Doubtful Tekhelet — Its Status in Tzitzis

Rabbi Yaakov Epstein

Introduction

The identification of the Torah’s Tekhelet has been discussed extensively in recent years, and it seems that the last word on the subject has still not been said. Many talmidei chachamim and bnei Torah are uncertain whether the creature commonly identified today as the chilazon of Tekhelet — the Murex trunculus — is in fact the chilazon from which the Torah commanded us to make Tekhelet.

The question therefore arises: Is there a mitzvah in putting this doubtful Tekhelet on one’s tzitzis, or could there even be an aveirah involved in doing so, as long as it has not been established as definite Tekhelet?

Several halachic questions have to be clarified:

A. Without this doubtful Tekhelet, we would put four doubled white strings on the garment, making eight ends in total. Perhaps, if the doubtful Tekhelet is really not Tekhelet, those strings would not count toward the tzitzis at all. The person would then be wearing a four-cornered garment without proper tzitzis, thereby actively being mevatel a mitzvas aseh.

A second possibility is that the doubtful Tekhelet strings could invalidate the entire tzitzis, with the same result — that he is actively being mevatel a mitzvas aseh.

A third possibility is that the mitzvah is fulfilled through the remaining white strings, so there is no active bitul aseh, but the doubtful Tekhelet strings accomplish no mitzvah at all and are halachically as though they were not there.

A fourth possibility is that even if this is not the genuine Tekhelet, wool dyed a Tekhelet-like color can still join together with the white strings, and the mitzvah of tzitzis is fulfilled through all of them. Clarifying the status of the doubtful Tekhelet strings, assuming the current identification is incorrect, will also clarify the halachic status of kala ilan.

B. A second question is whether there is actually an obligation to put doubtful Tekhelet on tzitzis.

C. If we assume that, should it turn out not to be real Tekhelet, it does not count together with the white strings, another question arises: Is putting it on the tallis a problem of bal tosif?

D. And even if we eliminate all of the above concerns, perhaps we still have to worry that people will become confused if the definite Tekhelet is eventually rediscovered and it turns out that today’s accepted identification was wrong.

A. Fulfilling the Mitzvah Out of Safek

Is there an issur in putting doubtful Tekhelet on tzitzis?

The questions above can perhaps be clarified from several sugyos.

The Tannaim disagree whether Tekhelet and white strings are me’akev one another [Menachos 38b]. Rebbe holds that they are me’akev, while the Chachamim hold that they are not.

The Razah [Shabbos, Chapter 2, 11b in the Rif pages], as well as one opinion brought in the Itur [Hilchos Tzitzis] and the Meiri [Shabbos 25b], pasken like Rebbe. However, the rest of the Rishonim pasken like the Chachamim: Rabbeinu Chananel, Rif, Rashi, Rambam [Hilchos Tzitzis 1:4], Tur [siman 13], and Semag [aseh 20].

The Razah understood that the Behag agreed with him, although the Ramban in Milchamos argues with that understanding.

According to the Razah and those who agree with him, there is no way to fulfill the Torah mitzvah of tzitzis with white strings but no Tekhelet, or with Tekhelet but no white. According to this view, throughout all the generations since Tekhelet ceased to be available, the Torah mitzvah of tzitzis was not fulfilled. Tzitzis without Tekhelet would only be a Rabbinic mitzvah. The Ramban in Milchamos already raises difficulties with this position.

Accordingly, at a time when definite Tekhelet exists, one could certainly not use kala ilan out of safek according to this opinion, because if it is not actually Tekhelet, there would be no valid tzitzis at all.

However, since halachah was not paskened according to this view, it would appear that we do not have to be concerned for it.

At the beginning of Perek HaTekhelet [Menachos 38a] the Mishnah says:

“The Tekhelet does not prevent the white, and the white does not prevent the Tekhelet.”

Had we understood this statement the same way as the following statement:

“The shel yad does not prevent the shel rosh,”

we might have understood that each one stands entirely on its own. Meaning, if there is no Tekhelet, one would put on only two white strings and no more, according to Rashi; according to the Raavad, three white strings. The reverse would also be true.

If so, one could have argued that strings which are neither Tekhelet nor white — such as kala ilan — might invalidate the entire tzitzis.

However, Rashi explains:

“Even though the mitzvah is to place two Tekhelet strings in the tzitzis, as explained later, nevertheless they are not me’akev one another, and if he made all four Tekhelet or all four white he has fulfilled the mitzvah.”

The other Rishonim also write this. See Tosafos, the Shitah Mekubetzes, and the Rosh.

The Maadanei Yom Tov brings from the Levush that because tzitzis is one mitzvah, if one has no Tekhelet he puts white in its place.

It is somewhat surprising that Rashi, Tosafos, and the Rosh do not bring an explicit source for this. The Rosh writes, “The custom is according to Rashi’s explanation,” which itself requires explanation, as though this question depends merely on minhag. This is not the place to discuss that issue.

It emerges that the main mitzvah is to have four strings which are either white or Tekhelet, with an additional command that there be a pesil Tekhelet among the tzitzis. The Rambam does not state explicitly that one may make all the strings Tekhelet.

In the sugya of a linen garment with tzitzis [Menachos 40a], after the Gemara concludes that Beis Hillel require tzitzis, it brings the statement of R’ Elazar b’R’ Tzadok:

“Anyone who puts Tekhelet on in Yerushalayim is among those who cause people to wonder.”

Rebbe explains why this was prohibited:

“A gezeirah because of kala ilan.”

Meaning, we are afraid that someone might use wool dyed with kala ilan. Since the garment is linen, he would then be wearing shatnez where there is no mitzvah requiring it.

The Gemara asks:

“Let it be no worse than white.”

Meaning, if he does not have Tekhelet he would use white strings, and kala ilan should be no worse than ordinary white wool.

The Gemara answers that since one can use white strings made from the same material as the garment — linen — and in this case there is no actual Tekhelet, he may not use white wool and create an unnecessary issur of shatnez. Only if he had genuine Tekhelet would Beis Hillel permit him to put woolen strings on the linen garment.

We see from here that only on a linen garment did Chazal make a gezeirah against woolen tzitzis because of concern for kala ilan. We do not find any such prohibition on a wool garment. Even the color itself does not invalidate it.

This seems to fit the fourth possibility mentioned above: wool dyed with kala ilan fulfills the mitzvah of white tzitzis; it simply does not fulfill the mitzvah of Tekhelet. On a linen garment they made a gezeirah against it, because otherwise one would violate shatnez where there was no need for it.

Tosafos [38a] say the same thing. Although they discuss shatnez and bal tosif, they do not disagree regarding kala ilan. This also appears to be the view of the Rosh.

Another relevant sugya is the Gemara dealing with a garment which is entirely Tekhelet-colored [Menachos 41b]:

“The Rabbis taught: A garment that is entirely Tekhelet-colored may be exempted with strings of any color except kala ilan.

They challenged this from a Beraisa: A garment may only be exempted with strings of its own type. If the garment is entirely Tekhelet-colored, he brings Tekhelet and another color and attaches them. Kala ilan he should not bring, but if he did, it is kosher.

Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak said: There is no contradiction. One case is a garment with four strings and the other is a garment with eight strings.”

Rashi gives two explanations for why other colors are kosher, why kala ilan is initially prohibited, and why it is nevertheless kosher bedieved.

According to the first explanation, since on a garment entirely colored Tekhelet it is impossible to fulfill min kanaf with a visibly different white color, all other colors can serve as the “white” component.

Kala ilan is different because we are afraid someone will remove it and place it on another garment as though it were real Tekhelet. There it could create shatnez where there is no mitzvah.

The Gemara’s conclusion distinguishes between a garment with four strings, where we are not worried that someone will remove them because the original garment would then become invalid, and a garment with eight strings, where there is a concern that he might remove some of them for another garment.

According to Rashi’s second explanation, the issue with kala ilan is that we require two distinct colors in the tzitzis. Therefore, if there are already four Tekhelet strings, one should not add four more kala ilan strings, because the two groups would look like the same color. If there are eight strings, four of which are white, and additional kala ilan strings are inserted, the tzitzis remains kosher.

In any event, the concern revolves around shatnez.

Halachah is that we do not place linen tzitzis on a wool garment or wool tzitzis on a linen garment at all [Orach Chaim 9:2]. Therefore, the concern that someone might place kala ilan on a garment as Tekhelet and thereby create shatnez outside the context of a mitzvah is no longer relevant.

Furthermore, the entire concern in this particular sugya is specifically regarding a garment itself colored Tekhelet, whereas the Mishnah Berurah [9:16], based on the Taz, writes that a yerei Shamayim should make his tallis white.

The Rashba on Menachos, quoted by the Radzyner Rebbe in Ein HaTekhelet, writes:

“It appears to me that the reason all colors can fulfill the place of white except Tekhelet is because if he were to use Tekhelet for the white component, there would be only one color and not two types.

Nevertheless, what we require regarding the white that it be a different type and not resemble Tekhelet applies specifically when actual Tekhelet is present. But when no Tekhelet is placed and there is only the mitzvah of the corner, meaning white, one may use even a color which resembles Tekhelet, such as kala ilan, since he is not explicitly placing it as Tekhelet.

Therefore the Gemara asks that even if this kala ilan is nothing more than white, it should still exempt the linen garment from tzitzis, since there is no Tekhelet there.”

It follows explicitly from the Rashba that kala ilan, when the garment itself is not entirely Tekhelet-colored, can fulfill the white component of tzitzis.

The Rambam, however, writes [Hilchos Tzitzis 2:1]:

“The Tekhelet mentioned regarding tzitzis… Anything which was not dyed with that dye is invalid for tzitzis even if its color resembles the sky, such as something dyed with istis or another darkening substance; it is invalid for tzitzis.”

It seems that the Rambam means that it is invalid as Tekhelet for tzitzis. He is not discussing whether it can count as the white component. The mefarshim do not appear to address this point.

In Bava Metzia [61b], Rava says:

“Why did the Torah mention the Exodus from Egypt… regarding tzitzis? … I am the One Who will eventually punish… someone who hangs kala ilan on his garment and says it is Tekhelet.”

Similarly, the Sifrei on Parshas Shelach says:

“What does the Exodus from Egypt have to do here? So that a person should not say, ‘I will use colored strings and kala ilan which resemble Tekhelet, and who will know?’ I am Hashem your God; know what I did to Egypt.”

At first glance, this sounds as though there is an actual punishment for putting kala ilan on tzitzis as Tekhelet.

However, both sources indicate that the problem is specifically deliberate deception. The person knows he is not putting on Tekhelet and falsely claims that it is Tekhelet. For that he is punished by Heaven.

Our case is entirely different. Here the person is doing it in order to fulfill the mitzvah out of safek. He is not trying to deceive anyone.

Still, Tosafos there require explanation. Tosafos write:

“Someone who hangs kala ilan on his garment and says it is Tekhelet — even though he is violating the mitzvah of tzitzis, nevertheless a special pasuk was necessary to teach that he violates it from the moment he attaches the strings.”

The wording is difficult, because it sounds as though the person is not merely failing to fulfill the Tekhelet component, but is violating the mitzvah of tzitzis altogether, and even from the time he attaches the strings.

This is difficult for two reasons. First, the obligation of tzitzis only applies when wearing the garment; a garment sitting in a box is exempt. Second, we pasken like the Chachamim that Tekhelet and white do not prevent one another.

The commentaries also struggled with Tosafos.

The Maharshal explains that the case is where he attaches kala ilan to a garment and then sells it to someone else as Tekhelet. Tosafos’ question is that he would already be violating ona’ah, so why is there a special issue connected with Tekhelet? Tosafos answer that the special violation begins already when he attaches the strings.

The Maharam of Lublin explains similarly.

The Pilpula Charifta explains that the case is someone who attaches kala ilan to a garment for the purpose of selling it, rather than that the garment itself is necessarily being sold to another person.

The Maharsha disagrees and understands the Gemara as referring to someone attaching kala ilan to his own garment. The special Torah concern here is that he violates the prohibition already from the time of attachment, unlike ordinary ribbis or dishonest weights, where the wrongdoing occurs when he actually takes money from another person.

The Pnei Yehoshua, after discussing Tosafos, writes:

“However, the Rosh explains that ‘one who attaches kala ilan to his garment’ means that he sells it to others as though it were Tekhelet. This explanation appears to me compelling according to the halachah, since we hold that Tekhelet does not prevent the white, and bedieved one fulfills the mitzvah with white alone.

The Tekhelet written in the Torah is therefore a mitzvah min hamuvchar. If so, why did the Torah need a special mention of the Exodus in connection with tzitzis? After all, kala ilan is at least no worse than white, as stated in Perek HaTekhelet, other than the special gezeirah.

Therefore, min haTorah it is permitted even lechatchilah to use kala ilan, except that it is not the mitzvah min hamuvchar of genuine Tekhelet. If so, no deception is involved unless he is selling it to others.”

His words are clear: kala ilan is disqualified only because of the particular gezeirah discussed above.

The Chasam Sofer explains along the same lines:

“It appears to me that the question is obvious: If the only issue is that he deceives his friend by selling him kala ilan… the buyer nevertheless fulfills the mitzvah of tzitzis, because let it be no worse than white. As for the fact that he lost out on the mitzvah of Tekhelet, he is certainly not responsible for that, since he went to the trouble of purchasing Tekhelet. What more could he have done? It therefore turns out that the seller’s wrongdoing is only ordinary monetary deception…”

For our purposes, it emerges that kala ilan certainly fulfills the Torah mitzvah of the white component. The only wrongdoing is monetary deception when it is sold at the price of real Tekhelet.

The Yeshuos Malko [Orach Chaim 2] writes explicitly:

“Regarding what he further wrote, that even if it is only a safek, since perhaps he will fulfill the mitzvah of Tekhelet properly, it is correct and they are obligated to do so at least because of the safek, since it causes no harm — on this he certainly wrote correctly.

The string is not invalid according to halachah, as we say in Perek HaTekhelet, ‘Let it be no worse than white.’ Thus, although someone who hangs kala ilan does not fulfill Tekhelet, he nevertheless fulfills the white component. Although a few poskim disagree, the majority of poskim hold this way.”

I have not found who the “few poskim” are, unless he is referring to the Razah and those who agree with him.

Rav Kasher also addressed this issue — whether there is an obligation to restore Tekhelet to tzitzis even while its identification remains uncertain — in the supplements to Torah Sheleimah on Parshas Terumah. He offered four different answers.

First, he suggested that Tekhelet can only be restored through a mesorah, and without a mesorah the identification does not even enter the category of a halachic safek.

Second, he argued that the signs brought by the Radzyner Rebbe regarding the cuttlefish are insufficient and not compelling, so there is no real safek.

Third, he argued that even the Rambam did not have Tekhelet, contrary to the Radzyner Rebbe’s claims.

Fourth, he cited a source for the Arizal’s position that while the Beis Hamikdash does not exist, white tzitzis are sufficient because of the poverty of Klal Yisrael, so that poor people should not be embarrassed.

None of these answers is sufficient to dismiss the question regarding fulfilling the mitzvah of Tekhelet today.

Rav Kasher concludes:

“If, with siyata diShmaya, such a species is found regarding which there will be no question whatsoever, then there will be room for the Gedolei Torah to reconsider the possibility of fulfilling this mitzvah.”

Today, when there is a strong likelihood that the Murex trunculus is indeed the chilazon, it would seemingly follow from his own position that there is no reason not to put Murex Tekhelet on tzitzis at least out of safek.

B. The Gezeirah of Kala Ilan

Some argue that the gezeirah of kala ilan constitutes a general Rabbinic prohibition against wearing any doubtful Tekhelet. According to this view, only definite Tekhelet is permitted.

For them, doubtful Tekhelet is comparable to a chaticha d’issura, and therefore refraining from putting it on is preferable to putting it on out of safek.

Those who take this position bring several proofs.

The first is from Bava Metzia 61b:

“Rava said: Why did the Torah mention the Exodus from Egypt…? Hashem says: I am the One Who distinguished in Egypt between the seed of a firstborn and that which was not from a firstborn, and I am the One Who will eventually punish… someone who hangs kala ilan on his garment and says it is Tekhelet.”

At first glance, this indicates that a person who puts kala ilan on his garment is punished. If there is a punishment, there must be an aveirah. According to this approach, the aveirah is the very act of placing a dye which is not genuine Tekhelet on the garment.

Another proof is brought from the wording of the Gemara regarding linen garments:

“A gezeirah because of kala ilan” [Menachos 40a].

They explain this to mean that Chazal forbade wearing a garment containing kala ilan.

Another source brought for this prohibition is a statement of Rav Kook:

“It is especially clear to me that regarding all the uncertainties which hold back the proper plan for building the Beis Hamikdash — for example the issue of Tekhelet, the lineage of the Kohanim, the precise measurements and location of the Mizbeach, and the like — Ruach HaKodesh will assist in clarifying the halachah, together with clear indications and a ruling of a great and universally accepted Beis Din.”

At first glance, Rav Kook would appear to have closed the door on restoring the mitzvah of Tekhelet until the matter is clarified through spiritual revelation and agreement of a Sanhedrin.

However, it appears that none of these arguments removes the obligation to restore Tekhelet to tzitzis, at least out of safek.

First, nowhere in the Gemara or among the Rishonim or Acharonim do we find any such gezeirah turning kala ilan — which is kosher for tzitzis on nearly every garment, other than a garment entirely colored Tekhelet under particular circumstances — into a chaticha d’issura.

The Gemara itself asks:

“Let it be no worse than white!”

Where, then, do we have the authority to invent such a gezeirah on our own?

The proof from Rava’s statement in Bava Metzia can also be rejected. That case involves dishonesty and deceiving other people. That is why kala ilan becomes the subject of an issur.

But if someone uses it out of a desire to fulfill the mitzvah, while openly stating that he is doing so because of a safek, why should it be forbidden?

According to the other approach, every mitzvah we perform because of a safek would have to be prohibited — whether the uncertainty concerns the person obligated, such as a tumtum or androgynus; the time, such as Yom Tov Sheini; or the object or form of the mitzvah, such as certain shofar blasts according to some Rishonim.

That is obviously impossible.

It must therefore be that the issur here applies specifically to deceiving people, not to the use of the dye itself.

The explanation of “a gezeirah because of kala ilan” as a general prohibition is also incorrect.

The concern there is specifically that someone might put wool strings dyed with kala ilan onto a linen garment. In that case there would be shatnez without a mitzvah to justify it, because he is not fulfilling the mitzvah of Tekhelet, while the white component could have been made from linen.

As the Gemara says:

“Since it can be done with its own material, it may not be done otherwise, as Reish Lakish teaches: Wherever you find a mitzvas aseh and a lo sa’aseh, if it is possible to fulfill both, it is better; only where it is impossible does the aseh override the lo sa’aseh.”

Here it is possible to fulfill both, and therefore using wool would constitute an unnecessary violation of shatnez.

But halachah is that on a linen garment we use only white strings made from linen itself [Orach Chaim 9:2], and some opinions prohibit even that.

Putting Tekhelet on linen garments was itself prohibited already in the days of Chazal. As the Gemara says, someone who put Tekhelet on his linen garment in Yerushalayim was considered one of those whose behavior caused people to wonder.

Therefore, there is no concern today that someone will violate shatnez unnecessarily even if the dye turns out not to be genuine Tekhelet.

As for the proof from Rav Kook, one must note that his statement was made specifically regarding mitzvos connected with the Beis Hamikdash.

There is a distinction between Tekhelet for tzitzis and Tekhelet used in the Mikdash.

Many Acharonim have noted a difference in the Rambam’s wording. When discussing Tekhelet for tzitzis, the Rambam mentions the chilazon and requires that the dye remain beautiful and not fade. When discussing Tekhelet used in the Mikdash, he leaves these details out.

Some Acharonim therefore understood that according to the Rambam the Tekhelet of the Mikdash may not require all the identifying characteristics of the Tekhelet of tzitzis, but perhaps only the correct color.

Among the Acharonim who discuss this distinction, even if some remain puzzled by it, are the Mishneh LaMelech, Merkavas HaMishneh, Avnei Nezer, Yad Dovid, Aruch HaShulchan, and Rav Yechiel Michel Tukachinsky.

Even if we assume that the Tekhelet of the Mikdash is exactly the same Tekhelet, there is still a major distinction between Mikdash issues and ordinary mitzvos.

In the Mikdash, every halachic detail can be me’akev, and we generally do not perform the avodah merely as a chumra because of a safek, except in a few special circumstances and often only bedieved.

With other mitzvos, however, we regularly perform them even when the obligation or fulfillment is uncertain.

It therefore appears that there is no reason to refrain from putting Tekhelet on tzitzis, at least out of safek, because of a supposed Rabbinic gezeirah prohibiting doubtful Tekhelet.

C. Safek De’Oraisa L’Chumra in a Mitzvas Aseh

The Radzyner Rebbe, in Ein HaTekhelet siman 41, held that even if the Tekhelet he rediscovered was not identified with certainty, one must nevertheless put it on a four-cornered garment under the regular principle of safek de’Oraisa l’chumra.

The Rebbe argues at length with those who objected that if performing the mitzvah will not resolve the underlying safek, there is no Torah obligation to perform it.

He brings proofs from many sources that this argument is incorrect, although his proofs require further analysis.

There is a well-known machlokes Rishonim regarding safek de’Oraisa in prohibitions.

The Rambam holds that min haTorah we are lenient in a safek and only Rabbinically must be machmir.

The Rashba holds that the obligation to be machmir is itself min haTorah.

The Acharonim discuss this at great length, including the Shev Shemaitsa and Shaarei Yosher.

According to the opinion that a Torah safek must be treated stringently min haTorah, some explain that the safek itself is treated as an issur or almost as though it were definitely prohibited.

The Rashba’s wording in Toras HaBayis points in that direction. Rav Shimon Shkop explains in Shaarei Yosher that the safek creates an additional prohibition on top of the underlying issur; this should not be confused with the idea that the doubtful item literally becomes the original issur itself.

Others explain that the Torah obligates us to be machmir in a safek, similar to the concept of bringing an asham talui for a safek whether one ate forbidden fat. One does not bring a regular chatas, because the original aveirah was not definite.

Likewise, one separates from the doubtful issur because it may be forbidden, although obviously one could not administer malkus to someone who deliberately acted on a safek.

Returning to Tekhelet, however, we are discussing a mitzvas aseh. We must therefore determine whether the same machlokes applies to positive mitzvos.

The Maharit Algazi writes in his commentary to the Ramban’s Hilchos Bechoros:

“One should not ask against the Rambam that since he holds that all doubtful prohibitions are permitted min haTorah, why would the Torah ever obligate a woman who is a doubtful yoledes to bring a korban? Since it is a safek, she should be exempt.

This is not a question. The Rambam’s principle applies only to prohibitions. Regarding a mitzvas aseh, if a person is uncertain whether he fulfilled the mitzvah, or is uncertain whether he is obligated to perform it, min haTorah he must fulfill the aseh out of safek.

Since an aseh is stronger than a lav, as we know that an aseh can override a lo sa’aseh, regarding a safek as well it is stronger, and he is obligated to fulfill it out of safek.”

The Oneg Yom Tov similarly writes:

“If we say that a safek mitzvah must be treated stringently, everything works well, because destroying avodah zarah is a mitzvah commanded upon entering Eretz Yisrael, and a safek mitzvah is treated l’chumra.”

Their position appears to be that a doubtful mitzvas aseh is itself included within the mitzvas aseh. Just as one is required to pursue and fulfill the definite mitzvah, he must pursue the possibility of fulfilling it as well.

Some Acharonim compare the Maharit Algazi’s approach with that of the Chavos Daas at the beginning of siman 110. In my opinion, the two approaches are different.

The Chavos Daas discusses the well-known questions raised against the Rambam, who holds that safek de’Oraisa is lenient min haTorah and stringent only Rabbinically. He resolves the questions and concludes:

“From here we also see that there is a difference between a case where the Torah commands ‘get up and do’ and one of shev v’al ta’aseh.

Regarding prohibitions, where the Torah says ‘do not eat this,’ such as pork or forbidden fat, we say: definite pork and definite forbidden fat you may not eat, but a safek may be eaten.

But where the Torah commands an affirmative act, such as marrying a virgin, taking an esrog, or eating matzah, we say that one must fulfill it with certainty, not merely through a safek.”

The Avnei Nezer summarizes this approach:

“The Acharonim explain a beautiful idea in the Rambam: Anything written in the Torah refers to a definite case and not a safek. Therefore a mitzvah as well must be fulfilled definitely, and if it is only doubtful one has not fulfilled his obligation.”

According to this understanding, the initial thought would have been that just as the Rambam is lenient regarding doubtful prohibitions, perhaps he would also consider a doubtful performance sufficient for a mitzvas aseh.

The Chavos Daas demonstrates that this is not so: only definite performance fulfills the Torah obligation.

Some Acharonim therefore conclude from the Chavos Daas that safek de’Oraisa l’chumra applies to mitzvos aseh in two different ways:

First, if one fulfilled the mitzvah only doubtfully, he has not definitely discharged his obligation.

Second, one is therefore min haTorah obligated to perform even a doubtful possible mitzvah, because perhaps he will thereby fulfill the Torah command.

However, this second conclusion does not necessarily follow from the Chavos Daas.

According to his actual words, the Torah mitzvah is fulfilled only through certainty. Therefore, someone who is definitely obligated in a mitzvas aseh and is unsure whether he has fulfilled it, when he has the ability to perform it now with certainty, must certainly do so.

But if the only possibility in front of him is itself doubtful, and he does not know whether this act constitutes the mitzvah at all, there may be no Torah obligation to do it.

The practical difference between these two approaches would involve cases such as a tumtum, or performing a mitzvah during bein hashmashos when the mitzvah must be fulfilled that day.

According to the Maharit Algazi, he must perform the mitzvah because perhaps he will thereby fulfill a Torah mitzvah.

According to the Chavos Daas, however, there may be no Torah obligation where the act itself will only possibly constitute fulfillment.

It appears that this was also the understanding of Maharam Banet in his explanation of the Mordechai concerning tzitzis:

“It is true that one could say that regarding a safek mitzvah the Rambam agrees that we are machmir and that the mitzvah obligation is not fulfilled except with certainty.

A proof may be brought from the Rambam’s ruling regarding Krias Shema: If one is uncertain whether he read Shema, he reads it again and recites the brachos before and after it.

If the requirement to repeat Shema were only Rabbinic, how could he recite the brachos? It would be a safek brachah levatalah.

Rather, regarding a mitzvah the Rambam agrees that one does not fulfill his obligation until it is done with certainty. Therefore he repeats Shema min haTorah and may properly recite the brachos.”

According to the Maharit Algazi, however, if the doubtful mitzvah itself is considered a Torah obligation, one could perhaps recite a brachah even on the safek.

It appears that the Chasam Sofer also understood the Chavos Daas in this way. The Ksav Sofer, as quoted in the Sdei Chemed, writes:

“The Chavos Daas has already established for us, and my father, the light of the exile, the Chasam Sofer, independently upheld the same principle, that a safek mitzvas aseh is min haTorah treated stringently because the Torah did not speak about the doubtful case.

He discusses the matter at length and concludes that this applies specifically to someone who is definitely a person obligated in the mitzvah. But where the person himself may not be obligated — for example, a doubtful Kohen who may be obligated in Bircas Kohanim and may be a Yisrael, or a doubtful minor — we do not say that he is min haTorah obligated out of safek.”

According to the Maharit Algazi, seemingly even someone who is only doubtfully a bar chiyuva would have a Torah obligation.

The Mahari Assad appears to have taken the same approach:

“There is no question, because the Rambam agrees that one does not fulfill the mitzvos of Pesach and pidyon haben merely out of safek…”

His words indicate that a doubtful fulfillment does not discharge one’s obligation, but do not necessarily impose a Torah obligation to perform every possible doubtful mitzvah.

Other Acharonim, however, argue against the entire principle that a doubtful mitzvas aseh must be treated stringently.

Some maintain that just as the Rishonim disagree regarding doubtful lo sa’asehs, they disagree in the same way regarding mitzvos aseh.

Others hold that even according to the Rashba and those who rule that a doubtful prohibition must be treated stringently min haTorah, this applies specifically to a lo sa’aseh. In a mitzvas aseh, even they might hold that a safek is lenient min haTorah.

The Sdei Chemed lists among those taking such positions the Pri Megadim, Toras Chesed, the hagahos on the Semak, the Netziv, and other Acharonim.

The Pri Megadim in Orach Chaim siman 17 is himself uncertain. He leans toward saying that one is required to be machmir only miderabbanan. His reasoning is that with an issur one actively violates the Torah through a kum va’aseh, whereas failure to fulfill a mitzvas aseh is generally shev v’al ta’aseh. Therefore, in a safek, min haTorah one may be exempt.

The Pnei Yehoshua also writes along these lines.

There is a further question regarding how strong the status of a safek is. Even if one must personally be machmir min haTorah, is the safek treated sufficiently like a definite mitzvah that he could be motzi other people in their obligation?

This is discussed by the Pri Chadash, R’ Akiva Eiger, the Or Li, and Yechaveh Daas.

The result of this discussion is that there is a machlokes among the Acharonim whether there is a Torah obligation, or only a Rabbinic obligation, or perhaps no obligation at all, to perform an act where it is uncertain whether that act itself fulfills a mitzvas aseh.

D. Bal Tosif

Another question which must be clarified is whether performing a mitzvas aseh out of safek may involve bal tosif.

The Gemara in Rosh Hashanah [28b] concludes:

“Rava said: To fulfill a mitzvah does not require intent. To violate bal tosif during the mitzvah’s proper time does not require intent. Outside its proper time, intent is required.”

Rashi explains:

“To fulfill does not require intent — even without intending to fulfill, he fulfills his obligation.”

Regarding bal tosif, for example adding an additional species to the arba minim or making five compartments in tefillin, if done during the mitzvah’s proper time, one does not need specific intent to add to the mitzvah in order to violate bal tosif.

When the act is performed outside the mitzvah’s proper time, however, intent to fulfill the mitzvah is necessary in order to violate bal tosif. Therefore, someone who sits in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeres without intending it as a mitzvah is not punished for bal tosif.

The Gemara and Rishonim indicate that according to the opinion that mitzvos require kavannah — the Rif and those who follow him — intent for the mitzvah is also necessary to violate bal tosif during its proper time.

According to the opinion that mitzvos do not require kavannah — Tosafos, Rashba, and others — one may violate bal tosif during the proper time even without specific intent.

When a person is performing something only because of a safek, we therefore need to define whether this counts as full intent for the mitzvah or only as a conditional, doubtful intent.

Tosafos write:

“One may ask: Why is the case of blood from a korban requiring one application becoming mixed with blood requiring four applications stronger than the case of a Kohen who goes up to duchan and adds a brachah of his own?

One can answer that with a Kohen who intends to bless and add to the mitzvah, it is possible that he violates bal tosif even when it is not the mitzvah’s time.

But here, where he does not intend to add and is only acting because of the safek, there should be no violation unless this itself is considered the proper time.”

At first glance, this sounds like Tosafos hold that during the mitzvah’s proper time, where bal tosif can apply without intent, even something done because of a safek could violate bal tosif.

However, this proof can be rejected.

The case in Tosafos is not really a safek in our sense. It is a mixture of two different types of korban blood. Whether one gives more applications or fewer applications, he will necessarily be doing something wrong with one component of the mixture.

Our case is different. Here the question is whether there is a mitzvah at all. If the person knew for certain that there was no mitzvah involved, he would not do the act.

The word “safek” in Tosafos is therefore somewhat borrowed terminology.

This is even clearer from Tosafos HaRosh, who phrases the answer slightly differently:

“Here he does not intend to add, because he is only doing so because of the mixture…”

The distinction is that with a mixture, one way or another he has an obligation to apply either one or several applications. In our case, if he knew there were no mitzvah at all, he would not do anything.

Thus Tosafos provide no clear proof regarding our question.

The Mordechai in Megillah explicitly writes that even an act performed because of a safek can involve bal tosif:

“Why is the Megillah not read both on the 14th and 15th out of safek nowadays, as we do with Yom Tov?

One can answer that perhaps the 14th is the proper date, and reading again on the 15th would violate ‘and it shall not pass,’ and even though he already read it there is some prohibition of bal tosif…

Alternatively, there is bal tosif because it can still be considered the mitzvah’s time, since if people from a walled city were present he could be motzi them.”

It appears from the Mordechai that because perhaps it still qualifies as the mitzvah’s proper time, performing it again because of a safek can itself involve bal tosif.

Rashi in Eruvin [96a] explains the Gemara’s question:

“Furthermore, one who sleeps in the sukkah on the eighth day should receive malkus.”

Rashi explains:

“Because he is adding an eighth day onto the seven. Yet we ourselves sit in the sukkah on the eighth day because it may actually be the seventh.

The answer is that outside the mitzvah’s proper time, without intent, it is not considered an addition. Therefore it is permitted, because if it is really the eighth day we do not intend to fulfill the mitzvah of sukkah.”

According to Rashi, merely acting because of a safek does not automatically remove the concern of bal tosif. Rather, because it is outside the mitzvah’s definite time, one specifically does not intend to fulfill the mitzvah if the day is truly the eighth.

Rashi therefore disagrees with the Mordechai to the extent that a condition can prevent bal tosif: if this is not the proper time, I am not intending to fulfill the mitzvah.

The Rosh agrees with Rashi. Regarding the machlokes between Rashi and Rabbeinu Tam tefillin, he writes:

“Since great Geonim disagree on this matter, and the tefillin according to one opinion are invalid according to the other, a yerei Shamayim should fulfill both opinions.

He should make two pairs of tefillin and put on both, since there is room on the head and arm for two pairs.

At the time he puts them on he should intend: With whichever pair is written correctly I am fulfilling my obligation, and the others are merely like ordinary straps. There is no bal tosif here. Bal tosif would only apply to making five compartments.”

This is also paskened in the Tur and Shulchan Aruch [34:2].

The Rosh’s chiddush goes further than Rashi. Rashi was dealing with something performed outside the mitzvah’s proper time, where intent is required for bal tosif. The Rosh uses a condition to prevent bal tosif even during the proper time.

Our explanation of the Rosh is consistent with the Bach, who explains that considering the second pair merely “straps” is necessary because of bal tosif. The Magen Avraham and Gra seem to understand it similarly.

The Yom Teruah writes:

“One can explain why those who wear both Rashi and Rabbeinu Tam tefillin do not violate bal tosif: Since they do not intend to add to the mitzvah and are wearing them only because of the safek, there is no bal tosif.

It is as though he makes a condition that he fulfills his obligation with whichever pair is kosher, while the other is merely ordinary straps.”

It seems he did not recall the Rosh’s actual statement in Hilchos Tefillin.

The Mishnah Berurah, however, explains that the intent that the other pair be “merely straps” is necessary only to avoid a hefsek between the shel yad and shel rosh. Otherwise, putting on the invalid pair would interrupt between the two tefillin. He supports this from Rabbeinu Yerucham.

The Rishonim on Rosh Hashanah 16a ask why blowing both the seated and standing sets of shofar blasts does not violate bal tosif.

Tosafos answer that repeating the identical mitzvah does not violate bal tosif.

The Ritva writes:

“If you ask that there should be bal tosif — and even if you say that after the first set of blasts the mitzvah’s time has passed and outside its time one needs intent to violate, here we are certainly intending for a mitzvah!

This is not a problem, because here we are doing it because of a safek.”

Here we see a new approach: An act performed because of a safek is not subject to bal tosif at all.

Not because the person makes an explicit condition that if it is unnecessary he does not intend the mitzvah, but because intent generated by a safek simply does not constitute the type of intent required for bal tosif.

The Meiri writes similarly:

“Anything done because of a safek — such as sitting in a sukkah on the eighth day because it may be the seventh, or any other uncertainty which requires extending the time of a mitzvah or adding something to the mitzvah because of the safek — does not involve bal tosif at all.

When the Gemara asks that someone sitting in the sukkah on the eighth day should receive malkus, it refers to those times when the calendar was established through witnesses and the eighth day was definitely chol.

The explanation of Rashi, that the Gemara refers to an eighth day which may actually be the seventh, is not correct. If so, the same question would apply to every Yom Tov Sheini.”

The basic principle of the Ritva and Meiri is that an act done because of a safek is a halachic category of its own.

Bal tosif applies when a person intends to add something to the mitzvah itself. Someone acting because of a safek has no intent to add anything. He is merely trying to fulfill the mitzvah correctly.

The Riaz similarly writes:

“One who adds to the mitzvos does not violate bal tosif until he intends to add to the mitzvos.

Therefore we sit in the sukkah on the eighth day, blow shofar on the second day of Rosh Hashanah, and eat matzah on the second night of Pesach with a brachah, even though perhaps the day is really chol and we would seemingly be adding to the mitzvah.

Since we do not intend to add, and do this only because of the safek, there is no bal tosif.

Similarly, someone who blows additional shofar blasts is like someone who adds to his tefillah, and someone who takes the lulav and waves it repeatedly does not intend to add to the Torah but to enhance the mitzvah.”

We therefore have three basic approaches:

The Mordechai: Performing a mitzvah because of a safek can involve bal tosif.

Rashi and the Rosh: One can avoid bal tosif in a safek by making a condition regarding one’s intent.

The Ritva and Meiri: Anything performed because of a genuine safek does not involve bal tosif at all.

Applying these opinions to doubtful Tekhelet:

According to the Mordechai, it would seemingly be prohibited to put doubtful Tekhelet on tzitzis because of bal tosif.

According to the Ritva and Meiri, it is permitted.

According to Rashi and the Rosh, based on the Gemara’s principle “Let it be no worse than white,” one should have in mind as follows:

If these dyed strings are in fact genuine Tekhelet, I intend to fulfill the mitzvah of Tekhelet through them. If not, let them be ordinary white-component strings.

The same condition could be made even according to the Ritva and those who agree with him.

Rav Yaakov Ariel, Chief Rabbi of Ramat Gan, challenged this conclusion. Since color is merely an external appearance, even if these strings are nothing more than kala ilan, they can still serve as the white component. If one makes a condition, why should there be any bal tosif even according to the Mordechai?

In my opinion, however, because according to the Mordechai the condition does not solve the issue, and the person is adding an additional element to the mitzvah whose validity is uncertain, there may still be bal tosif.

E. Concern About an Issur if Definite Tekhelet Is Later Discovered

The Gemara in Beitzah [5b] discusses the takanah regarding an egg laid on Rosh Hashanah after Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai’s enactment:

Rav Ada and Rav Shalman said that even after the takanah of Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai, the egg remains prohibited.

Why?

Because the Beis Hamikdash may soon be rebuilt. People will say, “Last year we ate an egg laid on the first day of Rosh Hashanah on the second day; this year we can also eat it.”

They will not realize that previously the two days were treated as two separate kedushos, whereas after the Beis Hamikdash is rebuilt they may constitute one continuous kedushah.

The Gemara asks: If so, why accept testimony regarding the new moon differently?

The Gemara answers: Testimony is entrusted to Beis Din, whereas eggs concern everyone.

We learn two principles regarding Rabbinic takanos.

First, the general public does not necessarily understand the changing circumstances which produce a particular halachic ruling. Therefore, a temporary heter based upon particular conditions may cause a serious mistake when those conditions later change.

In the Rosh Hashanah case, the rebuilding of the Beis Hamikdash would change the rules governing when testimony is accepted, which in turn changes whether the two days are one kedushah or two, which in turn affects whether an egg laid on the first day may be eaten on the second.

The second principle is that we do not have the same concern regarding Beis Din, because, as Rashi explains, “they know the reason for the matter and will not make a mistake.”

Another source for this concern is the Gemara regarding reciting Shehecheyanu on Yom Kippur [Eruvin 40b].

The Gemara suggests making a cup of wine and leaving it for later, but answers that one who makes a brachah must taste from it. Giving it to a child to taste is also rejected because:

“Perhaps he will become accustomed to it.”

Meaning, the child might grow up believing that just as he was permitted to drink the kos shel brachah on Yom Kippur when young, he may continue doing so as an adult.

Based on these ideas, we must ask whether similar concerns exist with doubtful Tekhelet.

Perhaps at some future point definite Tekhelet will be discovered, and it will turn out that the Tekhelet we currently use was incorrect.

By introducing doubtful Tekhelet into the public consciousness and having large numbers of people wear it — many of whom are not necessarily learned bnei Torah who can be compared to Beis Din, “who know the reason and will not make a mistake” — perhaps we will be causing the public to stumble later.

It appears, however, that these concerns apply primarily where people may eventually violate actual issurim.

They do not necessarily apply where the future mistake would merely cause an imperfect fulfillment of a mitzvas aseh.

In our case, even if it turns out that today’s Tekhelet is not genuine Tekhelet, the future problem would be failure to fulfill the Tekhelet component properly, not violation of an issur.

There is, however, a halachic difference between the era when Tekhelet is available and the era when it is not.

The Rambam rules [Hilchos Tzitzis 3:5]:

“For a wool garment, the white strings are made of wool. For a linen garment, the white strings are made of linen.

For other types of garments, the white strings are made from that material — for example silk strings for a silk garment and hair strings for a hair garment.

If he wishes, however, he may make the white strings of wool or linen for any of the other types, since wool and linen exempt both garments of their own material and garments of other materials, whereas other materials exempt only their own kind.”

At first glance the Rambam seems internally contradictory.

He begins by saying that linen white strings are not used on wool, and wool white strings are not used on linen.

Yet he concludes that wool and linen can exempt even garments not of their own material, which would seem to include wool on linen and linen on wool.

An additional difficulty arises from the following halachah:

“What is the law regarding wool strings on a linen garment or linen strings on a wool garment?

Strictly speaking it should be permitted, because shatnez is permitted for tzitzis, since Tekhelet is wool and is placed on a linen garment.

Why, then, do we not do so?

Because the white strings can be made of the same material as the garment. Wherever an aseh and lo sa’aseh conflict, if it is possible to fulfill both, that is preferable. Only when this is impossible does the aseh override the lo sa’aseh.”

The Kesef Mishneh asks that if the Rambam is discussing a period when Tekhelet is available, why would he permit linen white strings on garments made from other materials where, according to the Rambam, the Torah obligation itself may not apply? Once one adds wool Tekhelet there would be shatnez without a Torah mitzvah justifying it.

He answers that the Rambam’s first ruling discusses someone placing only white strings on the garment. In that situation one may not mix wool and linen.

But min haTorah, if one places wool Tekhelet on a linen garment, one may also use wool for the white strings, because wool is already being permitted there because of the Tekhelet mitzvah.

According to the Rambam, therefore, when definite Tekhelet is being used:

A wool garment receives white wool strings; linen is forbidden.

A linen garment may receive white strings of either linen or wool.

A garment of another material may receive white strings of its own material or wool; linen is prohibited because of shatnez.

When there is no Tekhelet:

A wool or linen garment receives white strings only of its own material.

A garment of another material can receive its own material, wool, or linen, but wool and linen may not be mixed.

However, Chazal added another gezeirah:

“A linen garment is not given Tekhelet at all. Instead, only white linen strings are used.

This is not because the mitzvah of tzitzis does not override shatnez, but rather because of a Rabbinic gezeirah: Perhaps he will wear the garment at night, when there is no obligation of tzitzis, and will then violate the prohibition of shatnez when there is no mitzvas aseh present.”

Thus, regarding a linen garment Chazal imposed two additional limitations: no Tekhelet at all, and no white wool strings even during a period when Tekhelet exists.

Accordingly, the potential concern created by switching from doubtful Tekhelet to definite Tekhelet would exist mainly with linen garments, because only there does shatnez come into play.

But since Chazal already prohibited both Tekhelet and white wool strings on linen garments, there is no practical concern remaining.

According to Rabbeinu Tam and those who agree with him, who maintain that Chazal prohibited both wool and linen tzitzis on a linen garment, even this theoretical concern does not arise.

Tosafos, the Rosh, the Semag, and other Rishonim pasken that garments made from other materials are also obligated in tzitzis min haTorah, and that they may be exempted either with their own material or with wool or linen.

At first glance, if one were to place linen tzitzis on one of these garments and then add wool Tekhelet, there could again be a concern of shatnez where there is no mitzvah.

However, this is only relevant while the Tekhelet is still doubtful.

If, for now, we treat doubtful Tekhelet according to all the rules of a time when there is no definite Tekhelet, then no shatnez concern arises.

In the future, if definite Tekhelet is established, the new halachic status will itself allow whatever combinations are then halachically permitted.

Furthermore, for Ashkenazim who follow Tosafos that other materials are obligated min haTorah, the Rema rules that lechatchilah linen strings should not be placed even on garments made from other materials.

Thus the practical possibility of accidentally creating shatnez is already quite small.

Summary of This Issue

It therefore appears that doubtful Tekhelet creates no serious concern of causing the public to violate an issur in the future, provided it is treated according to the halachos applying during a time when there is no definite Tekhelet.

It should be worn only as a chumra, and no kula should be based on treating it as definite Tekhelet.

F. Concern That People Will Be Confused if Definite Tekhelet Is Later Found

The Gemara in Sukkah [31a] says:

“If he cannot find an esrog, he should not bring a quince, a pomegranate, or any other fruit.”

The Gemara explains:

“Obviously! Why would one think otherwise?

One might have thought that he should bring another fruit so that the concept of esrog should not be forgotten.

The Gemara teaches that he should not, because sometimes a problem could result and people may become accustomed to the substitute.”

Rabbeinu Chananel explains:

“Even when an esrog later becomes available, people may continue bringing the other item and say, ‘This one is like the other one; both fulfill the mitzvah.’

A serious problem will result. Therefore, no item other than an esrog may be used.”

In other words, using an object for a mitzvah which is clearly not the object commanded by the Torah is forbidden, even if the intention is merely to maintain awareness of the mitzvah.

The concern is that the public will eventually assume that the substitute itself is a valid mitzvah object.

At first glance, this argument could prevent us from using doubtful Tekhelet.

If definite Tekhelet is eventually established and it turns out to differ from what we currently use, perhaps people will say that both forms are valid — the definite one and the old doubtful one — and will not realize that the old dye is really no better than kala ilan for purposes of fulfilling Tekhelet.

A similar argument appears in Shu”t Besamim Rosh [siman 244], which was asked why one should not use the dye of a particular fish as a remembrance of Tekhelet.

The response says that one should not do so because future generations may eventually say that this dye itself is the Tekhelet mentioned by the Torah, just as the Gemara says not to substitute a pomegranate when one has no esrog.[1]

At first glance, however, there may be a distinction between the arba minim and Tekhelet.

Regarding the arba minim, all four species are me’akev one another. If one substitutes the wrong fruit, the entire mitzvah is not fulfilled.

Regarding tzitzis, Tekhelet does not prevent fulfillment of the white component. Therefore, even if people mistakenly continue using an incorrect Tekhelet, they would still fulfill the basic mitzvah of tzitzis; they would only be missing the Tekhelet component.

One could therefore argue that Chazal were concerned only with a mistake which would destroy the entire mitzvah, not one which would cause people to miss only part of the mitzvah.

Still, this distinction is somewhat forced.

The main distinction between the Gemara in Sukkah and our case appears to be different.

In the Gemara’s case, it is known with certainty that the pomegranate or quince is not an esrog.

Here, by contrast, there is an umdana approaching certainty that the Murex is in fact the chilazon of Tekhelet, even though the matter has not completely left the category of safek.

It is therefore not comparable to substituting a pomegranate for an esrog. In our case, the item we are using may very well actually be the esrog.

Similarly, the Chasam Sofer [Orach Chaim 183] permitted using an esrog whose status as grafted was uncertain based upon identifying simanim, without being concerned about the prohibition against substituting another fruit.

Nevertheless, there remains a practical concern that some confusion could result if the true Tekhelet is later proven to be different.

Therefore, it appears to me, as stated above, that those wearing Tekhelet today should clearly explain that they are doing so because of the safek.

If in the future the matter is definitively clarified, it will likewise be necessary to publicize clearly whether the Tekhelet strings currently accepted must be changed or may continue to be used.

Summary and Conclusions[2]

A. Fulfilling the mitzvah of Tekhelet in tzitzis using the Murex snails, according to the identification accepted today, is permissible as a middas chassidus.

At the present stage, however, there is no obligation — neither as a matter of strict halachah nor even as a requirement of middas chassidus — to put it on one’s tzitzis.

With Hashem’s help, when the definite Tekhelet is eventually discovered and established, may all of Klal Yisrael merit to place Tekhelet on their garments.

B. Those who do wear Tekhelet on their tzitzis should observe the limitations discussed above.

It is obvious that one may not rely on the present identification of Tekhelet to permit shatnez in tzitzis.

Perhaps it is also inappropriate to change the established form and number of windings from what is normally done on tzitzis without Tekhelet.

Footnotes

[1] This would seemingly describe what is happening today among the followers of the Radzyner Rebbe, who continue to wear Tekhelet produced from cuttlefish blood. According to those who support the Murex identification, as discussed above, the Radzyner dye is literally equivalent to kala ilan.

See the lengthy discussion in MiSafra LeSaifa, issues 44–54, summer 5753, p. 342 onward, “On Shu”t Besamim Rosh and Its Author.” The conclusion there, based on both sefarim and scholars, is that no halachic ruling appearing in this suspicious work can be relied upon.

[2] Note by Yoel Katan: This summary includes both portions of the article: the earlier section, “Methods of Identification in Mitzvos,” published in HaMaayan, Nissan 5756, vol. 36 no. 3, pp. 28–37, as well as the present section.

The next issue is expected, be’ezras Hashem, to publish the portion dealing with whether the identification of the Murex trunculus as the chilazon of Tekhelet can be established with certainty.