questions of pikuach nefesh. It is entirely possible that they do not have the ability to set aside the time necessary for this complex and wide-ranging sugya, which requires investigation in many different areas. But if that is the situation, then it should be stated as such: they have not reached a decision. A lack of investigation should not later be turned into a “psak” upon which everyone relies because “a zaken has already ruled.”

 

I very much hope that in saying this I have not violated the honor of talmidei chachamim. Heaven is my witness that my intention is l’shem Shamayim and for the truth of Torah. I would be very happy to discover that my criticism is mistaken.

 

1. This brings us to the Rav’s basic principle that matters of this kind belong only to the Gedolei HaDor, and even if a particular talmid chacham sees the matter differently, he must nullify his opinion before theirs. This touches upon fundamental principles of the halachic system. I am neither capable of nor intending to issue definitive rules on such a broad subject, but I would like to raise several observations.

 

First, even among the Gedolei HaDor who have ruled in practice not to wear Techeiles, many have not said with certainty that this is not Techeiles. Their ruling is based only on safek. R’ Elyashiv’s teshuvah, for example, is based mainly on doubts: perhaps a new identification will appear, perhaps the Beis HaLevi’s objection applies, and so on. It does not present a definite argument establishing that this cannot be Techeiles.

 

[There is a further argument there based on the Shulchan Aruch and Pri Megadim that the tzitzis strings should be white because the strings should match the color of the garment and the garment should be white, based on “His garment was white as snow.” But clearly this argument cannot stand on its own. The Shulchan Aruch and Pri Megadim certainly did not mean to uproot the Torah mitzvah of Techeiles forever and establish that from now on only white strands may ever be used. This point can therefore be no more than an additional consideration joined to the primary arguments, which are arguments of safek.]

 

If so, can we really say that every talmid chacham must nullify his own judgment before the ruling of the Gedolei HaDor when the Gedolei HaDor themselves are not certain that their assessment is correct? A posek may certainly issue a practical psak based on safek rather than certainty. But can that safek be imposed on other talmidei chachamim, obligating them to abandon their own conclusions in favor of someone else’s unresolved doubt?

 

And even if there were a definite psak, is a talmid chacham who is convinced of a particular halachic conclusion required by the rules of halachah to abandon his position merely because greater scholars disagree? At first glance, the sugya at the beginning of Horayos (2b) proves that he is not—and that in some cases he is actually forbidden to do so.

 

The Gemara says that if a student who has reached the level of hora’ah believes that the ruling of the Great Beis Din is mistaken, he may not simply follow their ruling and permit what he believes is forbidden. If he does so because he assumes that it is a mitzvah to obey the words of the chachamim even in such a case, that assumption itself is an error and he is liable to bring a korban. The Rambam codifies this (Hilchos Shegagos 13:5): a person who knows that Beis Din has erred may not act leniently because he thinks he has a mitzvah to obey Beis Din even when they are mistaken.

 

Nor can one say that a “student who has reached hora’ah” means only someone of an extraordinary level while an ordinary talmid chacham must always nullify his opinion before Beis Din. The Gemara includes even a student who is “learned but not strong in sevara” or “strong in sevara but not fully learned,” and the Rambam excludes only an am ha’aretz. The Meiri is explicit that no extraordinary level of Torah greatness is required to enter the category of “student” for this halachah.

 

[The Ramban—if I remember correctly, although I have not now located the source—limits this rule. If the student came before the Great Beis Din, presented his arguments, and the court nevertheless voted and ruled leniently, then he must nullify his position and would thereafter be subject to the law of zaken mamrei if he continued to rule against them. But clearly nothing comparable has happened here. There has been no formal vote producing an absolute decision, and in any event the Ramban’s statement concerns specifically the Great Beis Din, the only court to which the law of zaken mamrei applies.]

 

Neither the Gemara nor the poskim ask the rhetorical question raised by the Rav: Is this small student wiser and more righteous than the seventy judges of the Great Beis Din? Rather, “there is no wisdom, understanding, or counsel against Hashem.” If the student is convinced that this is the truth and the will of Hashem, he may not act otherwise merely because people greater than he disagree. All of this is said even about the Great Beis Din in the Lishkas HaGazis; kal vachomer, the Gedolei HaDor today do not possess the absolute authority of that Beis Din.

 

One cannot object that in practice we do follow the poskim of earlier generations. If a talmid chacham today believes he understands a sugya differently from the Rishonim or from the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch, he certainly may not practice according to his independent interpretation. But that is not simply because the Rishonim were greater. It is because Klal Yisrael accepted their authority. Later generations of Klal Yisrael accepted that the Rishonim cannot simply be overturned, and the communities of Sepharad and Ashkenaz accepted the Shulchan Aruch and Rema as authoritative poskim. Once Klal Yisrael accepts such authority, the situation becomes comparable to the Ramban’s case in which Beis Din has reached a final binding ruling and an individual may no longer disagree in practice.

 

The Rambam makes the same point in his introduction to Mishneh Torah. The reason the Talmud obligates all of Klal Yisrael is that all Israel accepted its authority, not simply because Chazal were greater than those who came after them. Chazal were certainly greater, but greatness alone is not what makes disagreement halachically impossible.

 

In our case it is impossible to say that Klal Yisrael has accepted a binding psak that Techeiles should not be worn. The sugya is still being investigated and is far from a final resolution. The Rav’s argument is not based on communal acceptance but on the greatness of those who do not wear Techeiles. According to the principles above, that greatness alone does not necessarily obligate a smaller talmid chacham to abandon his own judgment.

 

If the question is why a particular Gadol does not agree, then one should study that Gadol’s proofs and reasoning and discuss them on their merits in the normal way of Torah. The answer cannot simply be that the Gadol disagrees.

 

It therefore seems to me from this sugya that if a talmid chacham is personally convinced that this is Techeiles, he may not wear white tzitzis alone. He must act according to the truth as he understands it, even if Gedolei HaDor disagree.

 

As I said, I am not trying to establish final rules in this fundamental sugya; I am only raising the issue. But I think the first point alone—that the rulings of the Gedolei HaDor themselves are based on doubt—is enough to answer the claim that every talmid chacham must necessarily nullify his own judgment before theirs.

 

HOW THE RULING AGAINST TECHEILES IS PRESENTED

 

The Rav writes in his letter that “my entire discussion is l’halachah and not l’maaseh” and that “I do not say, accept my opinion; each person may choose.” But the Rav’s published letters give a different impression. There the statements are written in categorical language, both l’halachah and l’maaseh.

 

It seems to me that if the Rav does not intend to issue a definitive psak on this subject, that qualification should be stated explicitly in the letters that are published. The Rav does write there that the matter belongs to the Gedolei HaDor, but “although you may be small in your own eyes, you are the head of the tribes of Israel.” Readers treat the Rav’s statements as a full psak in every sense.

 

Even if every argument in the letters is actually based on safek, an ordinary reader understands the conclusion as a definite din. If that is not the Rav’s intention, it should be stated explicitly.

 

– – – –

 

I very much hope that my comments on these two subjects will be received as they are intended—as an attempt to illuminate and clarify, and not, chas v’shalom, as provocation or machlokes. (I am again enclosing an envelope in case the Rav wishes to respond. I would be very happy to receive a reply, but I truly do not want to burden the Rav.)

 

With great respect,

and with many thanks for the Rav’s letter,

Shmuel Ariel

 

REPLY B

 

B’ezras Hashem, to R’ Shmuel Ariel,

 

Much peace,

 

I apologize for the delay in replying because of my workload.

 

In general, questions of this kind should be directed to the Gedolei HaDor and not to someone as insignificant as myself. As I have said, restoring Techeiles after it has been inactive for such a long time is one of those matters that the Gedolei HaDor must decide.

 

Nevertheless, I will briefly say a few things according to my limited understanding.

 

What I brought regarding Rabbah bar bar Chanah, Rashi tefillin, and chaser and malei was not intended as a proof, but as an example; that is why I wrote “this is similar.” The same is true of the Gemara concerning the enormous re’em. It is not a complete proof for many reasons, only something like a remez. We find many examples of this. See, for instance, Shabbos 30 regarding extinguishing a lamp for a sick person and Rashi at the end there.

 

I did not say that Techeiles can be restored only through nevuah and ruach hakodesh. I said that it is presently not clear that we have sufficient proofs to restore it. You brought a proof from the Rambam that ruach hakodesh is not necessary, since the Rambam says Mashiach will restore korbanos, which require Techeiles for the bigdei kehunah, while he does not state that Mashiach must possess ruach hakodesh. If anything, there is room to prove the opposite from there, because Mashiach will also build the Beis HaMikdash, and Maran R’ Kook explained that building the Beis HaMikdash in an extraordinary manner requires assistance of ruach hakodesh (Mishpat Kohen 175). But as I said above, I do not insist that ruach hakodesh is necessarily required.

 

On the substance of the matter, one must distinguish between one kind of scientific proof and another. Of course we cannot deny what our eyes directly see. We cannot say that the moon was not visible when it was visible, or that the sun set when it did not set. But there are other scientific proofs that are filled with uncertainties—for example, various archaeological identifications built one hypothesis on top of another, far removed from an umdena d’muchach. A scientific proof must be absolute rather than merely a theory.

 

It is true that Talmudic proofs are also not mathematically certain, as the Ramban says in his introduction to Milchamos on the Rif. But that creates no difficulty, because the Ribbono Shel Olam decreed that this is how halachah is to be decided. Regarding kiddush hachodesh we are told that the ruling stands “even if they erred, even if they were mistaken, even if they acted deliberately,” and the poskim extend this principle into other areas. The Torah was given on the understanding that the chachamim would decide through the accepted methods of psak, even when those methods involve machlokes and conclusions that are not mathematical demonstrations. “Lo bashamayim hi.” The Gra already explained this principle in his treatment of Tanur Shel Achnai in Kol Eliyahu.

 

A scientific proof, however, has to be certain. There is not such a great distance between the Beis HaLevi’s words as quoted by the Radzyner Rebbe and the version transmitted by R’ Yosef Dov Soloveitchik. They express essentially the same lack of confidence in reconstructing lost mesoros by archaeological means, although R’ Soloveitchik’s formulation is sharper.

 

In the version quoted by the Radzyner Rebbe there is no fundamental objection to using archaeological and similar tools. Rather, there is a lack of confidence in the particular Techeiles identified by the Radzyner Rebbe. Since that chilazon had been known throughout the generations and was never identified as Techeiles, that fact creates a serious weakness in the identification. R’ Soloveitchik states the point more generally: every identification is inherently doubtful and cannot be fully relied upon, because someday it may be shown to be wrong even though at present it appears highly convincing.

 

You can see that the Gedolei Yisrael were reluctant to accept the Radzyner Rebbe’s restoration. One might ask: why not be machmir? If the identification is eventually disproven, nothing has been lost; if it is correct, an enormous mitzvah has been gained. Apparently the Gedolei Yisrael were concerned that in the end the identification would collapse and the entire enterprise would become a joke and a mockery. This is not comparable to an ordinary chumra in a halachic issue that depends on how one interprets the sugyos.

 

R’ Elyashiv’s wording should likewise not be seized upon—“we do not know…” —as proof that he was unfamiliar with the Techeiles issue. That conclusion is not necessary. The main point is that he does not rely one hundred percent on a scientific proof, even one that presently appears extremely strong. We have already seen identifications in the past that seemed one hundred percent certain and were eventually disproven.

 

You argue that the burden of proof should instead lie on those rejecting the new identification, since there are affirmative proofs for it. I do not agree. There is an established chazakah that Techeiles is not available, a reality also reflected in the Midrashim that say Techeiles disappeared or was hidden away. Therefore, someone who wishes to renew Techeiles bears the burden of demonstrating conclusively that his identification is correct. The opponent does not bear the burden of proving that it is wrong.

 

As for the identification itself, I too, in my limited capacity, have read the various articles about the new identification printed in different journals and booklets, and I am not convinced that this is the uniquely correct identification. Perhaps it is and perhaps it is not. There are many kashyos on the identification, which the proponents themselves acknowledge and answer. But what can we do when many of those answers appear dochak to people accustomed to halachic psak?

 

A number of the proponents’ proofs are arguments by elimination—what the poskim call a proof “mikoach kushya.” For example, it is true that many shells were found, and also dyed threads. But where is the proof that these were specifically used for the Techeiles of tzitzis? Perhaps they were simply ordinary decorative dyes. The answer is that no remains of a different species have been found. But what does that prove? Perhaps the manufacturers of Techeiles deliberately disposed of their remains so that competitors would not discover the secret of the process and misuse it, or perhaps there is another explanation. A final proof cannot be established merely from the absence of an alternative answer, because perhaps another answer will someday be found.

 

Similarly, the argument that today we do not know how to produce Techeiles from other mollusks proves nothing. Perhaps in the days of Chazal they knew a method that we have lost. Many ancient techniques have disappeared—for example, aspects of pyramid construction or ancient embalming, or the production of shemen afarsimon mentioned in the Gemara.

 

You argue that if, following R’ Soloveitchik, we hesitate to reconstruct a mesorah through scientific proofs, we will create two separate truths, a scientific truth and a halachic truth. There is no difficulty according to R’ Soloveitchik himself because in Ish HaHalakhah he explains philosophically that halachah is not a description of physical reality but a particular conceptual model of reality. That is admittedly a major chiddush.

 

More generally, halachah frequently rules according to chazakos even when the chazakah does not necessarily correspond to the actual reality. That is how the Ribbono Shel Olam commanded us to pasken. Here too there is a chazakah that Techeiles is not available, and overturning that chazakah requires absolute scientific proof, which we do not possess.

 

R’ Tzvi Yehuda likewise explains in his essay “Machlokes B’Metzius” that halachah is not always issuing a statement about the objective physical reality; at times it establishes the human halachic relationship to the facts (L’Netivos Yisrael II, p. 63). The Gra, discussing Tanur Shel Achnai, explains that halachah was given over to the chachamim and is not determined directly by Divine truth; HaKadosh Baruch Hu cast truth to the earth, to be determined according to the standards of the chachamim (Kol Eliyahu on Bava Metzia 59).

 

But in any case, there is no genuine conflict here with an established scientific truth, because the mark of doubt is present in every scientific statement. Every scientific theory is valid only according to the present state of knowledge; a new discovery may overturn it. Maran R’ Kook wrote that medical knowledge has the status of an umdena (Daas Kohen 140), and the same applies to science generally.

 

When I wrote that I do not force my opinion and do not say “accept my view,” I did not mean that I myself have no firm opinion. My humble opinion is firm. I simply do not force it on other people, just as I do not force my opinion in other matters. Each person should ask his rav what to do. I do not know who your primary rav is, but if your rav muvhak tells you to wear Techeiles, then follow his instruction and do not be concerned.

 

As I have already said, a matter of this kind has a Klal-Yisrael dimension. Restoring Techeiles after it has disappeared for so many generations is an enormous chiddush, and a question of this kind is reserved for the Gedolei HaDor to answer.

 

You ask who exactly is included in the category of Gedolei HaDor. That is a very serious argument. If we take that approach, we will overturn every proper hierarchy, equate small scholars with great ones, introduce chaos into halachic psak, and every little fox will declare himself a lion and begin destroying the vineyards.

 

You say that there is one great rav who has paskened to wear Techeiles and whom you define as one of the Gedolei HaDor. Without entering into the correctness of that definition, we cannot ignore the fact that most of the Gedolei HaDor have not paskened this way.

 

You further argue that a student qualified for hora’ah is not required to nullify his view before the Great Beis Din when he is convinced that they have erred, and similarly that a talmid chacham need not nullify his view before the Gedolei HaDor. But you yourself wrote that the Ramban limits this principle: it applies only if they have not heard his argument. Once they have heard his position, he may no longer disagree with them. The source is the Ramban’s comments on the Rambam’s Sefer HaMitzvos, Shoresh 2.

 

You add that they must formally stand for a vote and similar procedural details. It is not necessarily required that this take place in a formal, technical manner. The essential point is that the Great Beis Din be aware of the reasoning of the talmid chacham who disagrees. If they have never heard his argument, one can say that perhaps they would have accepted it had they heard it. But once they have heard it and continue to maintain their position, he must accept theirs. In our case, the Gedolei HaDor are certainly aware of the various arguments made by those seeking to restore Techeiles and have heard about them, yet they remain unconvinced.

 

You complain that Klal Yisrael turns to talmidei chachamim, but those talmidei chachamim refuse to pasken because they say the decision belongs to the Gedolei HaDor, while the Gedolei HaDor themselves do not decide, producing an unfortunate stalemate. How do you know that the Gedolei HaDor have not decided? Perhaps they have decided against it. And even if you say that they are uncertain and do not wish to decide, that too is a kind of decision—to be deliberate in judgment.

 

Who are we to lecture the Gedolei HaDor that they should hurry and decide? What is burning if we wait a few more years, or even a few generations? Is Klal Yisrael on fire because we do not presently have Techeiles? Is this really such an urgent problem?

 

Open your eyes and see how many young people cry out on behalf of the Techeiles thread, insisting that without it we are losing a Torah mitzvah, and therefore put Techeiles into their tzitzis, while other mitzvos are not nearly so precious to them. They are lax about lashon hara, devarim beteilim, proper boundaries between men and women, exposure to improper culture, and other serious problems, Hashem yishmereinu. That suggests that for some of them the Techeiles thread is simply yuhara and gaavah. They are also not hesitant to criticize the Gedolei HaDor.

 

Talmidei chachamim and tzaddikim like you, however, know very well that one needs patience and humility toward the Gedolei HaDor and should accept their deliberate caution with submission. This is immeasurably more important than a strand of Techeiles.

 

– – – –

 

One more point. Regarding Techeiles, please turn to the Gedolei HaDor. Regarding the other subject mentioned at the end, turn to [omitted]. I would be happy if you let me know what you are told on both matters.

 

B’kavod HaTorah,

Shlomo Aviner

 

LETTER C

 

B’siyata D’Shmaya, Nissan 5759

 

To the honored R’ Shlomo Chaim HaKohen Aviner shlita,

 

Shalom rav,

 

I received the Rav’s second letter with thanks. Regarding the substance of the matters, it seems that the main points have already been discussed, and the Rav has also referred me to others to ask. I therefore do not intend to reopen the debate, although obviously there is much more that could be discussed at length.

 

Nevertheless, I am sending this letter for three purposes.

 

First, I want to thank the Rav very much for his letters. Both letters illuminated extremely important points for me, both in the particular sugya of Techeiles and in much broader foundational questions. I am very grateful to the Rav for taking the trouble to answer me and for opening my eyes.

 

Second, with the Rav’s permission, I would like to clarify several points in the second letter where I apparently did not explain myself adequately and the Rav understood my words differently from what I intended. I do not mean to argue the substance again, but only to make my intention clear, in the spirit of “you shall be clean before Hashem and Israel.”

 

1. I did not mean to say that those proposing the new identification are not required to prove their case. Certainly, someone introducing such a major chiddush must support it with strong proofs. I was referring to the second stage—the stage of psak that comes after the identification work.

 

Once particular people—researchers and talmidei chachamim—have carried out the work of identification in detail and presented their conclusions to the poskim of the generation, if a posek is persuaded by their arguments and accepts the identification l’halachah u’l’maaseh, he does not need to repeat every proof himself. That work has already been done. If he wishes to pasken accordingly, he need only state that the proponents’ proofs appear sound to him and that he accepts the identification in practice.

 

2. I did not mean to say that there is no such concept as “Gedolei HaDor” and that all scholars are equal. Certainly there are different levels. Not every talmid chacham can pasken every question, and at times a lesser talmid chacham must indeed nullify his view before those greater than he. This is not the place to discuss at length exactly when he must do so and when not.

 

What I meant is that in my opinion the supporters of Techeiles include not only ordinary talmidei chachamim but also several people who themselves belong among the Gedolei HaDor. I mentioned one explicitly and alluded to two others whom I did not want to quote. It is certainly possible that I, being insignificant, am mistaken and am describing as Gedolei HaDor talmidei chachamim who do not deserve that title. But on the principle itself, I too know very well that there are Gedolim and there are smaller scholars, and every person must know his place.

 

As the Rav writes, it would indeed be a very serious argument to claim that anyone can pasken any question and disagree with every Gadol. I did not mean anything of the sort. Again, this is not the place to explain at length why, in my opinion, this particular Techeiles case does not raise that problem.

 

3. I was not complaining that the Gedolei HaDor are failing to decide the question quickly enough. Certainly a sugya like this requires great deliberation, and one cannot demand that poskim reach an immediate conclusion.

 

It is even possible that as long as a posek has not reached a clear conclusion, he may rule l’maaseh that based on the presently known facts one should not wear Techeiles, even though his reason is safek and he is not convinced that this is definitely not Techeiles.

 

My point was that if this is the situation, the posek should say so explicitly: the practical psak, even if clear and binding in itself, results from safek rather than from certainty. The public should not mistakenly think that a definitive determination has been reached that this is not Techeiles.

 

There is, after all, an important difference between a psak based on certainty and one based on safek. We should also be concerned for the future. If other Gedolim, whether in our generation or many years from now, eventually investigate the matter and conclude that this is indeed Techeiles and must be worn, people should not be able to reject them on the false assumption that an earlier binding decision has already established that this is not Techeiles.

 

– – – –

 

I will conclude once again with many thanks to the Rav for his letters.

 

Shmuel Ariel