Rabbi Eliyahu Tavger Response to Rabbi Shlomo Miller on Techeiles

BS”D, Iyar 5764

To the esteemed Rav Shlomo Miller, shlita,

I was shown the letter you wrote to R’ Mendel Singer, where you expressed your opinion on the techeiles from the “Murex” snail. With your permission, I would like to add some comments, in the way of Torah.

Regarding your difficulty with distinguishing between kala ilan and techeiles made from the “Murex” species, as the Gemara implies there is a way to differentiate between them. I struggled with this question myself when I first began researching techeiles around twenty years ago. I reached out to Professor Elsner, an expert in textile dyeing, who explained to me that while there is no difference between the dyes themselves, there is a difference in the byproducts found in each one. Today, after much experience in dyeing techeiles, I know that the results depend not just on the material used, but also on the method of dyeing. Who says the Gemara’s test was specifically to distinguish between the dyes themselves? Perhaps it was to test the quality of the bond between the dye and the wool, and maybe the forgers back then couldn’t achieve the same quality with kala ilan as the experts did with techeiles! Furthermore, the dyes themselves are indeed chemically different. Even when techeiles from “Murex” is altered to a blue shade similar to kala ilan, it still contains a significant amount of colorants that are not present in kala ilan – namely, dibromoindigo and monobromoindigo. There are more points to add on this topic, but I think I’ve written enough to nullify the question entirely.

Regarding your second difficulty, with the way the snail is processed today by cutting a small piece from its body, which according to all opinions is a melacha d’Oraisa, while the Gemara implies that wounding (Ptziya) is not a melacha at all. The truth is, it’s not agreed upon by everyone that cutting a piece of flesh from a living creature constitutes a melacha. The Ramban and Ritva at the beginning of Perek Shmoneh Sheratzim explain that the prohibition of mila on Shabbos isn’t due to cutting the foreskin but rather due to the extraction of blood.

We should also mention the famous question of the Maharam Bennet (Magen Avos, in “Hashochto”) on the Rambam, who holds that one who injures is liable because of “dash” – why is one liable for mila on Shabbos due to injuring if there’s no olive-sized measure of blood? Various answers have been offered by the Acharonim, but the very question itself shows clearly that the prohibition of mila on Shabbos isn’t due to cutting the foreskin but rather due to the extraction of blood. The Beis Yitzchak (O.C. siman 36) answers that one is liable for mila because it involves cutting part of the body.

We should also consider the response of the Avnei Nezer (O.C. siman 131, os 25), where he questions the Rambam’s position that cutting off part of a fetus within the womb is a violation of “taking life,” as the Rambam holds there’s no liability for taking life until one kills the entire living being. A fetus is considered a limb of the mother, like one of her organs. It’s not clear where the Rambam says that cutting a limb from a living being would be exempt, as a limb from a living being renders one impure just like a complete corpse. And it’s well known that the impurity of a corpse is due to the departure of life. Thus, even a limb has “taking life” from that limb. And since the Rambam had to say “because of pressing,” as blood from a living being is pure, it implies there’s no “taking life” in it, and certainly not with a fetus, which renders impure like a complete corpse even if it lacks an olive-sized portion. This would constitute complete “taking life.”

It seems one could bring proof to the questioner’s position from the Rambam’s language regarding “Psik Reisha V’Lo Yamus” = (Hilchos Shabbos 1:6):

“עָשָׂה מַעֲשֶׂה וְנַעֲשֵׂית בִּגְלָלוֹ מְלָאכָה שֶׁוַּדַּאי תֵּעָשֶׂה בִּשְׁבִיל אוֹתוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא נִתְכַּוֵּן לָהּ חַיָּב. שֶׁהַדָּבָר יָדוּעַ שֶׁאִי אֶפְשָׁר שֶׁלֹּא תֵּעָשֶׂה אוֹתָהּ מְלָאכָה. כֵּיצַד. הֲרֵי שֶׁצָּרִיךְ לְרֹאשׁ עוֹף לְצַחֵק בּוֹ הַקָּטָן וְחָתַךְ רֹאשׁוֹ בְּשַׁבָּת אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין סוֹף מְגַמָּתוֹ לַהֲרִיגַת הָעוֹף בִּלְבַד חַיָּב שֶׁהַדָּבָר יָדוּעַ שֶׁאִי אֶפְשָׁר שֶׁיַּחְתֹּךְ רֹאשׁ הַחַי וְיִחְיֶה אֶלָּא הַמָּוֶת בָּא בִּשְׁבִילוֹ.”

“When one performs a deed that results in the performance of a forbidden labor, and it is a certainty that this deed will cause [that labor] to be performed, one is liable…

For example, if someone needed the head of a chicken to play with and cut it off on Shabbos, even though his primary intent wasn’t to kill the chicken, he’s liable because it’s well known that it’s impossible to cut off the head of a living creature without it dying.” This shows that cutting off the head itself isn’t a melacha, and if such an important limb like the head wouldn’t be considered “taking life” if the animal remained alive, all the more so with other limbs; and there’s no need to discuss cutting flesh and skin in general. Cutting off part of a fetus is different because although the fetus is considered part of the mother, like one of her limbs, it’s still a complete being, and its growth depends on the mother. By removing it from its growth place, you’re taking its life from it. And this is exactly what the Gemara was mechadesh, that even in such a case, one would be liable on Shabbos.

Even if we accept the Avnei Nezer’s understanding of the Rambam that even a limb has “taking life” from that limb (and according to the Ramban in Perek Shmoneh Sheratzim, this is certainly the case), there wouldn’t be “taking life” in cutting a piece of flesh less than an olive-sized portion, which doesn’t render one impure, because of the reasoning he gave. We should also take into account the Rambam’s view regarding cutting off a wart from one’s body, which isn’t a melacha d’Oraisa (Hilchos Shabbos 9:8).

There are two additional reasons why cutting a piece from the snail doesn’t constitute “taking life.” The first is what the Ritva brought in Shabbos 75b in the name of his teachers to explain that the halazon is different because it doesn’t have limbs but rather a solid body like the snails found in refuse, and in such a case, there’s no “taking life” unless you completely remove all its life. And although the Ritva himself was only talking about bloodletting, the same reasoning applies to cutting off a piece of flesh. (Although halazonim have small limbs, one could say that since they’re small and not noticeable, the entire body is considered solid.) The second is what’s brought in the Shita Mekubetzes in Kesubos 5b in the name of R”i, that if the reason for the prohibition of making a wound is due to causing a deterioration, it’s understandable why there wouldn’t be “taking life” in bloodletting from a halazon, “since there’s no need for it to deteriorate.” The same applies to cutting off a piece of flesh or even a limb if there’s no need for the piece or limb itself but only for the blood, as is the case here; there wouldn’t be liability for “taking life.”

And if we follow the Shita Mekubetzes that there’s a prohibition of shearing in mila, there’s a special reason for mila – that it’s a mitzvah for a Jew to be circumcised, and it’s similar to removing nails or cutting hair, as explained by the Acharonim (Minchas Chinuch, Musach HaShabbos, melacha of shearing, os 8; Davar Avraham vol. 2 siman 23; Avnei Nezer O.C. siman 131), which isn’t the case when cutting flesh from the halazon.

It’s also important to remember that according to R’ Yochanan in the Bavli and according to everyone in the Yerushalmi, there is indeed “taking life” in wounding a halazon.

Practically speaking, the way the snail is processed today by cutting off a piece of flesh isn’t necessary at all for extracting the blood. It’s done merely as a precaution to remove the rest of the snail. It would definitely be possible to wound it and leave the entire snail, and the blood would flow out on its own, and some even say that this method is more effective for dyeing. Therefore, all that we’ve said above isn’t necessary, and there’s no question at all about cutting a piece from a living creature.

Regarding the claim that the dye is good and effective even an hour or two after death, which contradicts the Gemara in Shabbos 75a – on the contrary, it aligns perfectly with the Gemara there, which states, “R’ Yochanan said, when you wound it after it’s dead,” from which we see that you can wound a dead snail and still get good and effective dye.

Regarding what you cited from R’ Avraham, the son of the Rambam, in his response, that the rule “there’s no threshing except with something that grows from the ground” applies only to the primary category and not to a derivative, and that extracting mucus from the snail is a derivative. The words of R’ Avraham themselves need clarification, as we don’t see a clear definition or explanation in his words of why wounding a snail should be limited to the primary category and not a derivative. It’s difficult to raise questions from things that themselves need explanation. I have much more to say on this matter, but this isn’t the place for it.

Regarding what you wrote, according to the Rambam, if one makes an entire string of techeiles from one out of four strings, it would be a violation of “bal tosif” because the Torah only commanded one string, not two. In my opinion, this isn’t considered “bal tosif” because the string mentioned in the verse refers specifically to the wrapping cord, according to the Rambam, as explained in his response to the scholars of Lunel (siman 246, Blau edition). Therefore, the second half of the dyed cord, which isn’t used for wrapping, isn’t called a “string” and there aren’t two strings here at all.

The proof from the Ran regarding the obligation to take the lulav during bein hashmashos on the seventh day of Sukkos, that one is obligated to perform an act that’s a Safek mitzvah – this is the very proof of the Rebbe of Radzin zt”l himself in his sefer Ein HaTecheiles, os 41.

Regarding what you wrote, differentiating between a doubtful obligation and a certain obligation (Safek Chiyuv and Vadai Chiyuv), there’s much to discuss. However, due to a love for brevity, I’ll bring a simple example that shows that even with a certain obligation and a doubtful mitzvah, we apply the principle of “safek d’Oraisa l’chumra” – one who has tefillin that are of questionable validity is obligated to wear them without a bracha, as is clear in the poskim (for example, in the Mishna Berura, siman 39, seif katan 26). This is very much like our case, where there is a definite obligation due to the time-bound mitzvah and a doubt regarding the object, whether it can fulfill the mitzvah or not.

The opinion that the “Murex” snail is the source of techeiles isn’t just the conclusion of scientists, but also the opinion of many of the Rishonim and poskim, whose opinions cannot be ignored – the Raavyah in Berachos siman 25, the Ramban in his commentary on Shemos 28:2, Rabbi Avraham HaRofeh Portaleone in Shiltei Giborim, 5th column, Rabbi Binyamin Mussafia in Musaf HaAruch under the entry “parpor”, the Chavos Yair in Mekor Chaim, vol. 1, page 99, Rabbi Yaakov Emden in Mitpachat Seforim, chapter 4. And anyone who examines the words of Chazal themselves in Sifrei V’zos HaBeracha will see clearly that they identified techeiles with the dyeing industry that was conducted in the territory of Zevulun, as described in ancient historical records.

For anyone whose heart is still unsettled, who fears that this may not be the true techeiles, and is also concerned about the string being the same color as the garment despite the Gemara explicitly refuting this, and the main halacha permitting it, there’s a simple solution to fulfill all opinions – to attach two tzitzis to each corner, one white and one with a techeiles string, with the condition that if the techeiles string is valid, then the white is merely ornamental, and if not, then the opposite, as explained by Mahari Abuhav and brought by the Beis Yosef at the end of siman 12 in Orach Chaim.

I have no doubt that anyone who puts effort into fulfilling a Torah mitzvah, which is equivalent to all the mitzvos, not only isn’t engaging in any aspect of the sitra achra, chas v’shalom, as hinted in the letter (chas v’shalom to even mention), but is actually zoche to the hidden light that no malach or created being can fathom.

With great respect,

Eliyahu Tavger